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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Near East & South Asia**

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# Near East & South Asia

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16 January 1992

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### Ghali Comments on Appointment to UN Post

92AF0215A Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic  
29 Nov 91 pp 20-21

[Interview with UN secretary-general-elect Butrus Ghali by Sana' al-Sa'id by telephone from Bonn and Frankfurt; date not given: "My Job Will Not Be Complicated, But Is Important, Significant;" first two paragraphs are AL-MUSAWWAR introduction]

[Text] Dr. Butrus Ghali's winning of the office of UN secretary general is a medal for Egypt—a victory and support for her in the choice of one of her sons. It is also an honor and crowning for Egypt's international face, Butrus Ghali, with his unique political experience and his enthusiasm and energy in the venerable field of diplomacy. Besides being a position and a dignity, the office is also a mission directed toward the peoples of the world without exception. An Egyptian's assumption of this mission is cause for Egypt to be unequivocally proud. In particular, Dr. Ghali takes office when the United Nations Organization has passed its 45th year. If we apply the idea of what, in psychology, is called "the mid-life crisis," it is to be feared that the international organization may be said to be suffering from some or all the symptoms of this crisis on an international level. This endows the office with great significance and importance. Dr. Ghali will hold the office of UN Secretary General as the organization witnesses a new decade in the shadow of a new world order that follows the disappearance of the cold war and the retreat of ideologies. The international system, therefore, is in need of renewal. Its energies must be charged, its personality must be affirmed, its role must be imposed, the hopes of the Third World must be embedded in its structure and performance, and the concept of international law must be deeply rooted in it. Dr. Ghali is indeed armed with all the means of treatment that the United Nations needs in the remaining years of the nineties and on the threshold of the 21st century. Indeed, Butrus Ghali's history as an international expert and prominent politician is the best witness and aide to him as a new secretary general who possesses the required specifications.

He speaks here to AL-MUSAWWAR in his first press interview after his election as UN secretary general.

[Al-Sa'id] For an international expert and first-rate politician like you, who has probed the world through work in the Foreign Ministry, many shuttle tours, and dealing with numerous international organizations, the office of UN Secretary General should not constitute a burdensome responsibility or complicated job. How do you see it?

[Ghali] The job will not be complicated, but it is significant and important. I have already dealt with the United Nations apparatus, having headed the Egyptian delegation to UN meetings several times. On the academic side, I have written extensively about diplomacy and my practical life. I was the first person to write in Arabic about the United Nations. My first book was

published in 1955 under the title *Al-Tanzim al-Duwali* ["The International Organization"]. Its introduction was written by judge and minister 'Abd-al-Hamid Pasha Badawi, who was foreign minister and the first Egyptian judge on the International Court of Justice.

[Al-Sa'id] Nevertheless, the office of UN Secretary General may be a new experience for you and a fulfillment of Egypt's role in leading the Third World, whether African, Arab, or non-aligned. How do you see it, when the nature of the office may deprive you of serving Egypt?

[Ghali] Who has said this? I will continue to serve Egypt by serving the international community. Although I shall be in New York, my heart, my feelings, and my spirit will always be with Egypt.

### The Human Being First

[Al-Sa'id] Does this mean that the new office will have a negative effect on part of your personal life?

[Ghali] If there is any negative factor, it is that I shall be living far from Cairo, the place that always draws me near. I was born, grew up, and became successful there, and Cairo is even the place where I hope to die. Of course, I will feel an overwhelming yearning for it.

[Al-Sa'id] Do you have the impression that the nature of your responsibility has changed—that you have moved into a new kind of responsibility exercised for others, and not on behalf of Egypt?

[Ghali] Not exactly. On the contrary, there will be indirect gains for Egypt from my holding this office. You will see that there are many gains. Time will tell.

[Al-Sa'id] Some people thought that, in the wake of the announcement of your appointment as UN secretary general, you would cut short your visit to Venezuela and return to Cairo to prepare your papers and other business.

[Ghali] I will go to Cairo early in December after taking the oath as UN secretary general. Before that, I had to finish my last job as an Egyptian and as President Husni Mubarak's representative by attending the summit meeting of the Group of Fifteen in Caracas. This is my last job as an Egyptian diplomat. I was assigned it by President Mubarak and am very happy with it. In Caracas, I will meet with ten presidents who are attending the summit to exchange views concerning my new post at the UN. I have received telephone calls from many people, including President Bush, Mr. de Cuellar, and President Mitterrand.

[Al-Sa'id] Your successes are many, and your political history is replete with many instances of your acting as a man of dialogue and negotiation. What role can the new UN secretary general play to support and strengthen peace?



[Ghali] I hope to succeed in my new job and that the United Nations will be able to play a prominent role in establishing peace and encouraging cooperation between all countries of the world. I hope the United Nations will be able to narrow the gap between North and South. I hope it will be able to defend human rights.

#### Achievements

[Al-Sa'id] One feels confidence about you because of your ability and exceptional capacity for work. I would ask you what, from your point of view, were your most important achievements in all these years.

[Ghali] You have to distinguish between achievements by the time they take and the effort expended on them. On this basis, my visits to Jerusalem accompanying the late President Anwar al-Sadat count as rapid achievements. An achievement that took time was the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel—I participated in the negotiations for it. Then there were the achievements of creating Senghor University in Alexandria and the Fund for Development in Africa. There was the achievement of the Egyptian presence on the African continent. Then there is the new relationship between Egypt and Latin America. The achievements are many. I hope to accomplish many more through the UN.

[Al-Sa'id] There is no doubt that the new office has come to you because you worthily deserve it. However, wasn't this event surrounded by circumstances that certain parties prepared for you and that consequently contributed to the fact that the process did not turn to someone else?

[Ghali] Naturally, I owe this office to friendly countries and political leaders in various parts of the world. I am indebted first to President Husni Mubarak, who smoothed the way for me by great effort and intensive contacts. Moreover, I thank all who helped make me successful. I hope I live up to my responsibility so as to fulfil the tasks incumbent upon me, for they are important and significant.

[Al-Sa'id] What do you hope to accomplish through the office?

[Ghali] To succeed in my new job, for I do not like to have a job entrusted to me and not prove my worth and success in it.

[Al-Sa'id] The responsibility may be sensitive in another way. Hasn't the office of UN Secretary General, since its establishment, historically had to be neutral?

[Ghali] Yes, whoever holds the office must remain neutral. The secretary general is an international employee who draws information from the member states of the international organization. He is by the nature of things neutral, for real authority lies in the

hand of the countries, especially the major ones. The secretary general carries out the instructions of the major countries.

#### Egypt and Israel

[Al-Sa'id] Won't your affiliation with Egypt, a country considered a party in the Arab-Israeli conflict, lead Israel to put everything the new UN secretary general says under the microscope?

[Ghali] I don't think so, as shown by the fact that my identity as an Egyptian did not stand as an obstacle to my being chosen for the office. I would say that the Arab-Israeli conflict has moved past its original phase. It is no longer a trench difficult to cross or surmount. The issue today is being discussed in an agreed framework of negotiation with the United Nations present. The UN role is present in all regional problems; the process is not limited to the Mideast problem. As for myself, I repeat that I am merely an international employee. The decisions are made by the member countries in the UN Security Council and General Assembly. So I hope the member countries will help me in solving many problems. Foremost among them are defending human rights, overcoming the gap between North and South, strengthening dialogue and cooperation within the South, and establishing a new dialogue between the two, as well as helping with the environmental problem and disarmament.

[Al-Sa'id] Along with a new world order has appeared a desire to strengthen the UN role in international peace and security operations. A call has gone out to make the UN role more prominent and effective than it was in the past. What is your view?

[Ghali] The organization's role now certainly has changed from what it was in the past. It has deepened and become effective and influential. This is because the United Nations, during the past 45 years, was subject to the prevailing cold war and the East-West confrontation. With the end of the cold war and the new cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union that has replaced confrontation and opposition, and in the wake of the role the United Nations played in and after the Gulf war, the United Nations has acquired a new standing that enables it to play a new and influential forefront role.

#### Success

[Al-Sa'id] You seem enthusiastic about the new office.

[Ghali] I am very enthusiastic about the office and hope to succeed in my task. Honestly, had it been offered to me ten or five years ago, I would have declined. Today, however, I am enthusiastic about it, happy with it, and proud to be working in it. I hope that the UN and I, as its secretary general, will be able to contribute to the establishment of world peace and stability, the defense of human rights, and the encouragement of cooperation among the countries of the world.

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### **Egyptian Former Ambassador Discusses Lebanese Affairs**

92AF0164A London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic  
8 Nov 91 p 10

[Interview with Hasan Shash, former Egyptian ambassador to Lebanon, by Usamah 'Ajjaj in Cairo; date not given; "Current Situation in Lebanon Not Temporary Truce; Resolution 425 Easiest To Implement"]

[Excerpts] Mr. Hasan Shash, the Egyptian ambassador to Lebanon, has recently completed his diplomatic assignment there, after having lived during one of the most difficult and important periods in Lebanese history since 1988: the presidency of Amin al-Jumayyil, the liberation war, the cancelation war, and the period following the al-Ta'if Agreement. During his presence there, the Egyptian Embassy was shelled and immediately rebuilt four times. Despite the fact that he spent half of his time working in a shelter, he increased the volume of contacts and level of relations with the political and religious leaders that would be the envy of any Arab or Western diplomat. During a ceremony in which he received the highest national award, the Award of the Cedar, the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs said to him, "You were the most important factor in protecting and improving Egyptian-Lebanese relations." It is no secret that Ambassador Hasan Shash is in love with Lebanon. Despite the conclusion of his assignment in Lebanon and in the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he decided to settle permanently in Beirut and to head the Association of Egyptian-Lebanese Businessmen. A few days after his return, "AL-HAWADITH" met him in his residence in Cairo and talked about his experience during his assignment in Lebanon. [passage omitted]

[AL-HAWADITH] Don't you think that the extension of legitimate control over the south, sending Lebanese Army units there, and handing over of arms by the Palestinian factions have put an end to any Israeli pretexts not to withdraw from the south of Lebanon?

[Hasan Shash] I think that although Israel wants security and stability on its northern borders, it has no desire to occupy Lebanese territories. The United States might be serious about finally ending the Lebanese crisis through cooperation with Syria. I am optimistic by nature, and I believe that Resolution 425 is the easiest resolution to implement, and might even be implemented before Resolutions 242 and 338, which will be discussed in the coming peace conference. The danger of sending of the Lebanese Army to the south and the handing over of the militias' arms, including the arms of non-Lebanese groups, will put an end to any Israeli pretext aiming to delay and gain an advantage at the peace negotiations by pretending that she, and not any of the Arab countries or Lebanon, can still decide the Lebanese case.

[AL-HAWADITH] But Israel's desire for the water of south Lebanon is no secret, and that might delay its withdrawal from the south.

[Hasan Shash] Let us say that the water issue is a regional issue. It is not only between Israel and Lebanon, but between Israel and its neighbors, as well as between Syria, Iraq, and Turkey. Consequently, I don't believe that water can be a reason for Israel not to withdraw from the south of Lebanon.

[AL-HAWADITH] are there any campaigns to destabilize the recent prevailing calm in Lebanon which followed the steps taken by the government?

[Hasan Shash] I assure you that the current situation is not a temporary truce. It is the end of a crisis. The gun has been completely abolished and the dialogue has started. What Lebanon now lacks is the capital to rebuild what the war has destroyed. The resumption of military operations is very unlikely, especially now that the militias have been dissolved and their weapons have been moved outside Lebanon.

[AL-HAWADITH] Don't you believe that delaying the arrival of Arab financial assistance to Lebanon is another factor that might delay stability?

[Hasan Shash] Unfortunately for Lebanon, peace returned to it after the Gulf crisis and reconstruction is facing difficulties because the International and Arabic support funds [possibly the International and Arab Monetary Funds] have not honored their obligations in paying Lebanon the two billion dollars, as was decided by the Arabs. I believe that Lebanon will receive in-kind assistance from the Arab and European countries which might help in rebuilding the infrastructure, especially telephones, electricity, and water. However, the situation necessitates the role of the Lebanese emigres in Europe and America starting reconstruction processes and wrapping the situation with confidence so that Lebanon can truly return to the way it was before the war, even if this will take some time.

[AL-HAWADITH] Do you believe that the hostages file in Lebanon is on its way to being closed as a result of the regional and international efforts on this matter?

[Hasan Shash] We must assert here that all religious leaders in Lebanon, including Shaykh Mahdi Shams-al-Din and Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, are against keeping the hostages and want to end this crisis, which is effectively on its way to being resolved, especially after it has been handed over to the Secretary General of the United Nations, who is exerting great efforts to make it succeed.

[AL-HAWADITH] Did your work in Lebanon give you the opportunity to get to know closely those in power there? What do you have to say about them?

[Hasan Shash] I knew President al-Harawi when he was still a representative [in parliament] and lived next to me in al-Hazimiyah. We were very close friends. I find

"al-Zahlawi" a courageous decisionmaker who is working to unify Lebanon, and who does not believe in this war. I also have strong ties with former president Husayn al-Husayni and, despite the severing of relations between Lebanon and Egypt, I often carried his messages to the president of the Egyptian People's Council. Former president 'Umar Karami is a graduate of Egyptian universities. I am proud of the Karami family and I often visited him in Tarabulus [Tripoli] when he was practicing law. I also know former president Salim al-Huss very well and, because of his many relations on the Arab level, we were in contact and good friends even before I worked as an Ambassador. [passage omitted]

### **Relations Between Sudan, Emirates Deteriorate**

92AF0207A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
29 Nov 91 p 2

[Article by 'Abd-al-'Aziz al Sadiqi]

[Text] Abu Dhabi—Official relations between the United Arab Emirates [UAE] and Sudan, which have been enveloped by tepidity since the Gulf crisis last year as a result of the Sudanese Government's position on the crisis, have become even more tepid amid the Sudanese Government's charges of the mistreatment of Sudanese citizens residing in the emirates by the UAE Government, and the UAE Government's categorical denial of such mistreatment in a communique.

In the communique, the UAE rejects these charges, and it does not conceal its exasperation "with the Sudanese Government's actions and positions during the tyrannical Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the continuation of those positions after Kuwait's liberation, which are an expression of the negative sides of the Sudanese ruling regime." However, if the tenor of the UAE's exasperation has been intense, the tenor of the worry caused by accusations levelled by the UAE Government against the 100,000-strong Sudanese emigre community in the UAE has been even more intense.

The Sudanese emigre community—one of whose members during the seventies was Lieutenant General 'Umar al-Bashir himself, when he worked as an officer in the UAE Armed Forces—echoed that worry in a lengthy communique that it distributed to domestic newspapers. In the communique, it emphasizes that "the Sudanese emigre community in the UAE lives in security and safety under the patronage of President Shaykh Zayid Bin-Sultan Al Nuhayyan; the Vice-President and Ruler of Dubayy, Shaykh Maktum Ibn-Rashid al-Maktum; and their brothers, members of the High Council of the Federation of Rulers of the Emirates."

The communique also stresses that "all Sudanese in the state enjoy the respect and esteem of all of the people of the Emirates, and that members of the emigre community never feel or sense that they are living in an unnatural atmosphere."

It adds: "Since the Islamic Front took control of the [Sudanese] Government two and a half years ago, the Sudanese people have suffered from distress caused by the absence of employment stability, psychological security, and personal freedom, all of which are enjoyed in the UAE."

### **UAE's Right To Preserve Its Security**

It should be noted that the communique distributed in the Sudanese emigre community affirmed "the UAE's right to maintain and preserve its security and stability through appropriate means and measures."

This affirmation was consistent with the UAE's denial communique, which stated that "the UAE affirms that the maintenance of its security and stability is the essence of its sovereignty, and it will not hesitate to take measures which it deems appropriate regarding persons who violate laws and regulations in effect in the state."

From a reading of the communique to the Sudanese emigre community and the UAE's denial communique, it seems clear that there is talk of there having been attempts to damage the UAE's security.

According to information circulating in UAE official and media circles, the UAE was, until recently, the arena for a number of leading figures of the Sudanese NIF; and, the front, until recently, was engaged in political and economic activity in the UAE.

These circles state that, when the military coup that brought President al-Bashir's government to power occurred, two Sudanese civilians, who were appointed ministers in the first government formed by Lt. Gen. al-Bashir, were then living in the UAE. One is 'Abd-al-Mun'im Khawjali, who was working as an engineer in an oil company, and was appointed oil [energy and mining] minister. The other is Ibrahim Ahmad 'Umar. 'Umar, who was working in Dubayy and involved in commercial and economic activities, was appointed industry minister.

Although the two ministers have left the government, their appointment to the government was nonetheless considered, in some circles, as indicating that the NIF had special foreign activities in the Gulf region which were considered a source of hard currency.

In addition to the two ministers, a number of leading figures of the Sudanese NIF were living in the UAE and involved in political activity in the Sudanese emigre community. During the Gulf crisis, some NIF cadres pressured members of the Sudanese emigre community, especially those who took positions at odds with the Sudanese Government's position of support for Iraq.

### **Sudanese Embassy Practices Protested**

A number of members of the Sudanese emigre community in the UAE have protested the practices of several elements in the Sudanese Embassy in Abu Dhabi.

These practices include the direct summoning [of Sudanese nationals] to the embassy and the interrogation of the summoned persons, who have included several Sudanese journalists working for newspapers in the UAE.

Also, some Sudanese indicated that the embassy refused to renew their passports. This is considered an extremely serious matter for Sudanese emigres, because passport renewal is linked to the renewal of their residency in the countries hosting them.

A delay in the renewal of a passport sometimes makes it impossible to obtain or renew residency, which exposes the holders of those passports to fines that are beyond the financial capabilities of many.

#### End of Crisis Not in Sight

With the escalation of the Sudanese Government's accusations, and the UAE's abandonment of its media policy of restraint toward those accusations, observers believe that the containment of the current crisis between the two countries is currently not possible.

In any case, sources deem it unlikely that the escalation will lead to a break in diplomatic relations between the two countries or damage to the interests of the majority of Sudanese emigres in the UAE.

#### Amamou on Madrid Conference, UMA Gains

92AF0172A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT  
in Arabic 25 Nov 91 p 5

[Interview with Mohamed Amamou, Secretary General of the Arab Maghreb Union, by Moncef Essalimi in Marrakech, date not given; "Secretary General of the Maghreb Union to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT: 'Priority for Seeing to Concerns of 3 Million Maghreb Immigrants in Europe; Relations With EC Necessary Because of Common Interests'"]

[Text] Arab Maghreb Union [UMA] Secretary General Mohamed Amamou thinks that the Madrid Conference has witnessed a specific shift in the international position on the Middle East problem, as the Palestinians and the Arabs were able to present their case in a better framework. However, he called attention to Israeli obstinacy and delaying tactics, especially in relation to bilateral and multilateral negotiations, which are considered to be an acceptable formula for arriving at a solution to the problem.

In his first interview with AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Marrakech as UMA secretary general, Amamou added that the UMA has achieved important gains in three years. He admitted that there are difficulties and problems in the implementation of 15 agreements signed by the UMA, especially at the bilateral level. The text of the interview follows:

[Essalimi] Your first official assignment as secretary general of the UMA was to participate in the Madrid

Conference. What significant efforts did you make to succeed in your assignment?

[Amamou] The leaders of the UMA honored me by appointing me as the first UMA secretary general, and the assignment to represent the UMA at the Madrid Conference was my first. UMA participated in the peace conference as an observer, with the UMA secretary general representing the five countries.

Our efforts appear under a Maghreb framework—peoples and governments—to support the causes of the Arab nation, foremost the Palestinian cause, being the essence of Middle East issues.

#### Our Participation Came at Palestinian Insistence

[Essalimi] What was your role in the dealings of the conference and on its sidelines?

[Amamou] Of course, contacts were established throughout the conference, but they began earlier. We mention, in this regard, the existing relations between the PLO and the various capitals of the Arab Maghreb. Moreover, the consultations which were going on before the conference continued until the meeting of the Palestinian National Council, which ratified Palestine's participation in the Madrid Conference.

Our participation as a union came at the insistence of the Palestinians themselves.

[Essalimi] Did you make any special Maghreb efforts at the Madrid Conference, as the representative of the UMA, to bring together and coordinate Arab positions on the matters discussed?

[Amamou] Maghreb efforts are ongoing. You will recall that the five foreign ministers met in the Middle East before the Madrid Conference. Dr. [Abdellatif] Filali participated in his capacity as president of UMA foreign ministers, and Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal participated in his capacity as president of the Gulf Cooperation Council foreign ministers.

The contacts, consultations, coordination, and exchanges of opinion were ongoing from the period preceding the conference, first with those concerned, and then with the rest of the Arab states. No doubt, the conference was an occasion to broaden those consultations, coordination, and contacts between the Arab delegations. In this regard, we participated in a meeting of the Arab parties. We also conducted meetings in Madrid at the Maghreb level and closely followed conference developments, especially since it was a starting point for a series of meetings.

In spite of the fact that we were observers, we had direct contacts with all the Arab parties, the conference hosts (the United States and the Soviet Union), and those who were participating as observers, like the European Community.



**Shift in International Position**

[Essalimi] What is your evaluation of the current political climate, following the end of the first round of the peace negotiations in Madrid?

[Amamou] The Madrid Conference has most definitely witnessed a specific shift in the international position towards the Middle Eastern and Palestinian issues.

[Essalimi] If you mean that it caused a specific shift, how did that occur and what are its indicators?

[Amamou] I mean that the Arab and Palestinian sides have achieved this specific shift through what they manifested, achieved, and expressed, especially in the fields of communications and the international media. History has yet to witness a media gathering like the one that took place in Madrid.

The opportunity was available to the Arab delegations, and especially to the Palestinian delegation, to access this opening for greater dissemination of knowledge about their cause, about Israeli practices in the occupied territories, and about the peaceful solutions which the Palestinians keep proposing, in spite of the military nature of Israeli policies.

[Essalimi] And how do you see the prospects for bilateral negotiations?

[Amamou] It now seems that the efforts that were expended in this area were successful in finding an acceptable formula that would make it possible to proceed with the negotiations, which began in Madrid, to their second stage in Washington.

[Essalimi] Do you believe that the capitals of the Arab Maghreb are candidates for hosting a round of multilateral negotiations, for example?

[Amamou] I have no knowledge that the Arab Maghreb region has nominated itself in this matter.

**European-Maghreb Relations**

[Essalimi] What is the agreement that was arrived at between the EC and the UMA after the Brussels meeting?

[Amamou] I recently took part in the Brussels meeting of UMA and EEC foreign ministers, which was also attended by [EC Commission president] Jacques Delors and [Mediterranean] Commissioner Abel Matutes. This meeting—the second of its kind after a previous meeting that took place in Brussels last year—was positive and rich in the different topics which it dealt with, to delineate avenues of cooperation between the two communities, increase the number of meetings at the foreign ministerial level, and to designate some apparatuses to prepare for those meetings.

The agreements reached included contacts between the UMA general secretariat and the EC Commission in the framework of joint activities, and preparation for joint

meetings that will take place twice a year, instead of once, provided the agenda is set beforehand.

**Three Million Maghreb Immigrants**

[Essalimi] What are the priorities to be considered at the European-Maghreb venue?

[Amamou] There is no doubt that at least four Maghreb countries are linked to the EEC with various bilateral agreements. While Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco have similar agreements, Mauritania's situation is different because it belongs to a group of African States, the Caribbean region, and the Pacific Ocean.

From this springboard, we are working to find a common viewpoint on achievable cooperation between the two communities (5+12). Of the main topics that were discussed at various meetings, especially the recent Brussels meeting, was joint development, in addition to the topic of immigration and the Maghreb immigrants in Europe, who number approximately three million people.

For the Arab Maghreb countries, immigration remains the number one priority because of the living conditions that our countrymen encounter in foreign lands. Because of current developments in those countries and the recent changes, in addition to our intention that our countrymen should enjoy conditions of dignity, self-respect, and protection of their rights in emigration—because of all that—we are making active efforts to produce a joint agreement between the two communities (5+12). The third topic, which occupies a special place and is no less important than the first or the second, is deficit spending. That is because, in our opinion, as Maghreb citizens, it would be possible to exploit deficit spending to create projects in the Arab Maghreb region that will introduce growth activity into our countries. In its turn, this will create employment that will enable us to ease the severity of emigration. An incentive for growth activity, the protection of the interests and rights of our countrymen, and retaining our workforce at home would be the outcome.

[Essalimi] There are those who consider Europe's priority to be putting its house in order to be ready for 1993, and to directing its attention to the problems that developments in Eastern Europe are creating. Would this limit (12+5) relations?

[Amamou] I believe that, no matter how great Europe's preoccupations towards the north, its preoccupations towards the south will remain. That is because of the geographic location that draws the two shores of the Mediterranean together; the common interests of the two communities; and the changes that are taking place in the world that dictate the creation of groups; and subsequently, finding the conventions for cooperation between those groups.

### Maghreb Gains

[Essalimi] UMA countries have signed 15 agreements which comprise an extensive legal framework. The UMA's structures and institutions are adequate, yet there those who think that the UMA is undergoing a crisis in operations and implementation.

[Amamou] Less than three years have passed since the creation of the UMA (established in February 1989). For the Maghreb citizen, who has been dreaming about the creation of the UMA for decades, this period might seem long. Not considering the reasons for the delay in creating the UMA, he looks to the realization of this dream and the tangible, direct results it gives the citizen in a short period of time.

I believe that we should not forget that three years, even if it seems like a long time in the life of an establishment or an organization like UMA, is still a short time. In spite of that, it witnessed persistent efforts by the specialized ministerial committees, which resulted in signing 15 agreements in many fields, especially the economic and the financial fields. This is considered a gain for the UMA. There are also ongoing consultations that have come to characterize the behavior of the five states on joint problems and future operations. During the Gulf crisis, for example, extensive consultations were conducted between the five states to seek a solution for the crisis and to limit its deterioration.

### There Are Difficulties

[Essalimi] Do you, then, consider the union to be on a positive course, unencumbered by difficulties?

[Amamou] The union is moving along the path of progress, joint action, cooperation, unification, and integration between the five states, in line with the demands of unification work. We might face difficulties, but I believe that they spring either from already existing measures or from those measures which we have adopted in order to facilitate dealings between the five states under the ratified agreements.

[Essalimi] You did not clarify the political aspect.

[Amamou] I said that some measures might create difficult conditions, but responsible officials should set an example by devoting themselves to remedy those conditions and to seek ways to overcome them, as was the case during the recent joint meeting in Marrakech between the foreign ministers and the coordinators. That is what I mean by a positive posture.

[Essalimi] What is the expected role of the general secretariat, as a newly-created body, in setting up the UMA organizations that were decreed at the recent Casablanca summit?

[Amamou] The general secretariat is one of the union's structures. The 1989 Marrakech Agreement initially stipulated that it should not be permanent. In the course of the UMA's work and development, it seemed necessary

to establish a permanent general secretariat responsible for coordination among the various UMA agencies, monitoring its activities and performing the tasks defined in the decision adopted by the UMA Executive Council in Algiers in July 1990, after decreeing the establishment of the general secretariat, whose role is limited to implementation and coordination among the other bodies.

The September 1990 Casablanca Summit began work to focus the UMA agencies. It decided to locate the general secretariat in Morocco, and selected Casablanca as its permanent headquarters. The same summit decreed that the secretary general should be Tunisian. President Ben Ali nominated me and the leaders of the Maghreb countries supported the nomination. The secretary general was duly appointed and the general secretariat began its work. Its priority projects include the establishment of UMA organizations like the Judicial Authority in Mauritania, the Consultative Council in Algiers, the Maghreb Academy in Tripoli, and the Maghreb Investment Bank in Tunis.

### Transport, Tourism Limited Between Arab East, West

92AE0133A Doha AL-SHARQ in Arabic 28 Nov 91 p 7

[Article by 'Abd-al-Rahim Ahmad]

[Text] Rabat—Difficult land, sea, and air transport stands like a barrier in the contact between the Maghreb and the Arab east [al-mashriq], particularly the Gulf. It is also a barrier to the exchange of commodities and goods that abound in Morocco. These include agricultural products, such as fruits and vegetables, animal products and meat; leather; ceramics; copper products; and art objects. Transport difficulties would make these goods costly if shipped by air or overland, because the cost of air and overland transportation has multiplied. There remains maritime shipping, which is inexpensive, but is slow and often not available regularly. If we look at the air and land routes from the Arab east and Gulf to Morocco and vice versa, we would find no more than two regular air routes between the Gulf and Morocco with four weekly round trips from the Gulf to Casablanca.

These trips do not cover all the Gulf capitals or cities; they only cover Abu Dhabi and Jiddah. They are particularly for passenger transportation and fly over North Africa, which makes the trips long after stops in Tunis and Cairo. If we look at air transport between the Gulf and Morocco via European routes and airports, we find it even more complicated, since a Moroccan or a Gulf citizen heading for either country will have to travel through the Netherlands, France, Italy, or Germany. This means he has to travel across three continents: the departure point in Asia, then Europe, and finally south to Africa.

Naturally, this route, though complicated, is the most crowded as well as the most expensive and the longest

between the Gulf and the Maghreb. This route involves additional expenses which the traveller incurs—especially if he is accompanied by his family—at transit stops in Asia, Europe, and Africa where waiting there is long and boring. We are referring here to passengers, and not to goods, which cannot bear all these complications and waiting. Moreover, goods would have to be transported in commercial quantities, which would increase their prices both for the consumer and the merchant. This would also expose such goods to damage and risk because of the long trip and numerous stops. The overland route between Morocco and the Arab east is by train and car via Algeria and Tunisia, and from Tunisia eastward by car only, then to Tripoli, then along the coastal road to Alexandria. Later, the Red Sea has to be crossed in order to head eastward to the Gulf area. It is a long route involving frequent stops at border checkpoints for passports and customs, refuelling, and resting and eating. Thus, the cost for the traveller or merchant who is shipping goods between the two points will multiply.

There remains the question of maritime transportation between the Gulf ports and Morocco. It is inexpensive transportation, but requires shipping in commercial quantities in order to be profitable, and has to be carried out on a regular basis. There is also need for commercial traffic [between the two areas] before we look for the means of transport. If we realize that what the Gulf area needs for its daily requirements is bottled water, vegetables, fruits, and leather goods, which are available in Morocco, then the lack of cheap transportation on both ends prevents these products from reaching the Gulf.

Tourism is the other aspect of communication. This aspect is also faltering because of transportation problems and the unavailability of transport between the two points. It is also due to the high cost of airline tickets and long distances to be travelled by car. Tourist facilities, hotels, roads, and internal communications in Morocco are excellent. Furthermore, Morocco is a tourist country with a variety of attractions. It has folkloric and traditional industries that attract tourism. Because of its relatively low cost of living, Morocco is similar to developed countries. This has made Morocco attractive to tourists from Europe, Asia, and nearby Arab countries, as well as from the United States and Latin America. Another important attraction for tourists is the facility to travel from 10 different airports in its northern and southern parts, which enables the traveller to fly from them to any part of the country. During the oil boom, Gulf tourists used to go to Morocco despite the long distance. But the recent escalating cost of air transport has halted the earlier flow of Gulf tourism; Also, we should not forget other reasons that are related to the recent Gulf crisis. It can be said that there is a substantial Gulf tourist presence in Morocco that is being promoted by UAE institutions. This is mostly evident in investment in hotels. UAE institutions own many excellent hotels in major cities such as Rabat, Casablanca, Marrakech, Agadir and others, which are major centers of

tourism. These are efficiently managed with the help of Moroccan and international hotel expertise. Also, we find individuals involved in current tourist projects.

A month ago, a meeting was held in the Moroccan capital between Minister of Tourism Abdelkader Ben Slimane and Nasir al-Nuways, director general of the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development. The meeting was attended by director general of the Morocco-Emirate Development Company. The meeting dealt with developing investment in Morocco and the extent of participation by the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development in the development of the tourism sector. The two sides also reviewed issues concerning hotel management in light of the effects of the Gulf war. Discussion also dealt with financing tourism projects, particularly hotel installations. Several feasibility studies to develop this field are under consideration. The studies' results have shown that Morocco, in the language of tourism, has 300,000 tourist beds, and that the past nine months of this year saw the arrival of 2,443,855 tourists in Morocco compared with 2,160,000 during the same period last year; an increase of 13 percent. The results also show a drop in the number of European tourists, whose total during the same period of this year reached 592,686, compared with 954,935 during the same period last year, a shortfall of about 36 percent. Morocco had 5.52 million tourist nights [this year] compared with 8.18 million tourist nights in 1990. In light of this brief review of the tourism situation, we believe that there are possibilities for attracting tourism, as well as Gulf investment.

## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

### 'Ashrawi on Role of Self, Women in Politics

92AE0139A *Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic* 19 Nov 91  
p 6

[Interview with Hanan 'Ashrawi, spokeswoman for Palestinian peace delegation, by Nihayah al-Suwayti; date and place not given: "Palestinian Woman Capable of Initiative, Continuity; Can Bear Responsibilities Denied Her;" first two paragraphs are AL-QUDS introduction]

[Text] Because woman has always formed half of the active—not idle—society, because Napoleon said of her that "she who rocks the cradle with her right hand, rocks the world with her left," and because the social feminist struggle is no less important than the political fight, we interviewed a woman who has raised the name of Palestinian women to great heights. We wanted to prove to all the world that that specific leap in the face of challenges and obstacles that block the struggle calls for woman's equality, side by side with her brother man.

Hanan 'Ashrawi, spokeswoman for the Palestinian negotiation delegation to the Madrid Peace Conference, is the subject of a brief interview that we conducted. We discussed the Palestinian woman, because 'Ashrawi is a



woman before all else, before she became a political star in international and local circles.

[Al-Suwayti] Who is Hanan 'Ashrawi?

[Ashrawi] A Palestinian woman with a Jerusalem identity card; a resident of Ramallah of Palestinian upbringing. Her husband, Emile, is an artist and works in the United Nations.

She studied at the American University in Beirut and obtained a doctorate from America. She taught English literature at Beirut University, and later became dean of the College of Arts.

She entered politics in 1967, the disaster year. Through the student union, she began her activities, gaining experience as a woman and in her accumulating struggle. She relies on human, feminist, and political substance in everything she does.

[Al-Suwayti] In Hanan 'Ashrawi's view, who is the Palestinian woman?

[Ashrawi] The Palestinian woman has combined her struggle and self-confidence with the feminist and national struggle. The woman is sensitive to her senses and her issue, and the issues around her. She fights for the right of self-determination on both the feminist and political levels. She still strives for recognition commensurate with her numbers.

[Al-Suwayti] There is a saying: 'We don't want more women's participation, but rather, we want a complete role for woman, side by side with man, in the trenches, behind the barricades.' What is your comment on this?

[Ashrawi] Equality does not come through individual positions or symbolic positions, or gifts from on high, but rather, through woman taking her equal, appropriate, and confident place, and through proving herself and her work. One cannot differentiate one kind of repression from another, because repression comes as a consequence of a single process.

[Al-Suwayti] What is your evaluation of women's awareness? Have they become aware during these four years?

[Ashrawi] Woman's struggle, awareness, and situation has intensified and quickened in the face of direct challenge. It has not come from a vacuum. It is the result of an accumulative process of struggle, a gradual awareness. It produced a crystallizing of the program of feminist soldiers. This awareness depends on creating gains, a new situation, and protecting it from within an intellectual and conscious framework.

[Al-Suwayti] You are a woman, and we live in a "male" society. No one denies this. What are the problems that you have faced as a woman, a housewife, and in the nature of your job? What is required of you, for the most part?

[Ashrawi] I was born into an equal family. I mean my upbringing was on the basis of equality. We were five sisters, and my father established women's equality in all his dealings. At the same time, I have strong support. My husband is a liberated man; he has self-confidence. He has imposed a "relationship of competition." He has not made me stay at home, only to cook and have children. There was respect, naturally. But in society, I would like to say frankly that, while there is insistence on values through action, the woman must impose her presence and obtain respect. There must not be reliance on individual cases, but rather, on working toward a feminist program to obtain social gains. In my opinion, any gain must be for women as a whole.

[Al-Suwayti] What would Hanan 'Ashrawi like to say to Palestinian women everywhere?

[Ashrawi] I am proud, increasingly confident in myself and my accomplishments. She should hold her head high. She is capable of initiative and continuity. She can bear responsibilities that have been denied to her as a result of attitudes. Moreover, no society, nation, or people can be liberated without liberating its feminine half.

[Al-Suwayti] Hanan 'Ashrawi is a lamp that illuminates the area around her because, as the media and journalists say about her, her answers may be somewhat brief, but they are comprehensive. This is what makes her brilliant. What is your view about that?

[Ashrawi] I do not represent myself. I always represent the struggle of Palestinian women. We cannot make a distinction between form and substance. If the person cannot pursue substance, not to mention abilities, the form of the answers should contain emphasis on the importance of content. Accordingly, they must reflect participation and true awareness.

[Al-Suwayti] Are you satisfied with the role that women have attained in political representation?

[Ashrawi] I am satisfied that women must have a basic role, and so far, political representation reflects that they have not attained this position equitably. Women need to struggle for the awareness to express their abilities.

#### **Delegation Member Al-Kilani on Conference, PLO**

92AE0098B Jerusalem AL-NADWAH in Arabic  
8 Nov 91 p 4

Interview with delegate al-Kilani; date and place not given; "Kilani: 'PLO Has Been, Still Is Legitimate Sole Representative; Our Opposition to Sadat's Move Had Its Justification'"

[Text] AL-NADWAH met with writer Sami al-Kilani, a member of the Palestinian delegation in Madrid:

[AL-NADWAH] Do you believe that you find yourself today at a historic stage in the life of the Palestinian people?

[al-Kilani] From the first moments of the conference, any one of us feels that this is a new stage which the struggle of the Palestinian people has embarked upon. This stage is distinguished by a new approach to the Palestinian national struggle, inseparable from the history of our people's struggle, but it is a new aspect of this struggle.

We now recall all the sacrifices of our countrymen and their struggle: The blood of martyrs and the sufferings of prisoners, exiles, mothers and fathers. This is the basis of the long, historical struggle. At the same time, it is the basis of the legitimacy, wisdom, and courageousness of the Palestinian national resolve, which decided to participate in the conference as a venue for facing the issue, establishing our rights, and the legitimacy of our national struggle.

[AL-NADWAH] You speak of sacrifices. The feeling lately is that we have been hearing of sacrifices during the past four years in the occupied territories. Have you forgotten about the sacrifices of the Palestinian people in the course of 40 years in the 'Ayn al-Hilwah, al-Badawi and Tall al-Za'tar camps?

[al-Kilani] No. The age of the Palestinian struggle is measured from 1917 up till now. From the time of its confrontation with the sinister Balfour Declaration, observed only two days ago (from the day of the interview)—from that date, our people has been resisting and paying the price of its struggle and the defense of its rights.

Moreover, beginning with its struggle against the policy of the British mandate, and on to the pain and suffering of the refugees of 1948, and up to the launching of the Palestinian revolution in 1965 and its contribution to the establishment of Palestinian identity and the beginning of the stage when the Palestinians assumed responsibility for their cause after a period of reliance on the Arab regimes, and until the intifadah, which is now the mighty focus of the struggle and a focal point for the Palestinian struggle.

[AL-NADWAH] For the first time, and during this conference, the Palestinians have offered—in Dr. 'Abd-al-Shafi's speech—the principle of accepting a partial solution. Is this to be considered an acknowledgement of a mistake that was made approximately 12 years ago?

[al-Kilani] This is not the first time that a partial solution has been proposed. In 1974, in a speech by Brother Yasir 'Arafat at the United Nations, the PLO revealed the beginning of practical and realistic thinking that enabled us to express partial solutions. We also must not blame the masses and leadership of our people for losing opportunities, as each stage has its historical characteristics in relation to the general international situation.

The landmarks and details of each stage become intelligible through laborious experiments. This is a natural process, and we must not judge it by looking at it as a case of lost opportunities or not. Even 1947, considered a lost opportunity by some because the positive aspect of Security Council Resolution 181, which grants two states to the two peoples, was not exploited. We cannot blame our masses at that juncture, watching the nation disintegrate unjustly and seeing oppression and injustice before their eyes.

Our opposition to Sadat's move had its justification then, because the region at that juncture was fit—from an Arab, regional, and international standpoint—to achieve a comprehensive solution to all the problems of the region, but that step was a unilateral one.

[AL-NADWAH] When the parties were invited to Camp David, there was a Palestinian flag waiting at the table. And now there is no flag?

[al-Kilani] One does not see any flags here now. Had we seen flags without seeing the Palestinian flag among them, we would have felt the oppression and injustice. That is a positive aspect: When all other flags are absent because the Palestinian flag is absent. There is no inferiority in that.

When the Palestinian flag was raised over Mina House, a solution designated as "self-rule" was proposed. It was accompanied by attending circumstances that made it entirely unclear whether it would be prolonged, in tandem with the problem's future, or whether it was being proposed in the framework of a current and very limited problem.

[AL-NADWAH] When will you return to the occupied territories?

[al-Kilani] God willing, we shall return Friday, 8 November. It is incumbent upon us to meet the masses of our people, which came out onto the streets celebrating the speech of Dr. Haydar 'Abd-al-Shafi. Two tasks are before us: The first is to meet with those masses, draw strength from them, and discover their opinions. The second is to restrain their feelings, happiness, and hopes, because the road is still difficult and long. That is why we shall demand that these masses should keep to the path of the struggle until the end of the occupation.

[AL-NADWAH] Nayif Hawatmah said recently that he is demanding the immediate return of the members of the delegation to the occupied territories. I do not believe that you are returning because of this call.

[al-Kilani] (laughing) No. I am returning to the occupied territories because, at this stage, my mission has ended and I shall return to acquire the momentum of those masses for the next stage. What I heard, and I am not sure of this, because I don't pick up Radio Monte Carlo here, but I heard from my brothers in the occupied territories that Brother Nayif Hawatmah declared in the

announcements that have been released that he is with Hamas and the Popular Front [for the Liberation of Palestine]. He did not mean boycotting the Madrid Conference or the Palestinian leadership, but meant boycotting the American solution or the American administration. There is hope that this is a sign that they are reconsidering their position on participation in the Madrid Conference. This is our hope, because we aspire to a united national front behind this important political movement undertaken by our people, in accordance with the resolutions of the [Palestine] National Council and the Central Committee, after it was prevented from having its leadership participate directly. It insisted on the essence and the content, however, and that the Palestinian people be present at this conference.

[AL-NADWAH] Is the PLO still the sole, legitimate representative, or are the members of the delegation another legitimate representative?

[al-Kilani] The PLO was, is, and will remain the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people based on a historical and struggle-laden right. No quarter, be it hostile, friendly, or neutral is able to withdraw this from the PLO.

[AL-NADWAH] Are you, then, a member of the PLO delegation for negotiation?

[al-Kilani] We are talking about the essence, which is that we are a united people with an acknowledged leadership, and it would not be possible to block out the sun with a sieve. Binyamin Ben Eli'ezer said that he had the files of all the members of the Palestinian delegation and that they are all PLO, and if they were not such, then it was Hamas!

[AL-NADWAH] Is Shamir, then, overlooking a fact that is known to him?

[al-Kilani] Shamir, and even the greatest Israeli extremists, are attempting to block the sun with a sieve.

[AL-NADWAH] What do you say about Shamir's position? Shamir listened to 'Abd-al-Shafi's speech, one of the founders of the PLO, which was written by Mahmud Darwish and others?

[al-Kilani] This is an new indication that Shamir and his government are shutting their eyes to the truth.

[AL-NADWAH] There is a Palestinian demand to halt settlement activity. Is this a condition for the continuation of negotiations?

[al-Kilani] No, this is one of the most important sources of energy for moving the process forward. It coincides with improving the conditions of our people and is a means of showing the Israeli side's commitment to peace. We do not want to say whether this is a condition or not, because that will put the negotiations on a path of action and reaction, and this is what the Israelis want.

[AL-NADWAH] There are various Palestinian opinions regarding the intifadah. Some say that practically, it is finished, while others have demanded that it be escalated. Does the intifadah still exist?

[al-Kilani] The intifadah exists. It is a broad, popular movement that takes on various traits at various times. That is why the intifadah will continue as long as the occupation continues, as an expression of the rejection of occupation. The intifadah is not a mechanism that is remotely controlled by this one or that one, but is an extension of the Palestinian revolution and the PLO.

If the occupier demonstrates that he is serious about peace, then our masses are ready to come out in their thousands and express their feelings.

### Study of West Bank, Gazan Economies

92AE0139B Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 20 Nov 91  
p 8

[Article by Dr. Majid Sabih: "General Statistics of Palestinian Economy"]

[Text] From the first moment of the Israeli occupation, the bulk of the Israeli authorities' attention in the occupied Palestinian territories (West Bank and Gaza Strip) was devoted to imposing a kind of regional division of labor between the occupied territories and Israel, so that the former would be bound to the latter by economic ties in positions of weakness and subservience, and so that the occupied territories would be turned into a consumer market for Israeli goods and a source of relatively low-cost manual labor.

In order to achieve their goals, the Israeli authorities used, and still use, various military, administrative, legal-judicial, and economic methods, measures, and means directly and indirectly to influence economic changes and direct development of the Palestinian economy, in order to serve the interests and goals of the Israeli economy. Accordingly, one can confirm that the objective factor represented in the Israeli occupation and its directed policies can basically be explained by the general statistics of the Palestinian economy, whose highlights can be summarized as follows:

#### I. Imbalance of the Economic Structure

The imbalance of the Palestinian economy's basic structure is seen in the relatively weak importance of material production sectors (agriculture, industry, construction, electricity, and water) in terms of their relative importance in forming the gross local product and the rate they can absorb the labor force, compared with the domination of the non-productive services sector over material value in the local economy. Table 1.1 notes that the percentage of the share of commodity production sectors in the gross local product decreases with the continuation of the Israeli occupation, i.e., it is in inverse proportion to the "age" of the occupation. During the period from 1970 to 1973, the material production

sectors (agriculture, industry, and construction) and the services sector shared about equally in forming the gross local product of the occupied Palestinian territories, while the contribution of the material production sectors decreased an average of 48 percent during the period 1984-1986, compared with an increase in the services sector's share of 52 percent during the same period. It is worth pointing out that Israeli national bookkeeping is done by putting electricity and water under public and social services activity, despite the fact that the former should be within the material production sector. However, one can ignore that in the analysis, because the contribution of electricity and water decreases in the gross local product of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

**Table 1.1: Percentage of Economic Sectors' Contributions to West Bank and Gaza Strip Gross Local Product Between 1970-1973 and 1984-1987**

Sector	Average for 1970-1973	Average for 1984-1987
Agriculture	34.3%	23%
Transportation, Commerce, Other Services	33.1%	35.3%
Construction and Public Works	8.2%	16.7%
Industry	7.9%	8.2%
Public, Social Services	16.6%	16.8%

Source of Table 1.1: Dr. Samir 'Abdallah, "Principal Changes in Sources of National Income for West Bank and Gaza Strip," a study published in magazine AL-KATIB [THE WRITER] magazine, previous source p. 39, Table No. 4/1. I took into account the Israeli annual book of statistics, various editions, and financial and banking conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Among the preparers were Jabir Muhammad Badur, and Dr. 'Isa Ibrahim, Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Committee, Royal Scientific Association, June 1985.

- Note: In accordance with official Israeli statistics, comparable categories are grouped as shown below:
- Agriculture, hunting, fishing, and forestry
- Derivative and finishing industries
- Construction and public works
- Public and social services; water and electricity are included in this category
- Transportation, commerce, and other services; ownership of houses is considered within the context of other services.

On the sector level, the relative importance of the agricultural sector decreased in the gross local product from 34 percent for the period 1970-1973, to 23 percent for 1984-1987. As for the industrial sector, its percentage of share in local production remained approximately constant, since only a slight, almost negligible, increase occurred. Because of that, the relative importance of the

agricultural and industrial sectors together (the backbone of material production) decreased from about 42 percent in 1970-1973 to 31 percent for 1984-1987, while the relative importance of the construction and public works sector in the gross local product doubled. It jumped from 8.2 percent to 16.7 percent for the previously mentioned periods. Perhaps that explains the reason for the material production sector (agriculture, industry, and construction) maintaining its relative importance in the gross local product and not decreasing, despite the drop in relative importance of agriculture and the approximate stability of industry's percentage.

The doubling of the relative importance of the construction and public works sector in the gross local product is attributable to the rise of investment in this sector because of the shortage of housing and the occupied territories' population's dire need for public housing. An important part of their savings was directed toward investing in construction for housing purposes, in order to achieve continual improvement in their income levels. During the seventies, an important part of the Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Committee's budget went for housing activities. This activity took up 16 percent of the joint committee's total budget for 1979-1985 (Table 2.1). This was in addition to government expenditure by Israeli authorities for public works projects, which satisfied the requirements of settlements and the military needs of the Israeli Army in the occupied territories.

**Table 2.1: Distribution of Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Committee Budget for Selected Sectors, 1979-1985**

Sector	Total Percentage
Education	25%
Agriculture	7%
Industry	4.5%

Source: "Production Sectors in West Bank and Gaza Strip, Growth Obstacles and Outlets," Economic Development Project, UN Development Program, Jerusalem, December 1990, p. 21

On the other hand, relatively little attention is given to material production sectors in the Palestinian economy in terms of their share in employing and absorbing the labor force. In the agricultural sector, the percentage of labor force decreased from 39 percent in 1970 to 23 percent in 1987. A slight increase occurred in the industrial sector, inasmuch as it rose from 14 to 17 percent during the same period. As for the construction sector, it increased significantly, rising from 8.4 percent to 11 percent in 1970 and 1987, respectively. In the material production sectors (agriculture, industry, and construction) it decreased from 61 percent in 1970 to 50.7 percent and then to 49.3 percent during these same years [as published] (Table 2.1).

It should be noted that the changes that occurred in the relative importance of the labor force in various economic sectors was in conformity—to some extent—with the changes that occurred in the relative importance of the various economic sectors in the gross local product.

The picture becomes clearer when the sector distribution of the labor force in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip is analyzed separately. In the West Bank, the percentage of labor force in agriculture declined from 42.5 percent in 1970 to 26 percent in 1987. A slight increase of no more than 2 percent occurred in the industrial sector,

since it rose from 10.6 to 16.6 percent [figures as published], while the percentage in the construction sector rose from 8.4 to 12.3 percent during those same years. In the services sector, this percentage rose strongly, from 34.5 percent to more than 45 percent in 1970 and 1987, respectively. (See Tables 4.1 and 5.1)

**Table 4.1: Gaza Strip Employees, by Economic Activity (1970-1988) [percentages do not all total 100%]**

Year	Agriculture %	Industry %	Construction %	Services %	Total Number (in thousands)
1970	21.6	12.1	8.5	47.8	52.9
1975	26.3	12.0	5.1	56.6	46.7
1976	26.5	13.5	4.6	55.4	48.3
1979	21.1	18.2	8.0	53.7	45.5
1980	18.8	18.6	7.3	55.3	46.3
1981	18.0	16.5	8.4	51.1	46.6
1982	17.9	14.8	8.5	58.8	46.1
1983	19.2	15.2	8.3	57.4	45.6
1984	16.5	17.1	8.5	57.9	47.0
1985	18.0	16.2	8.4	57.4	48.9
1986	16.9	17.8	8.2	57.1	50.7
1987	16.0	17.5	8.4	58.1	54.1
1988	18.6	16.3	8.4	56.7	52.5

Source: Same source as previous table, Table 27/21, p 721.

**Table 5.1: Employees in Occupied Palestine, West Bank, by Economic Activity (1970-1988) [not all percentages total 100%]**

Year	Agriculture %	Industry %	Construction %	Services /	Total Number (in thousands)
1970	42.5	14.6	8.4	34.5	99.8
1975	34.6	15.8	8.4	41.2	91.9
1976	33.9	14.9	10.0	41.2	92.6
1979	21.5	15.9	11.8	40.8	92.5
1980	33.2	15.2	10.7	40.9	94.3
1981	20.5	15.7	11.9	41.9	93.5
1982	32.1	15.9	10.7	41.4	97.5
1983	29.5	16.1	11.0	42.4	99.1
1984	28.5	15.9	11.3	44.3	104.0
1985	37.3	16.2	12.4	44.1	103.8
1986	28.6	15.7	12.7	42.0	115.7
1987	26.0	16.6	12.2	45.2	114.7
1988	31.3	15.9	10.7	42.2	119.0

Source: Same source as previous table, Table 20/21, p 721 (without Arab Jerusalem, and without workers from the West Bank in Jerusalem)

In the Gaza Strip, the relative importance of the labor force in agriculture decreased considerably, dropping from 21.6 percent in 1970 to 16 percent in 1987. That is attributable to expanded use of modern technology in agriculture, particularly on large farms, and especially those that produce for export. That was encouraged by the availability of irrigation water sources in

the Gaza Strip. An additional factor was the conversion of large numbers of farmers in the Gaza Strip to the wage labor market, especially the Israeli market, because of the policy of economic integration.

A tangible rise occurred in percentage of labor force in the industrial sector, increasing from 12 percent in 1970



to 17.5 percent in 1987. Perhaps the explanation for this can be found in the increased number of industrial organizations in the Gaza Strip, specifically firms under bilateral contracts for finishing work for the Israeli industry, such as weaving, clothing, minerals, and the lumber and furniture industries.

## II. Economic Subsistence

Israeli policy has led to weakening and marginalizing the material production sectors (especially agriculture and industry), and to establishing the Palestinian economy as consumer-oriented. A surplus of manual labor has been created, which, in effect, transcends [the area's] employment capacity. This, in turn, has forced a vast number of

the Palestinian labor force to emigrate in search of work and sources of livelihood outside the occupied territories, particularly in Israel and the Arab oil countries.

**1. Increased dependence on the Israeli labor market:** One of the results of Israeli policies in the occupied Palestinian territories was the creation of change in the class structure of the Palestinian people. This has led to the conversion of large numbers of rural and urban petit bourgeoisie into a wage-earning labor force. The percentage of wage workers in the occupied territories increased from 53 percent in 1970 to more than 64 percent in 1987, in terms of the total labor force in the West Bank and Gaza Strip together for those years (Table 6.1).

**Table 6.1: Total Labor Force in Occupied Territories, Including Wage Workers  
(in thousands)**

Year	Total Labor Force	Wage Workers	Wage Workers %
1970	173.3	91.7	52.9
1975	205.1	125.9	61.4
1980	215.7	120.5	60.5
1985	241.9	153.5	63.5
1986	261.1	164.1	62.8
1987	277.8	178.0	64.1
1988	281.9	171.6	60.9

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1986, 37, Table 27/23, p 707; and Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1989, 40, Table 27/23, p 723. Annual numbers for 1975-1988 do not include Jerusalem.

Because of the local economy's inability to provide work opportunities, large numbers of Palestinian workers were forced to seek sources of livelihood outside the occupied territories, particularly in Israel and the Arab oil countries. As a result of the rise in world oil prices shortly after the 1973 October War and the increased profits from their oil sales, the governments of the Arab oil countries began to invest a part of these profits inside their countries, especially by creating and developing economic infrastructure projects that led to increased demand for Arab and foreign labor. After the opening of the Israeli labor market to Palestinian workers, their number began to increase rapidly, rising from 20,600 in 1970 to 109,000 in 1987. It is clear from Table 6.1 that the labor force in the West Bank and Gaza Strip rose from 173,300 in 1970 to 277,800 in 1987, i.e., an absolute total increase of 104,500, while the absolute increase in number of Palestinian workers in Israel was more than 88,000. Moreover, the percentage of Palestinian workers working in Israel rose from 11.9 percent to more than 39 percent of the total labor force in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in those same years. It should be noted from the same table that the degree of dependence on working in Israel differed between the occupied Palestinian West Bank and the Gaza Strip, since it was 35 percent of the West Bank's total work force and 46 percent of the Gaza Strip's in 1987. This means that more than one-third of the Palestinian labor force in the West Bank, and approximately one-half of the Gaza

Strip's labor force depended mainly on their livelihood in Israel as their source of income. At times, Israel formed the only source of income, which caused many Palestinian families to be at the mercy of the Israeli economy for their standard of living.

In terms of sector distribution, it is clear from Table 8.1 [Table 8.1 was not published with this article—FBIS] that the largest part of the Palestinian labor force working in Israel is concentrated in the construction and public works sector. From 1970 to 1989, the percentage of workers in this sector varied by only one-half [percent]. As for the remainder, roughly analogous percentages were distributed among the agriculture, industrial, and services sectors. The same table notes that sector distribution of workers in Israel from the West Bank and Gaza Strip changed significantly in the eighties compared with the seventies. Their percentage in the agricultural sector dropped, while it increased in the industrial and services sectors. In the construction sector, the percentage remained nearly constant, since it varied only a little less than one-half [percent]. Perhaps this change can be explained by the structural changes that occurred in the Israeli economy. Developments in technological and heavy military industries and the growth of the governmental services sector—especially the army and security apparatus in the wake of events in the Arab-Israeli conflict after Israel's 1967 aggression—have attracted Jewish labor to these sectors and increased

demand for Palestinian manual labor in traditional consumer sectors and service-performing branches such as commerce, transportation, hotels, restaurants, etc. This was due to the shortage of labor in these sectors.

Source of [unpublished] Table 8.1: Same source as previous table; Table 17/21, p 721, Statistical Abstract of Israel 41, 1990, Table No. 27/21.

From another aspect, the results of one of the field studies indicate that most Palestinian workers in Israel are unskilled laborers doing jobs that usually require physical effort and are characterized as hard and relatively tedious labor. These are jobs that Jewish workers reject, such as construction, agriculture, street cleaning, hotels and restaurants, etc. Furthermore, this study's results have shown that no Palestinian workers in Israel

work in management, secretarial, or clerical jobs, financial institutions, or technological and military industries. These positions usually require a specialized work force with a relatively high educational, administrative, and technical level.

**2. Commercial subservience:** One of the special characteristics of the occupied Palestinian territories' foreign trade is its strict geographical concentration, because most of this trade is with Israel or through Israeli marketing channels, agencies, or Israeli commercial companies. The occupied territories form the second largest market for Israeli civilian exports after the United States. In 1970, imports into the occupied Palestinian territories from Israel formed more than 82 percent of its total import value in US dollars, and jumped to 91 percent in 1987. As regards exports to Israel from the occupied territories, they were more than 46 percent, rising to 79 percent of the total export value in those two previously-mentioned years, respectively (Table 9.1).

**Table 9.1: Trade Balance for West Bank and Gaza Strip in Selected Years**  
(in millions of dollars)  
[some calculations incorrect]

Year	With Israel			With Jordan		
	Imports	Exports	Balance	Imports	Exports	Balance
1970	83.2	20.9	-63.3	3.7	17.2	-13.5
1975	371.4	123.3	-247.9	5.2	51.7	-46.5
1980	582.4	224.4	-258.0	5.5	107.2	-101.8
1985	589.0	181.3	-468.4	8.7	85.4	-76.7
1987	961.2	303.7	-657.5	9.4	78.2	-68.8
Year	With Other Countries			Total Trade Balance		
	Imports	Exports	Balance	Imports	Exports	Balance
1970	12.6	7.1	-5.5	99.5	45.2	-54.3
1975	30.5	17.9	-12.6	406.9	192.9	-214.0
1980	77.7	11.5	-65.2	664.6	242.3	-321.4
1985	61.2	5.7	-55.5	667.9	272.4	-395.5
1987	80.6	3.4	-77.3	1051.2	385.3	-665.9

Source: Same source as previous table, Table 27/11, p 709

The reason for the geographic concentration of the occupied territories' foreign trade is attributable to its monopolization by Israel through the restrictions and measures that Israel imposed. These restrictions prevented the establishment of direct trade relations—import or export—between the occupied territories and the outside world, with the exception of over the bridges with Jordan. The occupation authorities permitted direct exporting over the bridges with Jordan for the purpose of trying to sneak Israeli goods into Jordan and the other Arab countries. As for direct importing by means of the open bridges, this was permitted, but it was subject to various administrative and commercial measures and complications. Moreover, it was confined to a limited number of commodities non-competitive or dissimilar to Israeli goods. With the exception of this means, the occupation authorities prohibited direct

importing or exporting between the occupied territories and the outside world, unless they went through Israeli marketing channels. As one example, Israel stipulated that the exporting of Palestinian agricultural products to the outside world, with the exception of Jordan, had to be done through the Israeli monopoly, AGRISCO. For a short time only, and at the request of European Common Market countries, the Israeli occupation authorities permitted the exporting of certain types of agricultural products, such as citrus fruit and olive oil, directly to those nations.

In fact, these numbers do not reflect the state of Palestinian industry which, throughout the years of the Israeli occupation, continued to form a weak, marginal sector both in terms of percentage of contribution to the gross local product and percentage of labor absorption and



employment. As regards the considerable rise in relative importance of industrial goods in the occupied Palestinian territories' foreign trade, this can be explained by a number of reasons, including:

a. The concentrations of the occupied territories' foreign trade with Israel on industrial goods, in view of the considerable similarity between Palestinian agricultural products and their Israeli counterparts.

b. Encouragement of Palestinian industries whose goods meet the requirements of the Israeli economy, such as construction materials like building stone, bricks, floor tiles, etc., which fulfill the needs of the Israeli construction sector and settlement expansion. Furthermore, various facilities are provided to industries that complement Israeli industry, or the so-called bilateral contract industries, which operate on behalf of Israeli companies and agents in exchange for a specific commission. These industries include clothing, weaving, shoes, leather goods, furniture and lumber, etc. They depend on Israeli companies and importers to supply the raw materials and intermediate goods. This is the case with the ready-made clothing business, where the Israeli agent provides the Palestinian contractor or employee with cut material, which he then prepares and returns to the Israeli contractors. In turn, the Israelis market the clothes in the West Bank and Gaza Strip through Arab merchants and agents, market them inside Israel, or export them abroad, profiting from the cheap cost of the labor, etc. As for other industries that fulfill the population's needs and develop the Palestinian economy, such as food industries, their number has decreased under the Israeli

occupation because of Israeli competition and the absence of administrative, financial, and marketing facilities; and the production, marketing, importing, and exporting restrictions imposed on them by the occupation authorities.

c. The Palestinian industry's considerable dependence on imported raw materials and intermediate goods, because of the poor integration between industry and other economic sectors such as agriculture and construction. In addition, there is an almost total lack of industries that produce the capital goods required for industry, and a lack of local industrial production of the rest of the population's needs for finished personal consumer goods. This has led to a principal dependence on importing these goods, particularly from Israel.

3. **The decrease in the relative importance of the gross local product in forming the gross national product (GNP):** The third main form of the occupied territories' economic subservience emerges through an analysis of the components of the GNP (national income), which is formed from the gross local product and the net income of production factors abroad.

The latter factors are formed from the profit of labor, or from the wages and salaries of Palestinians from the occupied territories working abroad, particularly in Israel and the Arab oil countries, and from the profit of Palestinian capital invested outside the occupied territories by Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The profit from labor is considered the main source of income from production factors invested abroad.

**Table 10.1: Expenditures for Gross Local Product for West Bank and Gaza Strip**  
(market price, in millions of new shekels)

Expenditures	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
1. Private Consumer Expenditures	27.2	69.6	354.7	1298.0	2534.0	3191.0
2. Government Consumer Expenditures	3.4	9.2	52.5	154.0	228.0	212.0
3. Formation of Gross Local Capital	8.9	20.3	88.0	338.0	761.0	845.0
4. Exported Goods and Services	10.2	22.8	96.8	252.0	620.0	689.0
5. Minus: Imported Goods and Services	24.0	59.9	273.9	1060.0	1758.0	2247.0
6. Gross Local Product (market price)	25.5	62.3	218.1	1183.0	3385.0	2790.0
7. Net Profit, Income from Investment Abroad	11.3	20.8	137.8	421.0	789.0	1148.0
8. GNP (market price)	36.8	93.1	455.8	1614.0	2174.0	3938.0
Percentage of Row 6 to Row 1	106.7	112.2	111.5	118.2	106.2	114.4
Percentage of Row 6 to Row 3	34.9	27.7	27.7	28.6	24	21.5
Percentage of Row 8 to Row 7	30.7	30.2	30.2	26.7	24.9	29.2

Source: 1. Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1986, op. cit., Table 27/5, p 687; Table 27/6, p 688. 2. Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1980, op. cit., Table 27/5, p 703, Table 27/6, p 704. Note: Numbers are computed to nearest decimal.

It is clear from Table 10.1 that net income from production factors formed, on the average, more than 29 percent of the occupied Palestinian territories' GNP for 1982-1987, while the gross local product's share of the GNP was no less than 80 percent at the beginning of the

seventies. There are several causes for "net income from production factors invested abroad" having a large proportion of the GNP's components. One of the most important is the increased share of profits from labor from abroad, in the wake of increasing numbers of

Palestinians working in Israel and the Arab oil countries, notably the Gulf states, during the first half of the seventies. The second reason is the slowdown in economic growth rates in the occupied territories' gross local product because of the economic stagnation that has plagued the Palestinian economy since the beginning of the eighties.

It is well-known that the greater the importance of foreign sources in forming a specific country's GNP increases, the more its dependence on, and economic subservience to, the outside world increases. It is true that foreign remittances to the occupied territories contributed to the average increase in personal income and the population's buying power, but at the same time, it has led to an increased degree of economic subservience to the outside world. The result is increased sensitivity to total economic changes, as well as being strongly influenced by economic fluctuations and political events and changes that occur in the outside world. These have—for the most part—devastating economic and social consequences. Perhaps the effects of the Gulf crisis and the flood of new immigrants to Israel, with its negative repercussions on the occupied territories' economy, are significant examples of that.

### III. Proportional Disparity Between Consumption and Gross Local Product

One other general peculiarity of the Palestinian economy is that private consumption alone is greater than the gross local product. One example is that the private consumption expenditure for the West Bank and Gaza Strip totalled an average of 111.5 percent of gross local product for 1982-1987 (Table 10.1). This means that the country consumes more than it produces. As for surplus consumption, it is basically covered by wages from working in Israel and the remittances from Palestinians abroad. This peculiarity is considered a result of Israel's policy of economic integration and annexation, which has led to the weakening and marginalization of the Palestinian economy's material production sectors, and to the establishing of consumerization in the occupied territories, especially for Israeli goods. However, one should not neglect the domestic factor or the "self" factor, represented by luxury and conspicuous consumption and expenditures by affluent groups within the Palestinian population, who share—to a degree—in the deepening and worsening of this economic problem. At the same time, despite the unavailability of precise, reliable statistics on private consumption in the occupied territories under the intifadah, it is certain that there is some decrease because of the growing awareness that the intifadah has crystallized. This awareness is practically embodied in the boycott of Israeli goods and the controlling of consumption through decreased conspicuous consumption and expenditure. In addition, the factor of declining income levels among most of the population has resulted in decreased buying power, particularly at the beginning of the intifadah and in the aftermath of the Gulf crisis and the collective expulsion of Palestinians working in Israel.

In short, this is a lesson that must be turned into a program and model for living, through changing temporary, spontaneous, and accidental consumer guidance into permanent and planned guidance awareness. Growth in the occupied territories has become a matter of necessity and should have top priority; achieving it must be accompanied by sacrificing consumerism—especially conspicuous consumption—in favor of increased savings, investment, and accumulation and, consequently, as much self-dependence as possible in order to achieve it.

#### Footnotes: [not keyed to text]

1. Dr. 'Abd-al-Fattah Abu-Shakr, "Social and Economic Conditions of West Bank and Gaza Strip Workers in Israel," published by the Center for Documentation, Manuscripts, and Publication, National University of al-Najah, Nablus, April 1987.
2. 'Abd-al-Fattah Abu-Shakr, "Industrial Conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories/West Bank and Gaza Strip," study published in the magazine AL-KATIB, No. 117, Jan 1990, Table No. 4, p 25.

#### Modus Operandi of Black Panther Unit

TA0601172091 Tel Aviv HADASHOT  
in Hebrew 6 Jan 92 p 6

[Text] Serious clashes between residents and IDF [Israel Defense Forces] soldiers occurred in several places in Gaza yesterday, in a protest over the expulsion decision. Demonstrations were held in the al-Shati', Nusayrat, and Jabaliya refugee camps in Gaza City. In the Jabaliya refugee camp six residents who tried to attack an IDF position in the area were injured.

The Unified Leadership of the Uprising called on residents of the territories "to intensify the struggle against the soldiers and settlers."

In one of the villages in the Janin area a festive ceremony was held to mark the anniversary of Fatah's establishment. The speakers protested against the expulsion of the 12 Palestinians, which according to them proves that the intention of "the Zionist enemy" is to put an end to the Palestinian people and the peace process. "The ground beneath the feet of the occupiers should be burned, they should be fought everywhere, and the armed struggle should be intensified," proclaimed the gatherers.

Also present in the village was the "liaison officer" of the "Black Panther" unit, who is wanted by the security forces. According to him, the intifadah has recently remained the legacy of armed groups which are keeping up most of the activity against the IDF, settlers and, collaborators. "In the full sense of the word, members of the 'Black Panthers' are Fatah, but they do not receive instructions from the organization abroad, rather they operate in the area in an independent way, and decisions are reached within the group," he noted.

According to the "liaison officer," anytime one is suspected of being a collaborator, members of the group open up a "security file" on him and gather information about him. Only after the information seems well-founded, the suspect is abducted and investigated, and oftentimes in the end he is executed.

### **Delegation Member Warns of Backlash After High Hopes**

*92AE0131A Jerusalem AL-USBU' AL-JADID in Arabic  
30 Dec 91 pp 10-12*

[Interview with negotiation delegation member Ghassan al-Khatib; place and date not given: "Negotiating Delegation Member Mr. Ghassan al-Khatib: 'Our Primary Goal Is End to Settlements; We Have the Means To Pressure U.S. Administration'"]

[Excerpts] In an interview with AL-USBU' AL-JADID, Mr. Ghassan al-Khatib emphasized that the Palestinian delegation will not allow discussions to move on to another subject until the settlements issue has been successfully resolved. He added that "we have the means to pressure the U.S. administration, since it would be unable to establish stability in the area, which would ultimately serve its interests, without our participation."

He described the anxiety of the people as the best authority, best guide, and best control for the delegation's work. He said that initial reactions to the conference indicated the Palestinian [man on the] street has inappropriately pinned greatly-exaggerated hopes on the conference, as if a solution was only a step away. He said that a unified Arab stand is the best guarantee against peril and that "we would have the most to lose should that unity collapse." [passage omitted]

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] How do you view the Palestinian reaction during the conference, and how do you view it in the future?

[Ghassan al-Khatib] It must be pointed out that there are two time aspects to reactions. There were spontaneous, direct, and quick reactions manifested during the conference and after the Palestinian statement. I would like to point out three things here. First, the one positive aspect to that reaction was that the Palestinian side showed that it supports a course for peace and that Palestinians who were, and still are, capable of confronting the occupation in a variety of ways are also capable of self-control and of communicating peaceful intentions whenever the climate is conducive. That put us in a positive light for the rest of the world.

But there were negative aspects to the atmosphere that prevailed during the conference. The first was the unjustified and greatly-exaggerated hopes that the Palestinians pinned on that conference, as if a solution was close at hand, as if the issues were nearing resolution, and as if peace, or peaceful agreement, was an accomplished fact.

These exaggerated expectations are fallacious and unrealistic, and could do serious harm if the conference fails, which is always a possibility to be considered and anticipated by all.

As for the next stage, popular reactions to the Madrid developments were much more mature and reflected a lot more awareness and understanding. Since our return a few days ago, we have been engaged in continuous meetings with the public in various regions, towns, camps, and villages. My impressions may be summarized in that the masses' reaction is first of all an enlightened reaction cognizant of reality. Secondly, it is supportive of the principle of participation and of the Palestinian performance in Madrid.

### **Signs of Awareness**

Many of the questions and observations we heard indicate involvement, awareness, and concern. Indeed, I find that popular concern is the most satisfying thing about such meetings. There is reason for satisfaction, as long as the public is concerned, aware, and alert. We should be concerned and worried over something going wrong the moment the public becomes sanguine and indifferent. Concern is a sign of watchfulness and of interest and awareness. We believe that these sentiments should be maintained because they are the best feedback for us, and the best guide and control for delegation's work as a whole.

The time, in my opinion, is quite appropriate for translating this popular concern and this wide populist involvement by utilizing them and organizing them into populist frameworks and organizations that spring from the base of those concerned masses. That would serve several objectives. First, of course, is to follow up and support the negotiating delegation. Second, is to scrutinize the activities of the delegation as one form of popular political oversight. Third, is to act as liaison between the negotiating delegation and the Palestinian public, especially in the absence of Palestinian information media and also in light of the very dirty war waged by the Israeli media. We need an entity that would act as a link between us and our masses, and that would relay a true picture of the situation. Fourth, such organizations and frameworks, if we are successful in establishing them, could play an important and primary role in public administration.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] Is it true that certain members of the delegation might be changed?

[Ghassan al-Khatib] We are to expect changes to the delegation from stage to stage because each would require expertise peculiar to it. For example, there will come a stage when we discuss the water issue, and the negotiating delegation will have to be changed to include experts in that field, for instance.

There will be a time when legal issues are on the table and we will have to have legal experts among us. Changing members of the delegation is, therefore, a

matter of practicality and is not based on political considerations. We should consider this empirically rather than politically. The composition of the delegation does not reflect many political dimensions. It is important, though, that composition represent all parties and a number of independents. The specific identity of individual members is a technical matter relating to the issues on the table. We should avoid falling into the trap of rigid molds. Each stage will involve specific issues and each issue requires expertise. That is fundamental. The political aspect is the political authority's job—the political leadership of the Palestinian people.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] How can you see as a foundation for building national unity in the shadow of opposition to the conference?

[Ghassan al-Khatib]: I believe that it is legitimate to call for organizing demonstrations or holding seminars in opposition to the conference, since certain elements want to show that there is support for their opposition to the conference. To impose a strike by force, however, is out of line with the democratic tradition. On the other hand, it is a precept of democracy to respect legitimate institutions. Various political entities must respect the legitimacy of the decision to take this step as long as they believe, claim, or agree that the PLO, with its legislative and executive branches, is a legitimate authority, and as long as they are members of it and vote on its resolutions. The National Council and the Central Council [as published] have debated the issue of participation. The majority was in favor and the opposition was a minority. Now that the decision has been made, the opposition should respect the legitimacy of participation on the basis of resolutions by Palestinian legislative bodies. [passage omitted]

#### **Study on Gazan Population, Economy in Year 2000**

92AE0098A Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 5 Nov 91 p 9

[Article by the Jerusalem Center for Strategic Studies: "Gaza Strip in Year 2000: 45.1 Percent Population Increase, Sharp Reduction in Income"]

[Text] A dark future awaits the Gaza Strip in the coming years if the present condition there continues without practical and immediate solutions to confront ongoing deterioration at all levels.

According to various indicators obtained in the last decade, sharp demographic, economic, and environmental crises will become aggravated in the Gaza Strip and will have social and political repercussions that will then be difficult to confront.

Analyzing living conditions for the whole world or for one of its finite regions (a country or a province) is by no means a simple operation. It requires mighty efforts to gather various explanatory data and make an accurate

computation of rate increases or decreases in specified fields followed by clear conclusions.

Several studies dealing with this topic on a global level have come out, one of which is the report "Global 2000," which was prepared by a group of researchers and specialists in various fields at the request of former American President Jimmy Carter and published in 1980. Each of its three parts exceed 100 pages. For the decisionmakers in Washington and all the capitals of the globe, and in order to prevent the occurrence of some likely calamities at the beginning of the next century, the report laid out its account of their world's future if development trends were to continue in the same manner as before the publication of the report. This report is not considered to be the first of its kind, as many similar reports were issued under the auspices of various international research organizations.

On the local level, a report on the Gaza Strip in the year 2000 by a group of Israeli specialists in economics, sociology, planning, and housing was issued in 1986. The Israeli ministry of defense, which is directly responsible for the occupied territories, greeted the report with interest.

Generally, it is not easy to accept the accuracy of such studies in that their conclusions might sometimes be inconsistent. This goes back to the range of accuracy of the data and information gathered and relied upon, the divergence of one source from another, and to the presence of disparate errors in the research methods employed. Nevertheless, it is impossible to deny the authenticity and relevance of some conclusions in the less controversial areas (census taking, for example, and its future predictions). In any case, they present certain trends which are presumably to be studied extremely carefully in order to prevent the problem or to find a solution for it before it occurs. Perhaps, considering its importance, there is insufficient concern on the Arab and Palestinian levels in this field of research.

#### **Demographic Situation**

According to official Israeli statistics, the population of the Gaza Strip was estimated at the end of 1989 at 612,000 inhabitants, a 23,500 increase from 1988. Based on the area's population growth rate during the past ten years, which amounted to 3.17 percent per year, the number of inhabitants will rise to 890,000 in the year 2000, or an increase of 278,000 (45.4 percent, as compared to 1989 estimates).

The situation will become even worse if we were to move forward another ten years, as the number of inhabitants will reach 1.18 million in 2010, with an approximate growth rate of 93 percent over the Israeli estimates of 1989.

Palestinian census data are, however, somewhat different, since the 1989 census gave a figure of 750,473 inhabitants, which rose to 776,826 at the end of 1990—an increase of 26,400 inhabitants. Based on the same



sources, the annual population growth rate for the period 1980-1990 averaged 3.44 percent. If this growth rate were to continue at the same level during the coming years, then the total number of inhabitants in the Gaza Strip would reach 1.13 million by the end of the century, a 45.1 percent increase from 1990. However, in 2010, the number will increase to 1.58 million—a 103.4 percent increase from 1990. That means that the population of the Gaza Strip will double in less than twenty years!

If we consider another indicator for measuring the sharp demographic crisis in the Gaza Strip, the situation becomes more miserable. According to Palestinian estimates, the population density in the region was 2,158 inhabitants per square kilometer in 1990. (Population density = inhabitants/land area; 776,826 inhabitants/360 square kilometers). In itself, that reflects a crisis endemic to the Gaza Strip since the 1948 War. At that time, approximately twice the number of its population migrated there from the cities and villages of the Palestinian coast.

Hence, the population density in the Gaza Strip will rise to 3,130 inhabitants/square kilometer at the beginning of the next century, and will amount to 4,390 inhabitants/square kilometer in 2010.

It should be mentioned that the population density in Israel was approximately 214.8 inhabitants/square kilometer in 1988.

The astonishing population growth in the Gaza Strip over the next two decades will not be accompanied by economic development commensurate with the size of population growth, if we assume that the economy of the Gaza Strip will grow by rates similar to the past decade.

The general average of the real growth rates in the gross local production for the Gaza Strip from the beginning of the 1980s to the beginning of 1987 (which Israel considers a model period) is less than 2.1 percent, according to Israeli statistics. (It goes without saying that this percentage will decrease if we take the intifadah years into account). It is clear that this increase is insufficient to provide the necessities dictated by the population growth rates.

Nor does the picture appear more optimistic for the Gaza Strip's gross national income, as another indicator to interpret the economic situation and the limits of its development. During 1984-1989, the general annual average for the gross national income growth rate was approximately 2.6 percent in real 1986 prices. If we keep in mind that the gross national income for 1989 was \$569.7 million (one dollar = 1.48 shekels), then it would be expected that the amount would reach \$755.56 million in the year 2000 at the same growth rates as before.

In other words, this means that economic conditions will deteriorate relatively, despite an actual increase in national income of nearly 33 percent over 1989 by the end of the century. This deterioration becomes evident when we consider that the individual's share of national

income in the Gaza Strip, which was \$1,169 dollars in 1989 (in fixed 1986 prices), will decrease to \$668.64 in the year 2000, according to fixed estimates for that period.

This will result in a deterioration of living conditions for large sectors of the population, especially for large families and those with limited income.

The population explosion, coupled with worsening economic conditions, will affect the food security of Gaza Strip inhabitants as the individual share of the Gaza Strip's food production will shrink in an unprecedented manner. The Gaza Strip will be unable to meet its food needs, and its dependence in this area will increase, requiring a larger proportion of foreign aid.

There is no doubt that, according to official Israeli statistics, there has been subsequent progress in the production of some basic foodstuffs, like vegetables and meat.

The annual average growth rate for meat production during the past decade was approximately 6 percent, an increase from 6,200 tons in 1981 to 9,900 tons in 1989. Vegetable and potato production increased from 72,600 tons in 1981 to 160,600 tons in 1989, an average annual growth rate of approximately 10.6 percent.

However, the development of agricultural production will collide with the existence of a definite, ultimate ceiling, beyond which no progress is possible. This goes back to demographic inflation and the ongoing encroachment on agricultural land by horizontal housing expansion (examples of this are the private housing projects in the north of the Gaza Strip in areas that were once planted with citrus trees, etc.).

Agricultural development will also collide with the limited water resources, not to mention the severe crisis experienced by the Gaza Strip in water fit for consumption and for agricultural irrigation. The enormous population inflation after the year 2000 will lead to increased demand for water, whether for home consumption or for agricultural needs.

Competent Palestinian sources indicate that there is an annual water shortage of approximately 36-48 million cubic meters, which is being compensated for by underground reservoirs in the Gaza Strip. By the year 2000, this shortage could be doubled because of increased demand to a degree that would require water imports from abroad.

As many researchers have noted, population inflation, deteriorating production, and water and food shortages will lead to environmental repercussions that are more dangerous than the shortage of cultivated land and the depletion of agricultural land. This will require increased use of fertilizers and agricultural chemicals which, in the long run, will have a negative effect on the Gaza Strip's limited water resources.

## ALGERIA

### Coverage of FIS Sweep of First Round of Elections

#### Imam Moghni Anticipates FIS Success

92AF0237A Paris LE MONDE in French 25 Dec 91 p 5

[Article by Jacques De Barrin, special correspondent in Algiers: "A 'Vote for God' in Bab-el-Oued"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Voting is no simple matter. Already, the imam Abdelkader Moghni, a defender of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Bab-el-Oued, suspects the government of planning to take advantage of the situation and "alter the results." "Every afternoon, our sister students are in the mosques educating the women," he explained. The purpose is to familiarize the women with the ballot, which is a long list of contenders to the legislature, to show them how to find the number that has been assigned to the "right candidate" and carefully check the box next to his name. In this section of Algiers, number 11 is a "vote for God."

A vote is a vote. Although they were slow to enter the race, the fundamentalists are leaving nothing to chance in an effort to assure themselves of winning in their fiefdom here, which is important to them as a symbol. Bab-el-Oued, once the exuberant, rebellious district of Algerian-born Frenchmen who flirted with the OAS [Secret Army Organization] in the final days of French colonialism, is now a crowded district of mixed national origins and accumulated frustrations. Is it about to sell its soul to fundamentalism's "bearded men"?

#### 'Climate of Suffering'

"People trust us completely. They like Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj, our leaders who are being held hostage by the government," Mr. Moghni asserted. He is a 32-year-old literature teacher who preaches at the Es Sunna Mosque. "We will trample each one of our adversaries," he added, savoring his words. A product of Bab-el-Oued, he has already spent four and a half years in prison. Are the other candidates, including pro-Islamic candidates, not worthy of interest? "I know nothing about them. It's a sham." It is true that the residents of Bab-el-Oued are too disadvantaged, economically and culturally, to remain unmoved by a propaganda that promises them a brighter tomorrow in the name of God.

In the residential complexes of Diar-el-Kef and Cite de France (which has been rebaptized the City of Suffering), "life is hell," according to one resident. Life is not much better in the "historic" center of the sector, one of the most densely populated in Algeria. Large families are crowded into living quarters so small that some must wait on the street for their turn to go inside and sleep. For the young people who make up the bulk of the population here as elsewhere, it is a tough life. There is

no one to listen to them, to serve as a sounding board for their frustrations. Each has found his own preferred way to kill time: drugs of all kinds, pickpocketing, even gambling in a private club at the Marignan or the El Ketanni, which the FIS municipal government has yet to close down for some strange reason. Of course, the young people also have "trabendo"—a term for illicit dealing in a variety of things. A lost generation? "No, they have come to their senses," Mr. Moghni declared. "It is incredible to see them run to the mosques." There is an undeniable renewal of religious fervor that began some time ago. "From the mosques, the Islamists have been working on Bab-el-Oued for some 10 years," a resident explains. The sermons given at the Es Sunna and Taqwa Mosques by Ali Benhadj and Kamel Guemazzi—representatives of the radical wing of the FIS and now in prison—did much to stimulate new energy. Skilled in communication, the FIS activists were able to channel the anger of the residents of Bab-el-Oued who lost 31 of their people in shooting that occurred in the 1 November sector during the October 1988 riots. The FLN [National Liberation Front] lost all favor with the population as a result, and the prodemocracy parties have never been able to establish themselves in this Islamic stronghold.

Mr. Sid Ahmed Ghazali, the prime minister who wears a bow tie, has "talked a great deal with the young people of Bab-el-Oued" and has concluded, as he said in a recent interview with L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI, that they are turning to the FIS "not at all because of ideology, but because they completely reject the existing system." Mr. Moghni, who is convinced that the district's residents are guided by the hand of God, threatened that, "If 'Bow Tie' came here, he would be kicked out...."

Just the same, there is a faint air of disenchantment in Bab-el-Oued. It does not take a genius to realize that the FIS has not performed any miracles in the cities it manages and that the Islamic state advocated by Mr. Moghni and his ilk is not a panacea. But it is not certain that such realizations will result in abstentions or surprise prodemocracy votes.

Mr. Moghni thinks it would have been better to reeducate the people before placing a ballot in their hands. But, he insists, "we did not want to fall into the trap set by those in power, who hoped the Islamists would shun elections." Whatever these electoral maneuvers may mean, the FIS has the better end of the deal: Its inspectors will be present at 99 out of 102 polling stations in Bab-el-Oued, while the FLN will have inspectors at 72 polling stations. Heartened and relieved, the young imam interprets this good fortune as a "sign from God."

#### FIS Sponsored Rally Held in Algiers

92AF0237B Paris LE MONDE in French 25 Dec 91 p 5

[Text] AFP—Between 150,000 and 200,000 people attended a rally held by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) on Monday 23 December at the Olympic stadium in Algiers, according to estimates by journalists. The

leaders of the FIS expressed certainty that their movement will win 70 percent of votes in the legislative elections, provided the election is not "rigged," they stated.

### Ghozali Tours Country Prior to Election

92AF0237C Paris LE MONDE in French 25 Dec 91 p 5

[Article by George Marion, special correspondent in Algiers: "Ghozali, an Undeclared Candidate"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Algiers—Mr. Sid Ahmed Ghozali is the man who, on becoming prime minister in June, said that he would not be a candidate. Let's take him at his word and assume that he is not a candidate. If he has spent the past several weeks visiting each of country's wilayas one by one, it is not to conduct an election campaign as the skeptics have suggested; he is merely doing his job as prime minister.

On Saturday 21 December, Mr. Ghozali started out on the last leg of his journey through the west. He would return to Algiers only a few hours before the polls opened, having logged more mileage on his tour through the south, east, and west than any of the other political leaders who have been crisscrossing the country in efforts to reinforce their activists' enthusiasm and persuade voters to make the right choice at the polls.

But come to think of it, which office is Mr. Ghozali not running for? A legislative post, of course. As pledged, neither he nor any of his ministers have entered the race. Only one member of his governing team failed to honor the pledge: Mr. Ali Benfils, who was minister of justice until recently and who had no intention of submitting to that limitation. In July, he abandoned his ministerial portfolio to become the candidate of the FLN [National Liberation Front] in Batna. On every other subject, Mr. Ghozali has remained very vague. To those who remarked that his economic program was too ambitious to be undertaken by a government facing a countdown to legislative elections, Mr. Ghozali replied that elections were no reason to delay the urgent decisions before him.

### A Deep Enmity

But, the question is no longer posed in the same terms. The "ship of Algeria" now has not only a destination, but a captain as well, and he intends to stay at the helm: Mr. Ghozali is a candidate to succeed himself and he no longer makes a secret of it. The outcome will depend upon Algeria's president and, to an even greater degree, the new majority in the House as of the evening of 16 January after the second round of voting. But the prime minister now firmly believes that no political party will be in a position to call the shots on its own. The FLN has raised the prospect of a government of national unity; Mr. Ghozali's close associates reply that a coalition government is the more likely scenario.

This subtle distinction reflects a desire to reduce the FLN, particularly its current leadership as embodied in Mr. Mouloud Hamrouche, the former prime minister, to a minority party. While Mr. Hamrouche claims to be willing to share power with all parties having a significant presence in the House (including the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front]), Mr. Ghozali sees himself governing with a majority made up of future legislators from the Front of Socialist Forces (FFS), the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), moderate "Islamists," and most of all, independents who he hopes will win a large number of seats the legislature. Not to mention a few FLN representatives who, once elected, could well desert their leader. This scenario explains the prime minister's travels in the provinces where he has spared no effort to support the independent candidates. Many of the independents are FLN renegades, in reality. Prevented from running as FLN candidates by Mr. Mouloud Hamrouche and his friends, they sought refuge with the current prime minister who also has the support of the influential National Association of Former Mudjahedin (ONM), which is in the process of breaking off its traditional ties to the FLN.

If the maneuver succeeds, it will give rise to nasty reprisals at the special convention that the FLN is scheduled to hold after the elections. "The real electoral battle will be played out there," one of the prime minister's close associates predicts. Mr. Ghozali hopes to sideline once and for all Mr. Hamrouche for whom he feels a deep enmity that is increasingly visible. The feeling is mutual, by the way. Only one point remains unsettled: whether the voters will confirm Mr. Ghozali's forecasts when they go to the polls. That is no minor detail.

### Tallying Votes Described

92AF0237D Paris LE MONDE in French 28 Dec 91 p 3

[Article by Jacques De Barrin, special correspondent in Algiers: "Under the Watchful Eye of Election Officials"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Algiers—"I stretched the rules a bit," an old woman admitted without remorse as she left a polling site set up in an elementary school classroom in Blida, one-half hour from Algiers by car. Unable to read or to write, she had her grandson accompany her into the voting booth where she checked the proper box on the ballot. An observer reported the incident, but purely for the sake of form in the accommodating mood projected here. "Children who have not yet reached the age of reason can help their parents without influencing them," a government official said.

In Boufarik, a large farming town on the Mitidja plain, the sexes are segregated: Men vote at one school, while women vote at another. Few of the women voters are willing to remove their veils for an identity check. Although the supervisor of the polling station claims that the rules are applied to the letter, he eventually concedes



that it is better "to rely on intuition" in identifying those who categorically refuse to expose even an inch of their faces in public.

#### **'Completely Aboveboard'**

In Hydra, in the upscale neighborhoods of Algiers, and in the city center where no fewer than 31 candidates are vying for the voters' preference, such customs belong to another era in the eyes of many. Here, the polling is going smoothly. "Since independence, I have never seen such a flawless election," remarked a member of the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), who had not voted in any election since the referendum of 2 January 1962.

In the Casbah and in other working-class neighborhoods of the capital, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) has made its presence felt, playing the good Samaritan by going to the aid of uninspired voters. By the early afternoon, a fundamentalist observer on watch at a school in Belcourt had already counted "a dozen irregularities, some of them serious," which he blamed on the authorities in power. "We, the Islamists, are completely aboveboard," he claimed.

#### **A Closed-Door Tally**

A siren goes off in the courtyard of the Oum-Habiba elementary school in Bab-el-Oued. It is 1930. The polling station closes after staying open an additional half-hour to compensate for a late start this morning. The voting did not get under way here until nearly 1000, almost two hours late, because of difficulty in locating the ballot forms, it seems. For the young supervisor of polling station 152-153, who wants to do things by the book, the problems are only just beginning.

"We try to be as strict as customs agents, and that's an understatement.... Or like visa officials at the French consulate!" says a government official. But he begs the foreign visitor's indulgence: "Don't judge us by your standards."

Once the representatives of political parties have had their badges checked (and two of them have no badge but refuse to leave), the provisions of the electoral law are read aloud and in French. Then, lengthy discussions begin. Weary of battling, two FIS activists eventually impose themselves as tellers.

Behind closed doors, the small group counts the folded blue envelopes in the transparent ballot box, then the number of voter signatures on the registers. Making themselves difficult, the "bearded fellows" from the FIS enter the numbers into their calculators and dispute the totals reached by the other tellers. The tallying of votes does not begin until 2040. A polling station official raises each envelope with a deliberate slowness, pulls out the ballot, unfolds the ballot and raises his arm to display it, announcing the candidate's number and party. When he dares to call the Front of Socialist Forces by its full name

rather than its initials, one of the two FIS tellers immediately calls him to order and suggests that he speed things up.

Twenty minutes later, 62 ballots out of 474 had been laboriously tabulated: 42 for the FIS, 10 for the FFS [Front of Socialist Forces], 5 for the FLN [National Liberation Front] and 5 for other parties. Outside the door to the school, rejoicing Islamists stamped their feet as they waited for the outcome—a foregone conclusion in this district where they have already begun to impose their way of doing things.

At FIS headquarters, a five-room apartment with kitchen in a rather run-down building close to the cathedral, the mood is guarded. The journalists are offered pastries as the spokesman explains in a slightly urbane tone that Mr. Abdelkader Hachani, president of the provisional executive bureau, is in the process of "sifting through the results" with his top staff. It is late at night. The resident of a neighboring apartment, unmoved by political propaganda of any kind, asks that the "bearded night owls" be more considerate of others....

At RCD headquarters, located in a middle-class building on the street once named Michelet, now Didouche-Mourad, the mood is sullen. Mr. Said Sadi, general secretary of the secularist RCD, which is anathema to the FIS, was defeated in Tizi-Ouzou in the Kabylie region by a rival prodemocracy candidate running for the FFS. The party seems to have fared no better elsewhere. A handful of activists are taking it very hard. An Islamist victory? "It looks like a wave of negative voting against the FLN," they remark simply, as if this were a battle that did not really involve them.

#### **Like an Oversized Suit of Clothes**

In an opulent villa in the hills of Algiers, FFS supporters—minus the party's general secretary, Mr. Hocine Ait Ahmed, who did not wait up with them—watch for the first signs of a political rebirth. With few exceptions, Grande Kabylie as well as Petite Kabylie fell into their hands, and in some districts of Algiers, they are in a good position for the second round of voting. "There is no doubt: The three main political parties are the FIS, the FLN, and us," the party spokesman announces. "We will be a blocking minority. And if we have to join a coalition government, it will be solely to make radical changes."

In the FLN's massive waterfront building with its ceremonial staircases and endless corridors, the atmosphere is lugubrious. In an immense reception hall, activists are slumped in arm chairs upholstered with imitation leather; a battery of silent telephones shares a table with tea that is growing cold. Once the only legal party, the FLN suddenly seems dwarfed by these spacious lodgings, like someone wearing an oversized suit of clothes. The "big victory" promised by the FLN's general secretary, Mr. Abdel Hamid Mehri, is not in the ballot boxes. The election is practically a rout for the FLN after a 30-year monopoly on power.

In the FLN, they believe the second round will produce "an awakening of the silent majority," and talk of agreements with the FFS to withdraw candidates who could split the vote. They are also quick to criticize Mr. Sid Ahmed Ghazali, the prime minister. "I would not like to be in his shoes," said an official. "He hurt the FLN and other parties by seeking an elusive middle ground."

Late into the night, even though it is still too early to project an outcome, the prime minister's predecessor and sworn enemy, Mr. Mouloud Hamrouche, seems to have enough information in hand to call it an FIS "victory" and suggest that the FIS "embrace (its victory) fully to the benefit of Algeria and democracy." An acknowledgement of defeat or a signal?

### Hamrouche Comments on FIS Win

92AF0237E Paris LE MONDE in French 29 Dec 91 p 3

[Article by Jacques De Barrin, special correspondent in Algiers: "A Dismayed FLN (National Liberation Front)"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Algiers—Their defeat is so resounding that some officials of the National Liberation Front (FLN) run out of words to describe it: "It is not a happy moment. This is a catastrophe, a massacre. The voters deceived us. It will be a relief to be in the opposition..." Mr. Mouloud Hamrouche—former prime minister and leader of the "reformer" wing in what was once the only legal political party—does not display his inner moods, even when his heart is heavy.

"With about 4,800,000 votes—roughly the same number that won them the local elections in June 1990, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) has consolidated its position," Mr. Hamrouche explains. "The FLN, for its part, received several tens of thousands of votes more than it did in the last election." However, early in the afternoon of Friday December 27 in Algiers, the figures were rapidly being updated, and very careless was he who relied on them: What was true at 1700 was no longer true at 1800, and the truth was becoming increasingly more difficult for the FLN. The former prime minister ventured a forecast for the second round: "In the first round, the FIS voters turned out en masse. In the second round, we may be in a position to make up some of our lost time and capture 100 more seats in addition to the 17 or so we have already won." If that is to happen, "the abstainers will have to come to their senses and vote, and supporters of candidates eliminated in the first round will have to shift most of their votes to us."

If it has come to this, "it is because we were unable to mobilize the population," Mr. Hamrouche states matter-of-factly. "The FLN has not had enough time to remake its image and come before the voters as an ordinary party." In plain language, the FLN has erased its image as an all-powerful state party. Mr. Hamrouche nonetheless had praise for the "remarkable work" done by the activists "despite the constant attacks by other parties

and the government itself against the leadership of the FLN." The subject very quickly turns to the unpleasant bickering that drives the small talk of Algiers, the running quarrel between Mr. Hamrouche, the "reformer," and Mr. Sid Ahmed Ghazali, the current prime minister known as a "convinced free-market advocate." Mr. Hamrouche faults Mr. Ghazali for—among other things—having "prematurely" (in political terms) opened the door to women voters by changing the proxy voting system: "The men would have given their wives' votes to FLN, but the women cast their ballots for the FIS."

### Limiting the Damage

"The grassroots members are upset by the goings-on at the top!" Mr. Hamrouche remarked. Then, for the greater good of the party, wouldn't it be better to lay the bickering to rest? "Is the party concerned by it?" replies Mr. Hamrouche. "Back in June, Mr. Ghazali went as far as to draw up a letter of resignation!" The quarreling does not prevent the ailing FLN from playing the role of "sole protection against the FIS."

Suddenly, the FIS is on the threshold. How do you cast a bad spell on the Islamists—by scaring people into walking away from them? "I don't believe that sort of talk pays off," says Mr. Hamrouche. He sees the FLN seated "firmly in the opposition" on the day the fundamentalists take power and predicts that in natural course of events the Islamists to "become reasonable."

Unless, that is, the army—guarantor of the smooth functioning of the democratic process—decides to set matters straight. "That could be, but when?" the prime minister asks. "The country would pay a dear price for that step backward, and we would be faced with a painful choice." For that reason, he believes in handling the Islamists politically. But, contrary to the fundamentalists who are trying to make the most of their edge, he believes that President Chadli should serve out his term "so as to give Algeria the time it needs in order to stabilize."

Mr. Hamrouche's immediate plans are to go back on the campaign trail wherever the FLN has a candidate in the run-off election. The FLN's disconcerted activists do not expect any miracle from him. But they hope he will "limit the damage."

### Projected Results, Army Status

92AF0237F Paris LE MONDE in French  
29 Dec 91 pp 1, 3

[Article by Georges Marion, special correspondent in Algiers; first paragraph is LE MONDE introduction; quotation marks as published]

[Text] The Islamist victory in Algeria could trigger an early presidential election. Even before the second round of voting takes place on 16 January, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) is already assured of a very wide majority in the legislature that will enable it to control

the executive branch. President Chadli Bendjedid has been placed in an uncomfortable position, his term not due to expire until the end of 1993. A power-sharing arrangement would most likely prove problematic. An early presidential election therefore seems inevitable. Mr. Chadli should first consider the demand to release the principal leaders of the FIS who have been in prison since June.

Algiers—The victory is already a total one: Whatever the outcome of the second round of voting on 16 January, the Islamic Salvation Front is certain to win an absolute majority in the next Algerian legislature.

In the space of a few hours, while the commentators—calculators in hand—were still trying to estimate potential transfer votes, the FIS went from being the most powerful political party to a party with a large majority. With its score steadily rising with every passing hour, the FIS is about to gain hegemony as a political party.

At dawn on Friday 27 December, the ministry of the interior estimated that the FIS had won between 110 and 130 seats (see LE MONDE of 28 December). One half of a day later, Interior Minister Larbi Belkheir, his face drawn and his voice thinned by fatigue, gave it 167 seats. A few hours later, the figure rose to 189 with the sanction of Mr. Abdelkader Hachani, a member of the FIS executive bureau, who had beat the official election administrators in announcing the figure to journalists gathered at FIS headquarters, thanks to the computers installed by his party.

It was only 1600 and the outcome of the voting in 31 districts was still unknown. At that time, after only one round of voting, the FIS was theoretically in a position to win the 216 seats that would give it an absolute majority in the future legislature. Suddenly, the scores of the other parties (still unavailable the morning of Saturday 28 December) took a low priority. Regardless of the others' performances, the FIS would dominate the Assembly either as of now or in three weeks' time.

Also overshadowed by the FIS victory was the remarkable gain made by the Front of Socialist Forces (FFS) which captured some 30 seats in the first round and stood to win another 10 in the second, killing two birds with one stone: It had trounced its rivals in the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) and outperformed the FLN [National Liberation Front] which, as of Friday evening, had won a mere 16 seats.

Just as the Islamists' victory in the municipal elections of 12 June 1990 led to the present legislative elections, their triumph today will inevitably result in a presidential election in the not-too-distant future, even if the various players still do not know how it will come about. Those still in power, blinded by hope and by questionable opinion polls (which forecast a 30-percent turnout for the FIS), did not expect an Islamist victory. They will now have to improvise, something they have never felt

comfortable doing. Two days before the voting, President Chadli called a press conference, using it to issue final warnings to the Islamists (see LE MONDE of 26 December).

Contrary to his previous promises of an early presidential election, President Chadli announced that he would in fact serve out his full term, which expires at the end of 1993. In addition, he announced that he is prepared to share power with the Islamists, "without any apprehension."

In the wake of the FIS victory, the question is now exactly the reverse: Never mind the president's "willingness," are the Islamists prepared to share power?

#### **Chadli Cannot Hang Back**

Already chastened by the president's manipulative treatment of them after their 1990 victory in dangling the prospect of legislative elections in their faces only to stall for time, the Islamists have lost the spirit of compromise they had back then.

Moreover, there has been bloodshed since then. The grassroots of the FIS, in their overcrowded housing complexes and with their built-up rancors, have not forgotten the lives they lost in June or those killed by the army in the siege of a barracks in Guemar in November. Their massive turnout, all generations combined, is not a "no-vote" against the ruling party, but a radical and definitive rejection of the system that President Chadli Bendjedid symbolizes, whether he likes it or not.

This time, the president will have to take the initiative very quickly. First, he will have to decide whether the electoral process should continue. Does he have the means or the desire to halt the process by cancelling the second round, a scenario some political analysts have not ruled out?

Although possible, it is very unlikely: The elections will probably continue as scheduled, and the Islamists will take utmost care to ensure a smooth continuation. Now that they are sure of winning, the Islamists—more than any other group—would be hurt by a derailing of the process, and they have no intention of being used as a pretext for one. At Friday prayers, by the way, the imam repeatedly preached tranquility and calm.

#### **Question of the Army**

It is not until after the elections that the problems will begin. As soon as the returns are in, President Chadli will be confronted with the demand for the release of the FIS leaders in prison since the unrest in June. He has very little room to maneuver in. As a punishment to him, Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj were placed in the military's hands. What, in July, was meant as an illustration of intentions to reassert firm control has now become a major obstacle to any negotiation.

To free the two Islamist leaders would be to humiliate the army, which has devoted itself completely to the

crackdown against the FIS. Not freeing them would place the head of state in an uncertain position at a time when the Islamist adversary has been given a popular mandate and, consequently, the political tools with which to retaliate.

Soon after that, other problems will surface—the selection of a new prime minister, for one. But that point has yet to be reached. Indeed, it is likely that in line with their persistent demands, the Islamists will require that a presidential election be called as quickly as possible. Will the president have the means to oppose it? What is the president's constitutional legitimacy be worth once the majority of the society swings into the arms of the Islamists who extend no credit to him? Will that legitimacy suffice to dissuade the FIS from making further use of its advantage?

The military is now central to the questions being asked. Many of the Algerians who are hostile to the FIS see the military as their only salvation. No one doubts the army leadership's commitment to blocking the FIS. On the other hand, no one knows the state of mind of the troops and the junior officers who would be on the front lines in the event of a conflict. As an army of conscripts, it is probably being pulled in different directions just as the civilian population is. The army will therefore have to be managed carefully should there be a showdown with the Islamists.

As can be seen, President Chadli is in an inextricable situation. Rarely has he been so vulnerable before. He has no choice but to face the situation clearly. By temperament and experience, he is one who would rather avoid taking firm action and let time do its work. The problem is that time is now on the side of the Islamists.

### Reaction of Expatriate Algerians

92AF0237G Paris LE MONDE in French 29 Dec 91 p 3

[Article by Philippe Bernard and Henri Tincq: "Between Fear and Hope"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] On Friday 27 December when the outcome of the first round of voting was known, the surprise expressed by the Algerian community in France at the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front [FIS] was as great as their indifference during the campaign had been. It was a rude awakening, all the more so because the election had inspired a homeopathic effort in France.

In fact, it would be an understatement to say that the Algerian power structure did not encourage its emigrants to vote. Polling stations had been set up in France for the Algerian presidential election and the referendum on the Constitution, but this time the would-be voter faced an obstacle course. First, he had to visit a consulate to obtain a proxy ballot and then forward his ballot to a trusted individual in his voting district. And so, out of one million Algerians living in France (Algerian nationals as well as dual nationals), only 15,000 over the age of 19 (the legal age of majority) bothered to vote.

Aside from the physical obstacles, the stakes of the battle seemed distant and there is a rejection of politics. "For 30 years, emigration has not been a topic of political debate in Algeria," explains Nacer Kettane, a doctor and a station director for Radio Beur. "People did not vote because they needed to have their passports stamped in order to return to Algeria. Unemployment and school issues in France now mean more to them. Most of the young people were born in France. When they vote, they vote in French elections."

Who would have had their vote? "They have been deceived by the FLN [National Liberation Front] for too long, and the FIS frightens them," says Azouz Begag, a writer and an economist at the CNRS [National Center for Scientific Research]. Other parties—the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) and the Front of Socialist Forces (FFS)—would have taken the vote of many Algerians in France, particularly those who are from Kabylie. That may well explain the Algerian Government's lack of interest in turning out the vote in France.

### 'A Giant Step Backward'

Kader, who chairs an association for the integration of young people, stayed tuned through the night to Radio Beur and Radio France Internationale. He sees the outcome of the first round as catastrophic: "I fear that Algeria is taking a giant step backward and that its ideas will spread to the other countries of the Maghreb," he comments. He did not vote because he was uncertain that his proxy vote would be cast as intended. But the gains of the FIS make him want to become active in the second round. "Algeria is the country of my day-to-day life," he politely explains. "We all have family in Algeria. We may yet come to our senses."

"Without a secular and democratic government, Algeria will not pull itself out of underdevelopment, and France will not be able to settle the issue of illegal immigration," says Amo Ferhati, president of Association Integration in Lille. "If the Algerians abandon the French language, the brain drain and capital flight will accelerate," he continues.

There are new fears for the future of women of Algeria: "I was counting on them to vote down the FIS, but my impression is that they have sad days ahead of them," said a young Algerian woman of the second generation, an activist for integration who nonetheless makes no secret of the pride she takes in "this first democratic and unrigged vote in Algeria." "It may do them well to learn democracy," she declared, as if to reassure herself. The idea is in the air: The success of the Islamists could have an educational value. "Like those who vote for Le Pen in France, the FIS voters in Algeria believe in miracle cures. Let them give them a try and they will see!" says the second-generation Algerian girl. Azouz Begag also expects the Islamists to flounder in the second round. "Let Madani search for the 20 billion Algeria needs in order to set itself on track. The system should be left to



reveal its contradictions." The worst scenario, similar to that of the French far right, is frequently raised by the France's second-generation Algerians and Algerian nationals, and it sends shivers up some spines: "So soon after it was first known, the fragrance of democracy could well evaporate in Algeria," says Kader. "If the FLN is replaced by the FIS, we have gained nothing. The deaths in 1988 will have been for nought."

#### 'It Was a Goulag'

The outlook was less pessimistic following Friday prayers at the Mosque of Paris, Place Puits-de-l'Ermite in the fifth arrondissement, which is owned by Algeria. The results of the first round were neither depressing nor heartening nor ever surprising to the congregation. The breakthrough by the Islamic Salvation Front was expected, even hoped for as far as most of them are concerned, regardless of age.

"We knew this victory would happen as surely as the USSR would fall," said Noreddine, standing between rugs covered with Koranic books and cassettes for sale. The outcome is "logical" and "satisfactory" to them. More than a victory for fundamentalism which they see as a figment of Western imagination, the outcome of the first round is punishment for the FLN's misuse of power. And, paradoxically, the FIS win is a point in favor of democracy. "There was a stifling monopoly; the country was snuffed out," another worshiper boldly claims.

Some openly hope for the birth of an "Islamic state." They have no qualms about a religious "governing party," on the contrary. The same anti-Western tones are heard—as in the Rushdie affair, the flap about Islamic veils in the schools, and the Gulf war. The FIS victory, according to an Algerian student, heralds "the emergence of a generation that rejects a materialist philosophy and believes that the Prophet's principles are worth as much or more than the Napoleonic Code or France's secularist laws."

Aside from the Islamic sentiment, one encounters in Paris and Algiers (proportionately speaking) an more pragmatic and reformist approach, which even fears an eventual embargo against Algeria but recognizes that the FIS victory—if confirmed—offers hope for reform, redistribution of wealth, and new jobs, etc.

Most of these faithful Muslims do not understand why France is fearful. "Algeria is not Iran and the FIS itself is very much divided between pragmatists and extremists," says Sadek Sellam, a writer. Furthermore, there are the unknowns: What will happen between now and the second round three weeks from now? Will the army allow the democratic process to run its course? Won't the ongoing debate of ideas be beneficial to the Algerian society and all of the political parties? The Algerian community in France may well show more interest in the second round of voting than in the first.

#### Editorial Comment Reported

92AF0237H Paris LE MONDE in French  
29 Dec 91 p 3

[Article by Jacques De Barrin, special correspondent in Algiers: "Editorials on The Unknown"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Algiers—On Saturday 28 December, commentary on the FLN's [national Liberation Front] defeat was nowhere to be found in the columns of EL MOUDJAHID, the daily newspaper published by the once unrivaled political party. Its headline read "Three Parties To Contest the Second Round." The newspaper wrote merely that "the initial results are far from representative of the political reality and its many currents."

In place of an analysis, EL MOUDJAHID enumerated the results as if it were writing up a police report and emphasized "the large number of races to be determined in the run-off election." It filled five pages with insipid and repetitive reports from its correspondents across the country who limited themselves to "factual" reporting: "As the Rain Fell over Tipasa," "An Unusual Day in Medea," etc.

#### 'Every Bit as Hegemonistic'

The coverage by the independent press, with its less rigid style, is another story entirely. LE QUOTIDIEN D'ALGERIE used the headline "Earthquake" printed in red ink. In an editorial, Kamel Belkacem spoke of the undoing of the FLN "which has taken the prodemocracy candidates and the independents down with it." He awarded the "consolation prize" to the Front of Socialist Forces (FFS) led by Mr. Ait Ahmed, and went on to question the intentions of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS): "Will it break bridges at the risk of floundering in a fanatic Iranization?"

"The hardest of all are the grassroots supporters," the newspaper wrote. "These people made to beg, abandoned by the power structure, and who see the FIS as their sole salvation..." But LE QUOTIDIEN D'ALGERIE, which published a lengthy exposition of possible scenarios in the not-too-distant future, wrote that "the worst is never certain" and that the FIS could calmly embark on an "Islamicisation in the realm of its choosing."

To LE MATIN, the future of Algeria is "to be decided in the second round." "A political crisis seems inevitable." "The results make a mockery of the forecasts, the analyses, the political arrogance, and the democrats' chit-chat," commented Mohamed Benchicou. "Slightly more than half of the voters went to the polls without knowing for whom nor how they would vote."

"The FIS gained a comfortable position in the National Assembly thanks to indifferent voters, a discredited FLN, and prodemocracy parties of no consequence," continued LE MATIN's editorial writer. "But it will not stop at the National Assembly. It wants total power."

EL WATAN went with a matter-of-fact headline: "An FIS Victory in the First Round." "The Algerians," it wrote, "will assuredly have to contend with a government just as hegemonistic as the one that has fallen." In his commentary, Omar Belhouchet worried about this "leap into the unknown" and the attitude of President Chadli after the second round. He also worried about the "army's reaction." In his view, "a power-sharing arrangement, for a while at least, seems inevitable in order to ensure the country's political stability," but "the first echoes of statements by FIS leaders as uttered in Friday's prayers are hardly calming." He concluded with the question, "Are we not faced with two irreconcilable ways of thinking?"

### Status of Army Position Following Elections

92AF0248A Paris *LE MONDE* in French 1 Jan 92 p 6

[Article by Jacques De Barrin, special correspondent in Algiers: "The Army Could Come to the Aid of Democracy"]

[Text] Algiers—The Algerian Army's hostility to the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) runs as deep as any religion: The Army will not tolerate seeing the "bearded fundamentalists" take control of the country for any length of time. It would grudgingly allow them a brief taste of power, should the voters so decide, but anything more than an "unfortunate interlude" is out of the question in the minds of the military.

The Army and President Chadli (who has a military background) seem to concur in their analyses and to conclude that they must unite to defend Algeria's fragile democracy without giving the impression that the president is a hostage to the Army. President Chadli has, in fact, moved skillfully in recent years to separate himself gradually from those in the Army elite who represented the regime's hardliners (Generals Attailia, Belhouchet, and Benloucif, for example) and to surround himself with new and devoted men like Generals Belkheir, Nezzar, and Guenaizia, the minister of the interior, defense minister, and Army chief of staff, respectively.

### Lying-in Wait for the Islamists

As a result, President Chadli was able to obtain the Army's green light, despite some reluctance, to legalize the FIS in March 1989. He also got the Army to agree to vacate the central committee of the FLN [National Liberation Front]. In the wake of the bloody riots of October 1988, and helped along by the prevailing winds of change, the military warmed up to the idea of a "democracy within well-marked bounds" suited to the country's sociocultural realities.

For a long time, it could be said that this Army of 170,000 men (120,000 of them foot soldiers) lived from the hand of the former USSR, which supplied most of its equipment, tanks, and combat aircraft. All its senior

staff received training in the "fatherland of socialism," although they did not necessarily return with favorable impressions.

Some of them, namely Gen. Nezzar and Guenaizia, also trained at France's war schools. The Algerian military community is well organized, offering its people housing (the senior officers generally own the homes they live in), commissaries, and vacation sites. The wages may leave something to be desired (a general earns 20,000 dinars a month, about 5,000 francs at the official exchange rate), but the many benefits they receive place the military among the privileged who are spared the hardships of widespread shortages. Consequently, in defending a certain degree of democracy, the Army is also defending its privileges.

The Army was unpleasantly surprised by the Islamists' landslide victory, but it does not seem tempted to take the law into its own hands, which it has pledged it will not do, short of losing face and honor. The Army is not interested in seizing power, having realized that military dictatorships are no longer in fashion.

Civilian and military leaders seem to be searching for legal means of blocking the FIS from winning an absolute majority in the National Assembly; if unsuccessful, they will try to think up legal ways of making life impossible for the FIS once it takes power. However, some negotiating cannot be avoided in the early stages of what would be a difficult period of power sharing. The items to be negotiated are the release of imprisoned fundamentalist leaders (to which the Army will probably resign itself, if handled tactfully), and President Chadli's realm of authority, which would include national defense. In that case, the Army would merely have to wait for the FIS to make a few political blunders triggering unrest, and then step in to reestablish the democratic order; should events fail to deteriorate fast enough in the Army's view, it could even nudge the Islamists into a mistake.

### Precautionary Measures

Whatever may happen, the Army is ready to face a test of its strength. The unfortunate precedent of the October 1988 riots—a situation that found the Army wanting—was a lesson to it. Since then, it has prepared to face new tests of this kind. It was, fact, more skillful in its handling of the unrest caused by the Islamists in June. Ready for any contingency, it keeps two divisions specialized in maintaining order (about 15,000 men) based in Bechar in southern Algeria and in Telergma, near Constantine.

In the event of a crackdown, the conscripts—young Algerians serving the mandatory 18 months of military service and who account for 60 percent of the land army's personnel—would not be posted to the front lines. That said, the Army's close supervision of young conscripts seems sufficient to prevent any acts of disobedience that are, indeed, unlikely: As far as anyone knows, the Islamists do not appear to have infiltrated the Army in Algeria as they managed to do in Tunisia.

At his last press conference, the head of the provisional executive bureau of the FIS, Mr. Abdelkader Hachani, tried to sound reassuring on this subject: "We have never fought the Army and we never will," he said. "The Army is the army of the people, and we do not doubt for an instant that it will defend the choice of the people."

For the Army to abandon its task, it would take a nationwide explosion of protest demonstrations of a magnitude exceeding the Army's means or desire to control them. No one can be expected to do the impossible—or the unpopular.

### Speculation on Outcome of Second Round of Elections

92AF0248B Paris LE MONDE in French  
31 Dec 91 pp 1,3

[Article by Jacques De Barrin, special correspondent in Algiers: "One Form of Totalitarianism for Another?"—first paragraph is LE MONDE introduction; quotation marks as published]

[Text] After the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won the first round of voting in Algeria's legislative elections, its opponents reacted by accusing it of electoral fraud and by calling on the forces of democracy to band together before the second round of voting takes place on 16 January. The FIS, trying to sound reassuring, denies that it intends to overturn the country's institutions, and has indicated that it is ready to share power with the president, provided certain conditions are met.

Algiers—Is Algeria about to jump from the frying pan into the fire, voting democratically to replace one totalitarian regime under the National Liberation Front (FLN) by another in the hands of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)? That may not have been the intention of the millions who voted for the Islamists, but many thought that given a choice between two evils, they had rightly voted for the lesser. At a time when the country seemed to lack a plan for the future, the "little brothers," as the Islamists have been nicknamed here, had such a plan, a very distinctive one that took its inspiration from divine law and rejected the socialists and the capitalists as equally misguided.

Even before March 1989 when they were granted official permission to form a party, the bearers of the green banner of Islam had patiently begun to rally a heterogeneous mix of support from all those who, for one reason or another, wanted to change what Algeria had become. The intellectuals were the first. Many of those who had applauded the nationalist views of the late President Boumediene between 1965 and 1975 eventually opposed them as too Marxist-oriented, too far removed from Arab-Muslim culture.

A current of Islamic thinking was allowed to develop inside the FLN itself, despite a totalitarian system that relinquished little of its hold on freedom of expression. At the time, the symbolic leader of that current was Mr.

Mouloud Kacem, once the minister of religious affairs and now chairman of the national commission for Arabization.

As soon as it was founded, the FIS naturally attracted a good number of intellectuals—particularly from the scientific realm, like Mr. Abdelkader Hachani, a petrochemical engineer who now heads the party's provisional executive bureau. In the fundamentalists' language, this intelligentsia discovered a logic similar to its own, in that the Islamists believe the study of religion to be an exact science.

At a more general level, the Arabization policy resulted in the hiring of teachers trained in the Koranic schools and the zaouias (religious secondary schools), and even some from Arabic-language universities in other countries, such as El Azhar in Cairo. These teachers, many of them of a rural background, imparted a somewhat narrow view of the world to their students. Moreover, several thousand Egyptians participating in cooperation programs—many of whom had been exposed to the fundamentalist influence of the "Muslim Brothers" in Egypt—lent support to their Algerian colleagues.

### Interpreting the Koran

The fact remains, however, that this largely illiterate and deeply religious population, unwary of the workings of political ploys, easily fell prey to the simplistic language of the FIS. There was an unstoppable logic to it: "To vote for the FIS is to vote for God;" "to vote against the FIS is to vote against Islam." Those who believed it are people who tend to think that faith is merely a matter of observing certain rituals such as prayer and Ramadan. But they do not know Muslim law or, at the very least, they do not allow themselves to admit that the Koran may be read in several different ways and that the Islamists' interpretation of it could hold some very unpleasant surprises in store for them.

Among those who flocked to the party, there are people who believe they have everything to gain from an FIS victory, and they did not hesitate to help the party out financially, hoping that they would soon be repaid. They are the merchant class whose businesses were stifled by the FLN's bureaucratic and socialistic system, unless they were members of the elite, and they intend to set things straight. Indeed, the Islamists are advocates of the free market ("a term that does not frighten us," says Mr. Abdelkader Moghni, the imam of the Es Sunna Mosque in Algiers), of "opening the borders," in short, of business full steam ahead.

### The Wave of Opportunists

The FIS recruited the bulk of its troops among the vast number living on society's fringes, who have nothing to lose by giving the FIS its chance, who are ready to try anything. In Algeria, among the 15- to 29-year-olds who make up 30 percent of the population, some 3 million young people lack education and jobs. For those left out, the FIS is a way of getting back at the FLN, which put



them in this position in the first place, cheating them through a variety of subterfuges. Stronger still in the minds of these young rebels is the desire "to get back at Algeria," as one young Algerian put it, to get back at a country in which everyone had a chance in the first years following independence whereas barriers now stand in the paths of the most disadvantaged, whether in the form of a selective school system or the underground economy ("trabendo"), which now benefits only the rich.

Their anger is that much stronger because they are constantly drawing comparisons with life on the other side of the Mediterranean where many fellow Algerians work. It has not escaped their notice that to buy a car, for example, a minimum wage earner in France must save up 10 months' pay while in Algeria, he must put aside 200 months' pay. They would like nothing better than "to get out of Algeria," and the sight of Europe closing up, taking away their chances of living there, leaves them infuriated.

The Islamic "wave" swelled just prior to the elections with an influx of opportunists following the tide of history more than their own principles, and those who did not dare to vote for the Islamists in the first round could well turn out to give them a broader margin in the second round.

But there is still the question of the silent majority of 5 million people, who either misjudged or had no inkling of the stakes involved and whose abstentions indirectly helped the FIS in its venture. The FLN and the Socialist Forces Front (FFS) are now banking on this mass of indifferent voters to "come to their senses" and prevent the irreparable from happening on 16 January in the second round of voting.

If the path to power is opened up to the FIS, how will it manage to run the country in the name of a disparate mass of voters without displeasing some? Echoing an impressive and vocal support base, the radicals—in the person of the imam of the Al Arkam Mosque in Algiers, Mr. Mohamed Said—have already warned their fellow Algerians to be ready to change their dressing and eating habits. But Mr. Moghni recently played the card of moderation, promising that "there will be a period of transition—an Islamic state will be built step by step" and that it take "many years" to complete. The negative reaction to the party's electoral performance in some segments of Algerian society as well as overseas, particularly in France, will force the FIS to clean up its language somewhat.

#### "Diabolical" Antennae

Is Algeria about to become another Iran? One thing is certain: It will not be easy for the FIS, despite "beating its drums" for years, to impose its ideas, even if it wins a solid majority in the National Assembly. It ineptly tried to do so after winning 856 municipalities in the local elections of 12 June 1990. The FIS will very quickly run up against socio-economic realities. It will inherit a situation that will require unpopular decisions such as an

increase in the price of bread made with imported flour, which the experts predict will rise from 1 to 3 dinars.

Europe, France in particular, is too close—and Algerians are too attentive to what goes on there—for the FIS to be able to erase all cultural and ideological references to the West. The "fanatics of God" should think about that before they send women back to their homes, revise school textbooks, ban the independent "atheist" French-language press, dismantle the "diabolical" antennae that enable 7 million Algerians to receive foreign television channels, and force the country to tighten its belt. "If they try to ban beer drinking, they will have a revolution on their hands in Kabylie," a local observer remarked.

#### A Desperate Population's "Folly"?

To those who are panic-stricken at the prospect of an FIS government, Mr. Moghni says: "We will never do what the FLN has done. We will never say that the government has run out of money." They promise "to allow free competition" in television and radio, but reserve the right to program "televised courses in Islamic morality." Just the same, Mr. Moghni and his party will strive to enforce the law of God and to draft—"after the presidential election"—a new constitution "inspired by the Koran and the Sunna (Islamic tradition)." According to them, the Algerians who talk of "packing up and leaving Algeria" belong to "very small Westernized minorities."

Will President Chadli be succeeded, as Mr. Moghni hopes, by Abassi Madani, the FIS leader being held in the military prison at Blida? Whatever the answer to that question, the implementation of the Islamic plan—laden as it is with potential misunderstandings and tensions—could open the door to violence and desperate acts of all kinds. In that case, an FIS win (if confirmed in the second round) could turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory, a moment of madness—or a "folly," as one local editorialist wrote—on the part of a population that has lost its sense of direction.

## EGYPT

### Politicians on Significance of Ghali's UN Posting

92AF0216A Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic  
27 Nov 91 p 11

[Article by Shadiyah al-Sharbini: "What Do Those Who Have Known Ghali Closely Say; Usamah al-Baz: He Is Model of Responsible Individual and Figure With International Status"]

[Text] The selection of Dr. Butrus Ghali, the deputy prime minister for foreign relations, to become the next UN secretary general has spread joy, not only in Egypt, but also in the Arab and African countries and at the international level. Why?

Because for the first time ever, a citizen of this continent and this region has been chosen to fill this important international post. This is in addition to the prominent

place that Dr. Ghali holds in his capacity as a professor, cabinet minister, political thinker, and legislator. Yes, Dr. Ghali is all these in one person.

I consider myself to be fortunate for having been one of the students of Dr. Butrus Ghali, the deputy prime minister for foreign relations, when he was head of the Political Science Section of Cairo University's Economics College. He nurtured us with his extensive knowledge, which he never withheld from anybody.

There are many who have known him closely, before and during his service in the cabinet and during the performance of his diplomatic missions. What do these people say about Dr. Ghali and about his selection to the post of UN secretary general?

### Three Important Considerations

Dr. Usamah al-Baz, the Foreign Ministry undersecretary and director of President Mubarak's office for political affairs, was the first to talk to AKHIR SA'AH about Dr. Butrus Ghali. Dr. al-Baz has known Dr. Ghali closely and they have cooperated on numerous important political issues connected with Egypt's foreign policy in its most delicate phases, from the peace journey initiated by the late president Anwar al-Sadat in 1977 up till now.

In his statements to AKHIR SA'AH, Dr. Usamah al-Baz expressed the belief that Dr. Butrus Ghali's selection to the post of UN secretary general has its various aspects and considerations:

"First, his selection reaffirms the world's appreciation of Egypt's status and leadership and the world's recognition of Egypt's significant role at this important point at which the features of a new world order are becoming clear. Moreover, this event gains greater importance by virtue of the fact that it comes at a time when there are growing possibilities that the United Nations will play a greater role in settling international disputes and various international issues, be they political, economic, social, or other important issues that concern the world community.

"Second consideration: It has been obvious that the countries of the world wanted to select a new secretary general who represents the African culture and who belongs to a Third World country. But this doesn't mean that Dr. Ghali is uninterested in international issues that concern the world community or that his interests are regional interests. Ultimately, regional interests in their totality are international interests also. Moreover, international issues concern everybody, regardless of regional affiliation.

"Third, this consideration is connected with the person of Dr. Butrus Ghali himself. The man is knowledgeable in political and legal issues. He combines a strong academic background with long practical experience. He enjoys a prominent international position, whether in his capacity as deputy prime minister for foreign relations or as a political negotiator who has contributed to

the peace efforts and who has taken part in hundreds of conferences. Moreover, he is a member of the International Law Academy in the Hague and a member of the Legists Association in Switzerland.

In his statements to AKHIR SA'AH, Dr. Usamah al-Baz went on to add:

"For Egypt, Dr. Ghali's selection is an event that perpetuates distinction of the great Egyptian figures—distinction beginning with the Nobel prize for literature which was awarded to prominent writer Najib Mahfuz and with the selection of 'Isamat 'Abd-al-Majid to the post of Arab League secretary general, and ending with the selection of Dr. Ghali as UN secretary general.

Of his personal experience in working with Dr. Butrus Ghali, Dr. al-Baz said that Dr. Ghali has been a model of the responsible individual who considers issues objectively and who has absolutely no personal motives in making his judgment on issues. Moreover, he is a man who works hard and with utter seriousness all the time. He has worked conscientiously and with a spirit of public responsibility in all issues on which we have collaborated, such as the peace talks and the Taba issue.

"Dr. Butrus Ghali is also distinguished by being possessed of a researcher's spirit and by his tendency to consult with others. He is not fanatic about any idea, and he believes that two or more opinions are better than one. Dr. Ghali is very concerned with the task of familiarizing the public with politics and he believes that public opinion must be knowledgeable in and must follow up on political foreign affairs."

Dr. Usamah al-Baz added: "Dr. Butrus Ghali has always been interested in recording, gathering, and documenting important political events and in having books issued on such events on behalf of the ministry. He has made major efforts in this regard. He also believes in teamwork and does not like to act unilaterally. He reveres collective action and respects everybody, even the most junior diplomats.

### Dr. Butrus Ghali Is Unique Figure

Dr. Mustafa al-Faqi, President Mubarak's information secretary, has known Dr. Butrus Ghali closely in academia as his professor, and in practical life, when Dr. Ghali assumed the task of minister of state for foreign affairs in 1977 and until he became deputy prime minister.

In a quick interview, Dr. Mustafa al-Faqi said:

"The selection of Dr. Butrus Ghali as UN secretary general honors Egypt and reaffirms its vanguard role in the region. When a UN secretary is selected from the region, he is an Egyptian. When a Nobel prize is awarded to a man of letters in the region, he is an Egyptian. When an opera house is rebuilt in the region for the second time, it is built in Egypt. When the first underground metro line is launched in the region, it is an Egyptian

line. All these things boost greatly the hope—whether in Egypt, in Africa, or in the Middle East—that Egypt will regain its leading and vanguard role in the region.”

Dr. Mustafa al-Faqi added:

“Despite all the immense problems facing Egypt, and despite the difficulties impeding our path, Dr. Ghali’s selection is one of the bright spots that provide hope and that give Egyptians the feeling that their country always produces capabilities that are recognized internationally and regionally. Dr. Ghali’s selection to this post crowns all these concepts. This selection has spread a sort of public joy that has reached the ordinary citizen in Egypt, and even in Arab and African cities and villages. This selection creates among all an awareness of the world’s recognition of Egypt’s status and of its wise and balanced policy, which has made brilliant accomplishments in recent years.”

Speaking to AKHIR SA’AH about Dr. Butrus Ghali’s personality, Dr. Mustafa al-Faqi said:

“Moreover, this selection reaffirms the personal ability and excellent capabilities that Dr. Ghali possesses and which combine academic excellence with a successful political career. He is a capable university professor who is well-known internationally. He is also a distinguished negotiator and an outstanding speaker who masters the language of dialogue with international and regional public opinion. He is also extensively acquainted with the various international issues. All in all, he is a “unique figure” who possesses merits and characteristics that are difficult to find in one person.”

#### Significance of Ghali’s Selection

AKHIR SA’AH has also contacted Ahmad Mahir, Egypt’s ambassador to the Soviet Union and one of the remarkable ambassadors at the Foreign Ministry. He, too, worked closely with Dr. Butrus Ghali at one time as the director of Ghali’s office.

Ambassador Mahir expressed his extreme happiness with Dr. Butrus Ghali’s selection to the post of UN Secretary General and stressed that this selection reaffirms numerous facts, some of which are, in Mahir’s viewpoint, connected with Egypt and some with the international situation, as well as other facts connected with Dr. Ghali’s personality.

Ambassador Ahmad Mahir added:

“First, for Egypt, Dr. Ghali’s selection to the post of UN Secretary General reaffirms the role played by the active and successful Egyptian diplomacy that President Husni Mubarak has led since he assumed the presidency. The president has been able to put Egypt in its proper place in the world and has enabled it to gain the trust of the world community, whether that of the advanced world, the developing world, or of all continents of the world. Egypt’s role has become a fundamental role in establishing the world order and settling regional problems.

“Second, regarding the international situation, the world’s changing circumstances since the end of the cold war between the two superpowers and the start of a new phase bespeak of the UN’s assumption of an active role, not only in political issues, but also in issues connected with human rights and with establishing peace.

“It was natural that the choice for this important international post would fall on a country that is a key to all these issues, not only in its region but in the entire world. Consequently, the choice has fallen on Dr. Butrus Ghali, an Egyptian figure and a capable personality. This leads us, of course, to talking about the facts pertaining to Dr. Ghali’s person.

“Third, Dr. Butrus Ghali’s merits are numerous. He is an experienced diplomat and an expert in international law and on international political relations. He is also a statesman who has numerous and profound connections with the heads of African and Asian states and with others. He combines academic experience with a practical experience which he has gained since 1977 under extremely important circumstances that have contributed to the major developments experienced by Egypt and by the region’s countries.”

#### Human Relations First

Ambassador Ahmad Mahir worked closely for a long time with Dr. Butrus Ghali as Dr. Ghali’s office director. The relationship between the two was strong. On this relationship, Egypt’s ambassador in Moscow said in the telephone interview I conducted with him:

“I was honored to be the director of Dr. Butrus Ghali’s office for a period of time and to work with him closely, and I became aware of many aspects of the man.

“He is extremely strong and he possesses an inexhaustible capacity to work long hours tirelessly. While demanding extensive work and effort from his aides, Dr. Ghali rewarded them with love, friendship, and care. He always appreciated them.

“Dr. Ghali’s personality is characterized by patience, even though he always wanted to accomplish things promptly. But he remains patient with people who deal with him until they learn to accomplish their work in the best manner possible. He understands human nature and realizes that other people’s capabilities may not match his.

“Moreover, when a person works with Dr. Ghali, he always remains the object of Dr. Ghali’s care, even after he stops working with him. Dr. Ghali is interested in human relations and he establishes deep and lasting human relations with those who deal with him.

“Outside official work hours, Dr. Ghali is witty and he loves to laugh and make merry. To him, leisure time is leisure time, and human relations have priority in such hours.”

Dr. Ghali has numerous colleagues and students in the diplomatic and academic fields, and not all of AKHIR SA'AH's pages would be enough to record their opinions on Dr. Ghali. But ultimately, the word which we must record is: "Congratulations to Egypt and to its people on the selection of Dr. Ghali to this elevated international post."

### **Opposition Leader Discusses Party Politics**

92AF0217A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic  
25 Nov 91 pp 63, 75

[Interview with Liberal Party Chairman Mustafa Kamil Murad by 'Abd-al-'Azim al-Darwish; place and date not given]

[Text] Based on the logic that contradictory positions and the replacement of one slogan for another is the "art of reality," which is dictated by the practice of politics as he sees it, Liberals [al-Ahrrar] Party Chairman Mustafa Kamil Murad concludes his interview on "the opposition's cards."

In this second and final segment of the interview, Murad denies that his party has become a mere appendage of the Muslim Brotherhood [MB] because of its alliance with the MB, although members in the Liberals Party confirm this truth.

Mustafa Kamil Murad states: "We are not an appendage of the MB or anyone else. Rather, we believe that the formation of an opposition front is conducive to strengthening political action."

Despite his previous declaration of a boycott of elections for the People's Assembly [parliament], he recently attempted once again to attract independent parliament deputies to the party in preparation for announcing the establishment of a parliamentary organization for the party. "Politics is the art of reality, not of the impossible. We boycotted parliamentary elections, but we did not boycott parliament. Reality suggests that we deal with it."

The party chairman drops a bombshell by announcing his plan to carry out the fourth coup in his political life by attracting to the party all parliament deputies belonging to the National Democratic Party [NDP], thus rendering the NDP "bereft of deputies in the blink of an eye."

Mustafa Kamil Murad reviewed the history of his political life, during which he participated in numerous coups. He states: "I carried out a coup with 'Abd-al-Nasir in 1952, and a coup against Khalid Muhi-al-Din to support 'Abd-al-Nasir in 1954. I carried out a third coup in 1971, and I am now planning a fourth coup, which will overturn the political situation in Egypt."

Mustafa Kamil Murad concludes this final segment of the interview by defending his party against the opinion of many that it is a fragile, cardboard party on the verge of extinction.

Let us begin now:

### **We Are Not a Appendage of MB**

[Al-Darwish] We ended the last segment of the interview amid a discussion of internal divisions in the Liberals Party stemming from the opposition of party members to the alliance formula, which, those bases believe, has made their party a mere appendage of the MB.

[Murad] It is not true. We are not an appendage of the MB or of anyone else. Rather, we believe that the formation of an opposition front is conducive to strengthening political action, to say nothing of surmounting the obstacles, relatively speaking, which constituted the declared reason for concluding the tripartite alliance formula. We believe that this alliance strengthens the opposition and supports its actions and involvement, both in elections and in other areas. For example, we recently organized a conference in Alexandria. All of the parties, except the NDP, attended. Although we have differing opinions, we nonetheless tried to conduct a political dialogue on a political matter concerning the Palestinian issue. We invited the NDP, but it did not respond to the invitation. However, all other parties attended, including political organizations that have not yet formed into official parties. We are holding a political dialogue to highlight the dissenting opinion.

We are not an appendage of the MB or anyone else. Rather, as in a democratic state, we ultimately attempt to form a consolidated opposition front that is stronger than a single party acting alone.

### **Attracting Deputies to Party**

[Al-Darwish] On the occasion of the start of the parliamentary session, some assert that you failed to convince a number of independent deputies in parliament to join the party with the aim of establishing a parliamentary organization for the Liberals Party in parliament.

[Murad] One of our members, Ahmad Muhammad al-Mallah, deviated from the party's decision [to boycott elections] and ran successfully in Kafr al-Shaykh. I cannot say that the party has made a serious attempt to recruit several independent deputies. We will try to do so in the near future. However, I would not say that we failed. We have simply not begun yet.

### **The Contradiction**

[Al-Darwish] However, is there not a clear contradiction between the party's boycott of parliamentary elections and its current attempt to recruit a number of deputies in preparation for declaring the establishment of a parliamentary organization for the party?



[Murad] Politics is the art of reality, not of fantasy or the impossible. We boycotted elections as a matter of principle. The principle here is the adoption of all guarantees that ensure fair, impartial elections. However, the government did not respond to our demands in this regard. Had we entered elections as a group of parties under existing circumstances, we would have had to spend two or three million Egyptian pounds, and we would have left the fair [mawlid] without any hummus [a proverb said of one who gets nothing out of an affair from which he might expect to profit], which is what happened in the 1989 Consultative Council elections. We therefore ascertained that a digression into elections would be to no avail, so we boycotted them.

### The Art of Reality

[Al-Darwish] However, how does the announcement of the boycott of elections tally with your renewed attempts to recruit deputies?

[Murad] This is the art of reality. The parliament exists. We do not reject the parliament itself. Rather, we reject the method by which it is elected. The parliament exists. Nothing prevents us from being flexible and attempting to enlist current deputies to support the party's parliamentary activity. We have three deputies in the Consultative Council. We have one deputy in the People's Assembly. Why should we not try to attract deputies from the NDP itself? Nothing prevents us from doing so. In any case, I reiterate that we do not reject the parliament, but rather the method by which it is elected.

[Al-Darwish] Does the Liberals Party's attempt to attract deputies from parliament mean that the party is remorseful about its decision to boycott elections?

[Murad] We are never remorseful. On the contrary, the decision to boycott was a wise decision. For example, of what value are the six deputies of the NPUG [National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party] in parliament out of 458 deputies? What weight do they have? None. However, I maintain that if the NPUG were to have boycotted elections with us, there would be no opposition in parliament, and it would become clear to public opinion that democracy is merely form without content.

### The Fourth Coup

[Al-Darwish] You attach little importance to the presence of six NPUG deputies in parliament. But you are simultaneously trying to attract deputies to the Liberals Party. Do you believe that you will manage to convince more than six deputies to join your party?

[Murad] Why not? Are you not aware that I organized and implemented three coups and have waged two wars in my life. I led a coup with 'Abd-al-Nasir in 1952 and a coup against Khalid Muhi-al-Din in support of 'Abd-al-Nasir in 1954. I carried out a third coup in 1971, and am now planning a fourth coup to overturn the political situation in Egypt by attracting all of the NDP deputies,

thus rendering the NDP bereft of its deputies in parliament in the blink of an eye.

[Al-Darwish] However, do you not believe that the LP's history since 1976 qualifies it to be the first party to become extinct in the near future, because it is a fragile, cardboard party that lacks public support, as indicated by the fact that the party chairman himself was twice unsuccessful in general elections and obtained only 0.6 percent of the votes?

[Murad] That is somewhat of an exaggeration. How can you say that the party is fragile when it obtained 43 seats in the People's Assembly in 1976, and people said that it is an opposition to be reckoned with? Although al-Sadat attracted our deputies, we nonetheless entered the next elections in 1979 and obtained three seats. In my opinion, action requires struggle and long patience. Liberals Party leaders are not weak leaders. They are all seasoned political leaders and include members of the People's Assembly. However, even if a party is small, it does not live in the shadow of another party or in obscurity. There are small parties and large parties. However, sometimes, small parties play a very important role in the formation of a parliamentary majority in the event of a coalition, as do the small parties in Germany and Israel. Politics is not just a state of being. It is continuous public action, whose development requires an awareness of reality. It is incorrect to say that the Liberals Party is a cardboard party. Who was shaking up parliament in 1976? Was it not Mustafa Kamil Murad, the party chairman? Whoever says that we are a fragile, cardboard party facing extinction does us a great injustice. Our political program is the best political program, whether in Egypt or elsewhere, and I expect the party to flourish in the coming phase.

### Minister Discusses Educational Issues

92AF0216B Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic  
27 Nov 91 p 19

[Interview with Education Minister Dr. Husayn Kamil Baha'-al-Din by Halah Fu'ad; place and date not given: "Egyptian Teacher's Concerns Before Education Minister; Teachers' Conditions Improving; Free Education for Superior Students"]

[Text] AKHIR SA'AH has put the teacher's concerns and the problems of the educational process before Education Minister Dr. Husayn Kamil Baha'-al-Din. It asked the minister about the teacher's prestige and why it has been shaken, and about how we can improve the teacher's material and professional conditions. It asked him if serious thought is being given to abolishing free education. The interview branched into questions about the difficult and complicated curricula which continue to be unable to graduate a high-level student, whether in higher education or in technical education. AKHIR SA'AH also asked him about reforming education and restoring its sanctity.



The minister opened his heart to my numerous questions and received them patiently, even though he had very little time. The minister answered all my questions. He said: "The logical beginning of reform starts with basic education. Free basic education is a must. As for the other stages, free education must be confined to superior students only. Because educational reform cannot be accomplished without a teacher, attention has been devoted to the teacher's material and professional condition, so that his status will not be shaken in the eyes of his students and so that he will not have to resort to private tutoring."

[Fu'ad] In the past, the teacher had his prestige and the school had its sanctity. This condition has changed now. What is the reason for this change?

[Dr. Baha'-al-Din] There are a number of economic and social reasons that Egyptian society has experienced as a result of the circumstances and the challenges endured by the people throughout 40 years. All these circumstances have motivated the teacher to abandon the school and to go seek his livelihood elsewhere. As a consequence of its difficult circumstances, the government has been unable to provide the resources that assure the teacher an honorable life. This is why the teacher began to look for another way to improve his position.

As a consequence of these circumstances, a group of teachers who prefer quick gain to hard work have come into existence. However, we cannot deny that the majority of teachers continue to view teaching as a national mission, even if some resort to private tutoring. The reason is, as I have said, the difficult economic conditions experienced by teachers.

The minister paused a little and then added: We also cannot deny that the economic conditions have affected not only the teacher, but also the educational process, as a consequence of the shortage of resources and the huge increase in the number of students. In contrast, there haven't been enough appropriations to repair and maintain schools. Simultaneously, class size has grown abnormally. As a result of all these circumstances, a large number of schools are in poor condition. Naturally, this has affected the academic level and the teacher's prestige, as well as the spirit of belonging, among both students and teachers.

#### Dialogue With Penknives

[Fu'ad] So how do we aspire to develop education when we find the teacher talking to his colleagues and superiors with fists and penknives? How did we reach this state of affairs and how can we reform education when the teacher is in this condition? Logic says: He who lacks something cannot give it.

[Dr. Baha'-al-Din] No, what has happened is an isolated case. The teachers who talked to each other with their fists and with penknives have been removed totally from the educational process, in addition to being penalized.

Of course, they are not fit to be a model for students and their natural place is far from classes and schools. But we must not approach this incident as if it were the rule. Inversely, this is a sporadic case and is not a phenomenon that arouses our concern. Such teachers are a minority that does not adhere to the profession's traditions or to the work rules. This minority is denounced by the majority, which observes and obeys its conscience that is concerned with the teacher's prestige and esteem, and that adheres to the sound educational spirit.

The minority that has offended education has proven on its own that it is not worthy of this profession and has doomed itself to being removed from the profession's sanctity and prestige.

[Fu'ad] But if the ministry is trying to improve the teacher's material condition, then what about the professional aspect? There is no doubt that the teacher's poor educational and professional standard can also cause the student to ridicule teachers.

[Dr. Baha'-al-Din] We have not, of course, forgotten the professional aspect. Education cannot be developed and reformed if we do not improve the teacher's standard and his performance of his task. This is an extremely important issue, and this is why we have devoted great attention to the full retraining of teachers, focusing on teachers of mathematics, sciences, and languages, in particular. To succeed in restoring the teacher's prestige and status, we have to work to improve his professional standard so that he will be able to persuade his students and to teach them his subject in the desired manner. To accomplish this, the teacher must keep pace with the age, must familiarize himself with the latest educational and scientific means, and must keep in touch with the immense developments in the world. He must be given all the inventions of modern science and he must select the most suitable and best methods to perform his task.

#### Curricula Without Fat

To succeed in the reform process, we have had to devote attention to the curricula. Some curricula are complicated, stuffy, and difficult. This is a problem from which all schools, both government and private, suffer. This is why I formed a committee last August whose task is to remove the fat and the difficulty from all textbooks. This committee has succeeded in omitting nearly 20-30 percent of all the complicated curricula, and its mission has neared its end. The committee recommendations will be implemented as of this year. Thus, we will have eliminated the biggest problem experienced by students, teachers, and parents.

#### Dead Languages

[Fu'ad] As long as we are talking about foreign languages, what have we done to improve the standard of language education in our schools? It is regrettable that most university graduates do not master any [foreign] language and are even unable to construct a single sentence in a foreign language.

[Dr. Baha'-al-Din] It is very important to devote attention to teaching foreign languages. My goal is to begin teaching students a foreign language at the elementary level, as our generation was taught such a language. We had to study a novel in a foreign language in elementary school. By the end of the elementary level, we were able to write a complete letter in English. This was not accomplished at the expense of the national language. Contrary to what some people imagine, we mastered Arabic very well and we mastered English along with Arabic.

It is very important to devote attention to language while we try to keep up with the immense development in the world around us. To keep pace with this development, we must arm our children with a language that enables them to keep up with this process, especially since the educational process must not end at a certain point, such as school or university, or after a certain time, i.e., after the school years. Inversely, education is not tied to time or place. Man must continue learning throughout his life in order to be able to keep up with the development and progress around him and to familiarize himself with the latest discoveries. Here emerges the importance of devoting attention to languages and developing good curricula of which teachers have good command, so that they can ultimately teach these curricula to the students.

Devoting attention to language is a final objective which we have set before our eyes. The educational process has its priorities, of course. It is my hope that we will realize all our dreams of enhancing the standard of education at all levels. To accomplish this goal, committees have been formed and people from the curricula development centers, advisers, directors, and teachers from the ministry, and educational research experts have been included in these committees. We have enlisted the help of teachers who provided private tutoring. We have even enlisted the help of students to establish realistic bases for the process of the development and reform that we aspire to accomplish.

#### For Superior Students Only

[Fu'ad] Because free education concerns everybody, I had to ask the minister if there is a plan to abolish free education and if it is possible that the day will come when education becomes an obstacle to the financially incapable and will be confined only to the financially capable.

[Dr. Baha'-al-Din] To the contrary, I support free basic education. It is an issue that is connected with national security. I cannot make basic education dependent on people's financial capability. As for the later stages, it is my opinion that free education should be confined to those who adhere to their task as students. A student who attends classes regularly and who always scores passing grades is entitled to enjoy a free education until he completes his studies. As for those who do not take education seriously and those who find it difficult to study, they should shoulder the costs of their education.

As for those who are capable of taking part in shouldering the costs of education, meaning private school students who are capable of paying 500 to 1,000 Egyptian pounds in school costs, logic says that they should contribute to free education by shouldering the costs of their own education as a form of social solidarity.

To put it briefly, one can sum up the free education policy by saying that it will be confined to basic education. As for the other stages, free education will be confined to superior students only, and it will be abolished for others. The government cannot shoulder the costs of educating a student who is not serious. If such a student wishes to get an education, he has to shoulder its costs. He is not entitled to demand free education from the state.

The same goes for students who repeat classes again and again and those who display inability to learn. Such students must also seek other fields. As long as a student's capabilities are incompatible with education, it is better for him to enter the labor market and learn a craft instead of wasting years in an education incompatible with his mental capabilities.

What remains are students in higher studies. Logic also says that education here should be free only for the superior, because a superior student is a national treasure that must be tended.

The gist is that we must support free education for those who deserve it. It should be provided to the student who adheres to his task as a student and who excels in his studies. As for the undisciplined and unqualified student, it is better for him to enter the labor market.

#### How To Devote Attention to Children

[Fu'ad] Because a child's psychological and physical health is an important element in learning, and because a sound mind is always in a sound body, it was natural to ask Dr. Husayn Kamil Baha'-al-Din, the physician and minister, what he has done for the health of our school children.

[Dr. Baha'-al-Din] (Signs of interest show on the face of the minister who has gotten an international award for his interest in child health and who has spent many years of his life devoting his attention to child welfare. He translated this interest into words, saying:)

I believe in the so-called complete child health care. Practically, childhood lasts up to 15 years. Some believe that it lasts up to 18 years. What is important is that we tend to all aspects of life and educational, cultural, health, psychological, recreational, and athletic development of the child. We must devote attention to his hobbies and must inundate him with love and kindness. Man does not grow with food and education alone. There are numerous components that collaborate to produce a vigilant and productive human being. This is why I have to pay attention to restoring sports fields,

athletic activities, and hobbies. I have to devote attention to the students' nutrition and to reinstating school physicians. If we succeed in this, we will have succeeded in restoring to our schools the role they must perform. Subsequently, the teacher's prestige and the school's sanctity, which we hope to achieve, will be regained.

Educational policy cannot be tied to a minister. It is tied to the president of the republic, because it is a national issue. Education means national security and an economic reform that concerns this country's future. This future cannot be tied to a minister, not even to a cabinet. Rather, it is the responsibility of the head of state, so that he may ensure educational continuity and stability.

As long as we view education as a national security issue, we will ultimately succeed in reforming and developing it. Education is the basis for building a sound society and a means for achieving our dream of progress and advancement.

#### **Journalist Relates Free Press to Democracy**

92AE0129A *Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ*  
*in Arabic* 4 Dec 91 p 7

[Article by AL-AHRAM assistant editor and AL-KHALIJ contributor Salah-al-Din Hafiz: "Press Freedom and Democratic Development"]

[Text] I participated under this bright heading in an important symposium that was conducted during the past few days in Casablanca, Morocco. It was organized by the Union of African Journalists jointly with the Union of Moroccan Journalists, and attracted wide Arab and African attention. Very clearly, that is because its topic is the topic of the hour. If it excites interest in the developed world, in our country, and in countries that are similar to us in circumstances and conditions, then it is exciting.

In any case, it is a concern that is weighing on our innermost souls and is disturbing our thoughts, because the innermost souls in our world are flaring up and boiling over, looking forward to a better life under better conditions after having lived through years of suffering, at times under imperialism and at others after independence. Life is life, after all. If it changed in form and appearance, it is still austere and gloomy in content and substance. Is man's advancement and happiness not the final aim? If that is the case, then how far are we from the verge of advancement and progress, and to what extent have we achieved for mankind some comfort and happiness?

In any case, deep in the discussions of this symposium, thoughts and opinions were strewn from this direction and that, but intersected around a basic problem: How are we to support the freedoms of the press, opinion, and expression as an integral part of general freedoms and as an essential step on the path to the intended democratic development?

We had, and we still have, a perplexing question that arose because most of the governing regimes in the Arab and African countries follow or claim to follow the model of the democratic regimes in the West. Whether they are truthful about this or not, the question under discussion is: What have those regimes done to their countries, their people, and their wealth? Why have they emerged as the opposites of those Western regimes? Why have democracy and the scientific and intellectual revolutions prospered over there, but have not moved forward sufficiently here?

There are many reasons and more justifications that we should take into consideration, like economic, social, and intellectual conditions, the resources and "brain drain" war, political and economic corruption, etc. But all that does not suffice as an excuse to hinder peaceful and sound democratic development, especially as we are unable to demand hurdling obstacles and obstructions, we deceive ourselves that we are capable of immediately achieving what the advanced Western countries have achieved. We should not forget that those countries went through two full centuries of revolutions and flare-ups before they achieved what they did!

One is reminded here that we must begin today, rather than tomorrow, with a sound beginning, serious in its intent to right the wrongs and erase the blindness that shackle democratic, political, and social development, rather than continue to mumble false slogans and propagandize incoherent, discarded ideas in our numerous capitals, where many are shutting their eyes to the depth of the radical changes taking place in the world of today. These changes are based on two foundations: the revolution of democracy, with all the freedoms, human rights, and political participation that it denotes; and the revolution of scientific development and all the modern methods for speedy progress aiming at ensuring social justice for all its people.

We are also reminded that many of our Arab and African countries are now witnessing "democratic tensions" that forecast that the democratic tide has begun to crawl towards us and to knock at the doors, not bothering to seek permission or to wait. The spirit of the age is the spirit of democracy and real progress. There are several models that are worthy of note in this area. Some, like Algeria and Zambia, are witnessing dramatic democratic development. Others, like Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, and Jordan are witnessing a calm, and sometimes slow, democratic development. Still others, too numerous to mention or count, are witnessing stupid and dictatorial opposition to any democratic development!

We should perhaps end with four principal comments:

1. The regimes that governed Arab and African countries, especially in the post-independence stage from European imperialism, might have succeeded in achieving some results, but they have, unfortunately,

mostly failed to establish social justice and sound democratic development, whether because of external pressures and challenges which they were subjected to—especially from the old imperialism—or because of poor choices and bad management of their countries. This has helped to spread corruption, isolationism, and dictatorship under many names. Our peoples are now suddenly waking up to a nightmare today. When they look back, they will find nothing to bequeath to their future, unless they change and renovate their choices, methods, and ideas!

2. We are witnessing the age of the collapse of comprehensive ideologies, especially Marxism, which for approximately half a century has ruled half the world. In some places it ruled directly, as in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China and others; or indirectly, as in some Arab countries that borrowed the Marxist cloak and decorated it with some “national gloss.”

But the latter countries were subjected to intense internal pressures after the collapse of the ancestral communist ideology. The axis for these pressures was principally the grinding economic social crisis, not to mention the political and intellectual one, which led the man in the street to revolt against his rulers. Having lost his political dream, he embraced daily suffering and experienced hunger!

3. The spread of education, information, and culture, which should be credited to the regimes of the post-independence stage, has played a principal role in creating a noticeable stockpile of new generations. These generations look forward to participating in government, fighting corruption, and rebuilding the country on democratic principles that guarantee every citizen his right to develop and advance, and the freedom to participate in government.

4. Perhaps these new generations will be more inclined toward the democratic Western model after they have experienced the failure of the totalitarian model that was borrowed from Marxism, in contrast to the success of the liberal model that was borrowed from European democracy. So now we see a brilliance in the liberalism that predominates in the world today, in the hope that it will turn out to be our rescuer from the historical predicament.

But the danger of the “brilliance” is that one may consider it sufficient in itself, stop at its slogans, and surrender one’s self to its brilliant glow, without serious work and real development that spring from within. Democracy is not an empty slogan, nor is it a magic prescription that cures all ills without cost or sacrifices!

## ISRAEL

### Ge’ula Kohen on Necessity of Settlements

91AE0143A Tel Aviv YEDI’OT AHARONOT in Hebrew  
6 Dec 91 p 16

[Article by Ge’ula Kohen: “Only the Settlements Will Advance Peace”]

[Text] If anyone says that the settlements are an obstacle to a territorial compromise, it is true; if they say that the

settlements are an obstacle to autonomy, it is true; if they say that the settlements are an obstacle to a Palestinian State, it is more than true; but if they say that the settlements are an obstacle to peace, there is no bigger lie than that.

When speaking of peace, the guarantees for which are anchored not only in a paper agreement, but also in territory, only the settlements in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza will advance peace between us and Israeli Arabs. Only these settlements will compel them in the final analysis to resign themselves to Israeli control of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.

Up until the momentum of the settlements gathered the strength that it has today, the PLO and the Palestinians were not ready—to talk about, much less to feel in their heart, even if only to make the declaration, much less really have the intention—to sit down at the negotiating table with Israel, even in roundabout fashion, as they are today.

Even Mubarak’s words to Arafat since Israel’s retreat to the Sinai in 1982: “What are you, the Palestinians, afraid of? Look, we got back through political negotiations what we lost in the wars—we forced Israel, through the supportive mediation of the United States, to retreat from Sinai to the international border. You do the same. Sit down at the negotiating table with Israel, and you, too, like us, will be able to get up to the last drop from Israel, especially when today, more than yesterday, the United States supports all Arab demands.... It is true that Sinai does not have the same value for the Jews as Judea, Samaria, and Gaza do, and Yamit is not exactly Jerusalem; it is also true that today, instead of Begin, it is Shamir who sits at the negotiating table—but is it not also true that in our agreement—that of Egypt with Israel that we signed Israel to at Camp David, that Shamir repeatedly declares he is bound by even today—Israel’s retreat to the international border was fixed in all sectors?... So hurry up to the table before Shamir changes his mind about his obligation to the Camp David agreements; and if there should be a need to promise that an agreement would also lead to peace with Israel, why should that bother you?... Who forces us, the Egyptians, to literally keep the promises we made to the nonbelievers?... The Koran certainly does not.... So look at us, Israel retreated from all of Sinai, while we promised a normalization of relations and a peace treaty, but is it not obvious that this so-called ‘peace’ is more cold than hot? ”So why do you continue to refuse—the Egyptians keep pleading with the Palestinians, ‘why do you not want this sort of negotiation in which you will not lose anything, but only gain?’”

But the PLO and the Palestinians were not persuaded to come to the negotiations, they definitely were in no hurry to do so. That being the case, what happened today when James Baker repeated exactly that same message, saying: “Come to the negotiations with Israel because



you have nothing to lose and everything to gain!" Why is it that today they did not just come to the negotiations, but actually ran to them? Why is it that today nothing, I suggest, not even attempts at stalling or Israeli torpedoing of the talks will not cause them to walk away from the negotiations, just as long as they are conducted on the basis of the Camp David agreement and with the American mediation of Bush and Baker?

What is so different today from all previous times?

The reality of the area has changed! There is settlement: there is the momentum of settlement in the areas of Judea and Samaria—the same territory intended by the PLO for settlement by a Palestinian State. What has changed today is the fact that beyond the "Green Line," in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, as well as in the areas surrounding Jerusalem, there live today close to 300,000 Jews, and within two or three years, this number will climb to half a million Jews.

What has changed is that these territories of Judea and Samaria are politically even today an empty vacuum without any sovereignty, not even Israeli. Those same territories of Judea and Samaria were for the PLO and its supporters in the world a source of hope and constant temptation to fill that void with Palestinian sovereignty. Today, when right in front of their very eyes these territories keep filling up with Jewish settlers, and with this fateful competition, the question is, who will be first to fill this political vacuum in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza—the State of Israel, or the Palestinian state? In this competition there is a possibility that Israel will be first. This is the main reason they are rushing to the negotiating table with us.

However, this is precisely what should compel us, too, to speed up and increase the process of settlement in the territories. And perhaps all this large emigration from the Soviet Union only happened today for no other reason than as a Zionist reminder in this direction. So it is no wonder, then, that this big immigration also impelled the Arabs to hurry to sit down with us, because who knows better than they that these Jews will arrive, if not today, then tomorrow, for settlement in the territories, causing their dream of a Palestinian state there to become castles in the air.

Only when reality opens the eyes of the Palestinians to see the fallacy of their belief that there is room for them in Judea, Samaria, or Gaza to build a Palestinian State, will they have to be satisfied, whether they want to or not, with the de facto Palestinian State that exists in Jordan already, on three-fourths of the historic Land of Israel.

Any additional settlement in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza is an added contribution to the advancement of peace, not to mention the fact that every additional settlement in these areas also advances security there: Since the goal of the intifadah and the terrorism is political—to chase us out of here—then if we, in the process of natural daily settlement also add a policy of setting up a new Jewish

settlement wherever a Jewish soldier or Jewish settler is struck by a bullet from a firearm or by a stone, there is nothing that will deter the Arabs more from hitting the Jews, that is to say...than adding new Jewish settlements....

The faster we fill up the empty political vacuum with Israeli sovereignty, and the faster we fill the empty lands of Israel in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza with Jewish settlements, the more we will advance peace tomorrow and increase security now.

### **Trend Toward Right of Ultraorthodox, Religious Blocs**

TA0601172591 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT  
in Hebrew 6 Jan 92 p 3

[Text] The ultraorthodox and religious have lost their position as the balancing factor between the two political blocs in Israel and are now clearly inclined to the right of the political spectrum—this arose from a survey conducted by Professor Yohanan Peres, within the framework of a project of the Israeli Institute for Democracy.

Seventy percent of the ultraorthodox and 60 percent of the religious defined themselves as "rightist," compared to only 28 percent of the seculars. Only 6 percent of the ultraorthodox and religious together define themselves as "leftists," compared to 31 percent of the secular sector. Twenty-four percent of the ultraorthodox and 26 percent of the religious place themselves in the center of the political spectrum, compared to 41 percent of the seculars.

The Israelis, the survey shows, are a society of believers. Fifty-seven percent of the whole population are convinced that there is reward and punishment in the next world. About 20 percent of those defining themselves as secular hold religious beliefs. In contrast, only less than 18 percent do not travel on the Sabbath and most of the public, including a large part of the religious sector, oppose religious legislation.

The findings in their entirety will be published in the quarterly, DEMOCRACY, which will be out this week. The research involved 1,287 citizens, excluding kibbutzim, IDF [Israel Defense Forces] camps, settlers, and immigrants, and was carried out by "Modi'in Ezrahi."

### **Current Status of B'ir Zayt University**

91AE0143A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew  
6 Dec 91 pp 6-7

[Article by 'Ari'ela Ringel-Hofman: "The University Is Closed, and Continues To Teach as Usual"]

[Text] The people of B'ir Zayt University had two weeks of happiness. For the first time in four years it seemed that the reopening of the institution was really close, so close, in fact, that they were talking about washing the classroom floors, airing out the labs, and dusting the library shelves. On 19 November, four members of the



Administration met with General Dani Rothschild, the activities coordinator for the territories, to talk about a possible reopening of the university. The coordinator told them that he would make a recommendation to that effect, but that the final decision would be made by the Minister of Defense, Moshe 'Arens. On Thursday, 28 November, the four members of the Board were invited to a meeting with the head of the Civil Administration in Ramalla, Colonel Jacob Zohar.

The atmosphere in the room was festive. "We have good news for you," said Zohar. "Next Sunday you are slated to meet with the Minister of Defense, Moshe 'Arens." The four members of the Board were asked politely for their personal data, i.e., ID numbers and the tag number of the car they would be driving to the meeting at the municipal building. At 1300, prior to parting, they decided that they would meet in front of the Civil Administration building and travel to Tel Aviv in two cars.

B'ir Zayt was the last university to remain closed. All the other universities on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip opened one by one during the course of the past nine months. It was clear, therefore, that the meeting with the Minister would be devoted to this topic. The Minister would talk about an open policy and about the need to resume normal life in the territories; the Administration would be required to give assurance that order would be maintained.

On Friday evening, 29 November, Dr. Sarafi, who was filling in for the Rector of the University and was one of the four scheduled to meet with the Defense Minister, received a phone call from the Civil Administration informing him that the meeting with the Minister had been cancelled. Sarafi asked what had happened and was told they would update him later. On Saturday morning he was asked to come to the Civil Administration offices. This time the atmosphere was much less cordial. Dr. Sarafi was presented with a new order to close down the University for three more months. At the University they commented about how close they had been, yet it did not happen.

In a meeting which took place in his office two days before the aforementioned meeting was scheduled to take place, the Minister of Defense decided to rule in favor of the General of the Central Command, Dani Yatom. The arguments of General Dani Rothschild, the coordinator of activities for the territories, were rejected. Yatom did not deal in ideology. He was interested pure and simply in defense. If the University were to reopen, he said he would want them to increase the forces at his disposal. He said that reopening the university a week before the fourth anniversary of the intifadah, during the week of peace talks in the United States, right after the latest rioting at A'Njah University in Shechem, would require the introduction of so and so many additional battalions into the territory. And that was precisely what the Minister of Defense did not want right now: an increase in the order of battle.

B'ir Zayt University, which has been closed by decree, has, for the past four years, been conducting regular classes right under the noses of the Civil Administration. The B'ir Zayt students attend classes practically next door to the Civil Administration, in a hotel which has been leased for this purpose. No one in the Civil Administration even bothers to play the game any more. There are constant telephone calls between the two buildings, and it is quite common for someone from the B'ir Zayt Administration to be asked to come urgently to the Civil Administration building, one and a half minutes' walking distance.

The Civil Administration, normally very strict about the closing of the labs and libraries, looks the other way in this case and accepts regular services from the so-called "closed" labs: medication tests, water purity tests, and so on.

The inactive University continues graduating tens of students each year, awarding them a B.A. diploma from what is considered one of the best universities in the territories. These degrees are perfectly acceptable in Israeli, Arab, and even overseas universities. Some of these graduates even find their way to the Education Officer of the Civil Administration, seeking a suitable job in the educational system of the territories. Whether such appeals lead to a job or not depends on the Civil Administration's policy at that particular time. The Education Officer has the right to either reject the applicants, claiming their diplomas are invalid due to the fact that these were issued by a closed university, or, on the other hand, he can channel them to educational institutions where additional teachers are needed.

The closed University issues detailed announcements for the local press, a list of courses, registration days, and registration procedures. It also advertises in the "Help Wanted" section for lecturers in various fields of study.

There are job-related disagreements in the closed University. A few months ago, "El Fajar," the East Jerusalem paper, described a strike among the faculty, demanding a salary increase.

B'ir Zayt was closed on 8 January 1988, exactly one month after the start of the intifadah. Five months later, the B'ir Zayt administration understood that this closing could go on for a long time. That same month they started conducting a few classes in private homes, particularly for students who were very close to receiving a degree. In the afternoon hours, some of the classes were dispersed among various elementary and high schools. Two weeks later, the school principals in whose buildings these classes were held, were summoned to the Civil Administration building. It was made clear to them that the use of the closed University was making of their respective buildings was against the wishes of the Civil Administration and might lead to the eventual closing of the institutions they were heading.

The University moved to other buildings. The Hebrew press of the day reported on student "groups," studying

secretly. As time went on, the students moved to the old campus, a rented hotel, rented rooms, or the homes of the lecturers. In one of the buildings in Ramalla, a prettyish building with a yard surrounded by a stone fence, the students get some sun at break time.

The classes are small—no more than 15-20 chairs. There is a huge blackboard and barren walls. The heating system does not function. In the entrance, a corner was set aside for drinks where one can order coffee or tea in simple glass cups. During classes and even afterward, the large iron gate is kept closed at all times. The guard checks everything twice, before opening it. Among the students, there are some who have been taking classes for four, five, and even seven years toward a B.A. More than anything else, one can feel the shortage of laboratories and libraries. The University folks learned to improvise, though. They moved books to private homes and transferred some of the laboratory equipment. B'ir Zayt, considered the best equipped university in the territories, has been operating in this fashion for 45 months already.

B'ir Zayt University is the first one established in the territories. What started as an elementary school and went on over the years to become first a high school and then a college. In 1972, under Israeli rule, it was accredited as a university.

In those years, the early 70's, Yig'al 'Alon, then Minister of Education, who, on the strength of his position, supported the idea, as the theory went, that economic well-being plus education would act as a brake on nationalist outbursts, stifling the will to remove the yoke of the occupation. The establishment of additional universities in Bethlehem, Shekhem, Hebron, Abbu-Dis, and Gaza was approved later.

In practice, it turned out that this theory did not stand the test of reality. It became apparent that education actually awakens the nationalist enzyme. Economic well-being, which today is not even to be talked about, does not prevent it. If the universities on the West Bank and Gaza became the forge of nationalistic activity, B'ir Zayt was the flaming core.

In B'ir Zayt militant student cadets flourished, who took active part in street fights against the Israeli army during the entire 24 years of occupation, following which the University was closed several times even before the start of the intifadah. B'ir Zayt also witnessed particularly violent battles among the various factions of the PLO, especially between the people of the Popular Front and those of Hamas. Construction of the mosque in the heart of the campus, close to the cafeteria, inflamed the campus for many years.

During the first month of the intifadah, the University dragged the whole village into a long series of disturbances of the peace. A huge barrier was erected in the entrance, and all of B'ir Zayt was covered by a black cloud.

The list of the Palestinian delegation to the peace conference can attest to the University's contribution to the local leadership that sprang up in the territories: Dr. Hanan 'Ashrawi, Lecturer in English Literature; Dr. Nabil Qasis, Vice President of the University; Dr. Samir 'Abdallah, Lecturer in Economics; Dr. 'Abd-al-Rahman Hamad, Dean of the Engineering faculty; Dr. Ghassan al-Khatib, Lecturer in Economics. The legal advisor of the delegation, attorney Raja' Shihadah, is the attorney for the University. The delegation's spokesman, Albert Agazarian, is the spokesman for the University. Simultaneously, B'ir Zayt also helped sprout the leadership of the opposition to the conference, like Dr. Riyad al-Maliki and Dr. Faysal 'Awdallah.

The preparation for opening the University actually began over the last several months. At the beginning of September, a delegation of military men went there to visit: five officers from the General Shin Bet, from the border patrol, and from the Civil Administration. The University representatives tried to emphasize the fact that it was a question of a distinguished academic institution, not only a platform for disturbances of the peace. They walked around in the library, the laboratories, and peeked into the empty classrooms. Later, while they sat over a cup of tea, the University spokesman, Albert Agazarian, remarked: "B'ir Zayt University is our Bat-Sheva. You have 99 beautiful women, we only have one." Those present smiled.

At the beginning of November, Brigadier General Gadi Zohar, the head of the Civil Administration on the West Bank, arrived. He conducted a similar visit. Dani Rothchild arrived shortly after Zohar. The meeting with him took place in the afternoon.

At 10:30 [AM or PM not specified], that very same day, right before Rothschild's arrival for the above meeting, two vehicles stopped near the University gate, at the entrance to the old campus. According to witnesses, armed soldiers got out of the vehicles and burst into the adjacent cafeteria, Cafe Abu-Wadi, a popular gathering place for the students, but also thought to be a meeting place for the Popular Front.

The students were sitting there bent down, while others hid under tables. The disguised men broke a window and overturned a few tables. Within minutes two Jeeps arrived at the site and uniformed soldiers also came in. They burned pizzas, mixed coffee and tea, organized a small vandalism celebration, following which eight students were arrested and taken to Ramalla. After sitting in the sun for a few hours, the students were released. They say at the University that it did not appear that they came to search for suspects or conduct arrests.

The matter was brought up at the meeting with Rothschild. The latter asked for a written report, while promising to investigate the matter. The report was sent to him on December 26. The incident occurred, wrote Agazarian a few hours before the meeting with Rothschild, and a few days following Brig Gen Zohar's visit.

According to Agazarian, this was an unnecessary provocation, intended to humiliate the students and to provoke them.

At B'ir Zayt University they will tell you off the record that they cannot promise absolute quiet—words that were spoken for attribution not a few times by Dr. Gabi Barmaki, the University President's replacement. Still, they say that for the time being peace disturbances are against the students' best interest. In a poster distributed a few months ago, the United Leadership calls for maintaining peace and quiet in institutions of learning—education is holy, it states.

In practice, the school year in all the schools, which commenced on 1 September, transpired without incident. This is the first time since the start of the intifadah, that all schools opened on the same day. The opening of the universities last year also passed quietly, with the exception of the riots at A'njah. The riots at A'njah, according to Rothschild, are what stopped the opening of B'ir Zayt. According to the army, there were shots fired from the campus at Shekhem, and processions of masked men were also seen there. The army does not want to contend with similar phenomena at B'ir Zayt. It is easy to open, they say in the army, but difficult to close.

Behind the incident, of course, there are also historical differences of opinion between the Civil Administration and the army. In flowery language one might say that they do not see eye-to-eye on ways to keep the peace in the area. The army talks about security, while the Civil Administration folks, "the white ones," in military slang, talk about normalization.

As to the approach of the Central Command's General Dani Yatom—he is a hardened, honest officer, for whom creative, open thinking is not the most salient characteristic, as the following example will attest. At one point, Yatom was talking about lifting the nighttime curfew from several Arab villages. On that same occasion, he also expressed great astonishment that the removal of the curfew was not accompanied by thanks from the local population. "I did not see, nor did I hear one word of thanks," he said. A curfew, apparently, in Yatom's view, is an organic part of Palestinian life in the territories. Its lifting is a gesture. By the same token he also considers the opening of the University a gesture.

Rothschild tries very hard to present a united front. Concerning the opening of the University, he says that there were no disagreements between himself, Yatom, or the Minister.

Only in the territory they can tell you it does not always seem that way. Contrary to Rothschild's wish, the University, in practice, has remained closed. Also against his wishes, the curfew imposed this week on Ramalla and the surrounding area following the murder of Zvi Klein of Ofrah, is still in force. Following a plea to ease the curfew, Rothschild replied that it was not up to him to do so.

## JORDAN

### Government Services, Projects for Gulf Returnees

92AE0138A Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 27 Nov 91 p 7

[Text] Amman, Petra—In order to achieve its objectives of setting up several industrial and service projects and investments, creating job opportunities, reducing unemployment, providing various basic commodities for the local market at reasonable prices, boosting exports to help earn foreign currency for the treasury to meet public and private sector import needs, the Association of Those Harmed by Gulf Events has begun a number of investment and services projects, especially production projects, that will positively affect association members and the Jordanian economy.

This step has been taken after the association prepared economic feasibility studies for a number of investment projects in cooperation with the concerned offices in order to enable returnees from the Gulf states to rejoin the community and to become productive members serving the Jordanian economy, boosting its effectiveness, and accelerating its progress. These returnees have been a burden on the Jordanian economy, which is suffering severely from the debt problem and the Gulf war.

Yahya al-Utaybi, chairman of the Administrative Committee of the Association of Those Harmed by Gulf Events, said that the association has begun implementing the first production project for ready-made clothes for export. The cost of operating the factory is estimated at 117,000 Jordanian dinars. Initially, the project will create about 10 jobs, which can be increased at later stages of the project. Its production of ready-made clothes will begin at the end of next month in order to boost exports and earn foreign currency for the treasury. The association has signed a contract with an international company which will buy all its products and market them internationally. The project is expected to yield \$30,000 in revenue annually and is expected to produce 800 pieces daily. Another project that the association intends to implement next month is the medical clinic project. A specialized clinic will be opened in the association's headquarters as a first step toward health care and providing free medical treatment for association members.

Al-Utaybi said that medicines available at the association, or medicine received from its members or from medicine companies will be issued free, while medicines not available at the clinic will be issued at nominal prices. Initially, the association will include various specialized sections, such as pediatrics, heart surgery, internal medicine, neurosurgery, and brain surgery. Other special cases will be referred to specialists at the association's expense. The clinic will be equipped with the latest sophisticated medical equipment. A committee of specialists has been set up to oversee the clinic and take the necessary steps toward operating it and providing it with various equipment.

The association is currently contacting various medical authorities, medicine manufacturing companies, and companies that export medical equipment and supplies, with the aim of providing the necessary equipment for this purpose. The chairman of the Administrative Committee of the Association of Those Harmed by Gulf Events said the association is implementing some services projects. Foremost of these is the building of overpasses in the congested main streets to enable pedestrians to cross the main streets without blocking traffic. This will be done through the use of escalators that enable pedestrians to cross the streets without difficulty, whereas bridges without escalators are difficult for pedestrians to cross. This forces them to cross the streets at points that are not designated for crossing.

One of the characteristics of the bridges is their attractive engineering design. They will be covered, in order to protect the citizens from searing summer heat and severe winter cold. The bridges will be an outstanding, civilizing landmark and will contribute effectively to solving the problem of traffic and congestion, especially in the town center and on the road to the university. This would help avoiding the tragic accidents that occur from time to time.

In addition to the overpasses with escalators, the association intends to implement another project of great importance. A multi-story communications tower is to be erected, on the roof of which a special communications tower more than 120 meters high will be erected in order to serve, develop, modernize, and facilitate telephone and telegraph communications and satellite service. It will provide the television station with cultural, informational, and arts programs via satellite.

The project, which will cost millions of dinars, will develop communications services in Jordan so that they will be as fast and reliable as those in the developed countries. Additionally, the communications building will be exploited for the benefit of the association members.

Another very important association project is a housing project for the returnees that would provide suitable housing for them in return for monthly payments that would be far less than rents, which have soared following the return of more than 300,000 citizens from Kuwait. This project, which is considered to be one of the biggest housing projects in the Middle East, would finally solve the housing problem in Jordan for many years to come. The association is now contacting international companies to implement the project. Intensive contacts are also underway to obtain the necessary financing for the project.

In addition to the aforementioned projects, the association is currently considering the possibility of implementing other entertainment projects, such as a zoo, in order to boost internal tourism and provide the citizens with a facility where they can relax, especially during the holidays.

The association had contacted a number of officials, who have expressed their total support for what the association is doing in the various fields of industrial investment and construction, in coordination with the authorities concerned, especially with regard to establishing industries that Jordan needs. Furthermore, there are very important studies have been prepared on this subject by the government organs on the question of [government-]guided industrialization that will be implemented in cooperation between the association and the concerned government departments, and especially with the Jordanian Cooperative Organization. This organization has shown total willingness to overcome all the obstacles to any of the association's production or investment projects.

The chairman of the association's Administrative Committee stressed that the interest in the problems of returnees is not transient; rather, it is strategic and its goal is to solve the problem of the returnees from all its aspects, including that of the future.

#### **Financiers To Fund Chlorine Factory**

92P40097A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
3 Jan 92 p 11

[Text] Amman, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT—Thirty-six Jordanian financiers have contributed 3.375 million [Jordanian] dinars to build a 4.5 million-dinar factory for the production of chlorine and its derivatives and sodium hydroxide and its derivatives, at a price of one dinar per share. The company floated, in an agreement on the project with the ministry of trade and industry, 1.25 million shares for the general subscription for a period of three weeks beginning on 11 January 1992. The Arab Banking Association, the Union Bank for Investment and Trade, the Chemical Industries Company, and the Jordanian Broadcloth Factories Company, in addition to other financiers, are participating in the establishment of the factory. The company will primarily exploit salt extracted from the Dead Sea.

### **KUWAIT**

#### **Minutes of 26 Nov National Assembly Meeting**

92AE0124A London SAWT AL-KUWAYT  
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 27 Nov 91 p 4

[Article by Fayhan al-'Utaybi: Thatcher Pledges All Efforts To Free Prisoners; Asks That Women Be Given Political Opportunity"]

[Text] The National Assembly in its ordinary session held on 26 November 1991 and presided over by 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Masa'id, approved the naming of one of Kuwait City's main streets after Mrs. Margaret Thatcher.

The assembly discussed several questions that had been raised, including the matter of press coverage of its



deliberations, the prisoners and hostages, and population composition. After ratifying the minutes in Article I, they took up the subject of volunteers' compensation, setting a retirement ceiling, and the study of the insurance system. The assembly also dealt with services and maintenance problems. It approved the report of the Committee of Public Utilities and Services concerning granting satisfactory compensation to those residents of Faylaka who wish to reside in another part of the country. It raised the issue of employment, Kuwaitization, and aid for students who want to work and study.

The highlight of yesterday's session was the visit by British Parliament member and former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to the National Assembly, where she received a friendly and warm welcome from the members. The assembly speaker, Minister al-'Uthman, and a number of members delivered speeches welcoming Mrs. Thatcher. They expressed their gratitude for her steadfast positions on the Kuwaiti issue during the Iraqi occupation. Thatcher promised to use all means to gain the release of Kuwaiti prisoners, and she took the opportunity to call for Kuwaiti women to enter politics.

The session began at 0900, with the roll call of those present and absent. Then the deliberations began.

'Ali al-'Umar: "There were some errors reported in the local press regarding our last session, which have put us in an embarrassing position with the citizens."

Minister of information: "What the journalists reported concerning the session may be incorrect. Therefore, I appeal to reporters to seek accuracy and to be careful about what they report concerning the sessions. I would also stress that the Kuwaiti people judge the National Assembly by the administrative notices that come to them. However, if there are some who exploit what is published in the press and discredit the National Assembly, that is illegal. Therefore, whatever was published in the local press was unintentional."

Al-Masa'id: "Anyone who does not take notes on what is discussed in the sessions and who does not report it accurately, will not be admitted into the assembly hall."

'Ali al-'Utaybi: "What the journalists reported was unintentional. Instead of writing that the matter of social security was decided, they wrote that the matter of compensations was decided."

Al-Masa'id: "There is the assembly's Public Relations Committee, to which reporters can refer in order to confirm what to publish in the press. We thank the minister of state for cabinet affairs for adhering to his promise on the matter of social security."

'Abd-al-Karim al-Juhaydali: "We are concerned with Kuwait's interests. We have entered this assembly out of national considerations. There are editors who wish to ultimately destroy the National Assembly. There are

those who weep over the 1985 assembly, but that assembly was the cause of Kuwait's misfortune.

### Feelings

Sa'dun al-'Utaybi: "The 1985 assembly was an assembly elected by the people. Therefore, Member al-Juhaydali should not hurt the feelings of the people's representative."

Jawad al-Matruk: "I think that Kuwait is going through a serious situation. Therefore, the Ministry of Information should put an end to certain publications that circulate from time to time. An end must be put to such publications that harm the country's general interests."

Al-Masa'id: "If we take rumors seriously, then the world and business will not get very far."

Khalifah al-Khurafi: "UN envoy Agha Khan went to Iraq and got the British hostage released. He did not take up the matter of Kuwaiti prisoners during his visit. Therefore, we ask the government to clarify for us the UN envoy's mission to Baghdad, and the possibility that the matter of the Kuwaiti prisoners was discussed during the visit. We also hope that the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] Foreign Ministers' Conference, currently being held in Kuwait, will work for a kind of harmony and mutual cooperation among the GCC people, along the lines of the EC. We should see this as an application, of which the Gulf people would take notice. Moreover, the matter of population composition was broached on the local scene. The government must study this matter. Kuwait for the Kuwaitis; they are more capable of solving their problems than anyone else. There is no fear or anything else. Funds will not go out of Kuwait. Some ministries have a high percentage of Kuwaitis, such as the Ministry of Commerce. The state's thinking ought to be based on a prepared and planned study, so that the percentage of Kuwaitis in the public sector and government during the next five years will reach a very high level. The university, specialized institutions, Ministry of Education, and specialists in this field should participate in this study."

### Ratifying the Minutes

Al-Masa'id: "Ratify the minutes."

The secretary general then read Article II, pertaining to documents and letters received.

Al-Masa'id: "Refer this to the Committee of Petitions and Complaints."

'Abbas al-Khudari: "I submitted a request for clarification to the minister of state for cabinet affairs, and four months have passed since he referred this request to the ministries. The minister tries hard, but so far, the ministers have not replied to us. We request clarification regarding the reason for these matters and regarding the delay in responding."



Dari al-'Uthman: "As regards the request for clarification, many elements were involved in it. We have responded with some data, but some other data requires more time. We will reply in the next two days to his request, when the remaining data becomes available."

'Abd-al-Latif al-Bahr: "We request that the government be concerned with the matter of population composition in the country. I thank the minister of planning for the reply."

#### Deaf-Mute Reply

Sa'dun al-'Utaybi: "The minister of state for cabinet affairs' response is considered a "blind, deaf-mute" reply. We ask the minister to clarify the reply to all inquiries contained in the request for clarification."

Dari al-'Uthman: "In past sessions, I have explained the mechanism to handle all these matters, under the leadership of the minister of state for municipal affairs. We ask the minister of state for municipal affairs to respond to this matter."

Minister of state for municipal affairs: "If the member wants clarifications in detail, we are fully prepared to respond to all inquiries submitted by the member when the data is available. There are no secrets."

Sa'dun al-'Utaybi: "We ask the minister to define "reply in detail" now, because the reply was ambiguous, and I understood none of it."

#### Fairness of Equality

Khalifah al-Khurafi: On the matter of voluntary service, it was for God and country. There must be fairness among citizens. However, we note that volunteers abroad were given a greater reward than volunteers at home during the period of the tyrannical occupation.

"Therefore, there must be justice when applying anything to the citizens. We must not discriminate among them."

Barak al-Nun: "Farmers are expecting a subsidy. I propose that a joint committee be formed between the Committee of Agriculture and Industry, and the assembly's Finance Committee, to study the matter of agriculture and industry in the country, because this is an important and sensitive affair."

'Abd-al-Latif al-Bahr: "This matter was pending in the last session. Because of a crowded agenda, the Finance Committee has not discussed this matter."

Munayzil al-'Anzi: "The matter of the committee has been proposed to the assembly and referred to the Finance Committee."

Al-Masa'id: "Approved."

#### Us and You

'Abbas al-Khudari: "There are proposals that have not yet seen light, as some of them have been put into the wastebasket."

Dari al-'Uthman: "This member's statement is incorrect. The assembly's internal bylaws regulate these matters. The government studies the submitted proposals for some time, and then responds to them. Therefore, we are all in the same boat."

Sa'dun al-'Utaybi: "There needs to be a definition of the retirement age, even if it remains unchanged."

Muhammad al-Muhmil: "There is unemployment in the country. Therefore, new, young blood should be brought into all government ministries. I think the retirement ceiling should be as it was."

#### So-So

Khalaf Dumaythir al-'Anzi: "How I wish that this debate was between the government and members of the National Assembly, and not between members and members of the Finance Committee. I think that the Finance Committee always opposes proposals submitted to it, as if it were a government advisor. We must put an end to the matter of substitution, and not deduct from the lifespan."

'Abd-al-Latif al-Bahr: "We have taken an oath to safeguard the people's money. If the committee adopted all the proposals submitted to it, there would be no money left in the people's treasury."

'Abd-al-Rahman al-Ahmad: "This was enacted in the forties. Therefore, the committee's report should be adopted as submitted."

Dr. Mubarak al-'Utaybi: "The insurance system is complex and concerns a large segment of the citizenry. Therefore, it should be studied by the Civil Service, because it has the expertise and draws up the regulations."

Ya'qub al-Sharhan: "There are various allowances, fixed and temporary, each with a specific sum. If the government agrees that a draft bill is needed, this would require sending it back to the National Assembly for approval."

After that, the Financial Committee's report was put to a vote.

Al-Masa'id: "Pending" (after the vote failed).

#### Legislation Committee

The assembly then approved reports submitted by the Legislation Committee, as well as the Committee on Education and Human Resources' report.

Khalaf al-'Anzi: "Why hasn't the minister of communications restored the telephone lines in the Sulaybikhat area—about 1800 lines? In our area, we are suffering

from problems of electricity, excavations, and other problems. These are matters that the government must pay attention to and take care of, for all citizens. Many areas suffer from problems and lack of service. More government attention is needed for citizens' services."

'Abd-al-Karim Al-Juhaydali: "I oppose any proposal that is against the interest of any citizen in any area."

Khalifah al-Khurafi: "Why postpone proposals that have been unanimously approved by the National Assembly and pertain to solving problems of a large segment that was greatly affected after the invasion? I refer to the real estate owners. Old property in Hawwali, al-Salimiyah, Qalib al-Shuyukh, Khitan, and al-Farwaniyah must be appraised, and the owners given support in installments, so that there is no burden on the treasury."

The National Assembly approved the report of the Committee of Public Utilities and Services concerning the proposal submitted by Member Saqr al-Sudan, containing satisfactory compensation for those residents of the Island of Faylaka who wish to reside in another area of Kuwait. Nevertheless, the report will be submitted in the next assembly session.

#### Working and Studying

Barak al-Nun: "In Kuwaiti society, the number of those holding masters degrees or doctorates is not sufficient. A young person knows whether he is capable of combining work and study. There are young men who can offer service to this country. Therefore, we should start with Kuwaiti youth. I don't know why we prevent young university students from both working and studying."

Ibrahim Bu-Rasuli: "Specific regulations must be written for all students on work and study."

Khalaf Dumaythir al-'Anzi: "It is illogical for us to deny the Kuwaiti youth, even though we are complicating the student issue. The university student depends on the daily payment for day-to-day life. Therefore, we demand that the government agree to allow university students to work in government organizations and ministries."

Minister of planning: "We do not object to university students working, except within the principles and regulations that safeguard the labor force in the country, along with the municipal force."

#### Circumstances

Mubarak al-'Utaybi: "We must not look at the matter of student labor from just one perspective, but from several angles. There are universities in some countries that give material incentives. Therefore, it was assumed by the Education Committee that, taking into consideration the students' circumstances, the grant should be a lucrative one. The committee is making a full study of this subject."

Dari al-'Uthman: "I don't want it understood that there is any disagreement among the members, especially

since what Dr. Mubarak al-'Utaybi said is the philosophy. However, [this must be] within regulations, because there is a law permitting student employment. Moreover, the Civil Service Council has set up a process to regulate university student labor."

Then Mrs. Margaret Thatcher entered the hall, and the members gave her a long ovation. Speaker 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Masa'id spoke on this occasion, saying:

"On behalf of my colleagues, the members of the National Assembly, and all the people of Kuwait, it gives me great pleasure to welcome you today with an open and happy heart. We salute your just conscience, honorable principles, and sincere beliefs. We welcome your visit to our National Assembly with great joy, on the occasion of your visit to our country, which holds you in great esteem for your steadfast determination and strong belief in the triumph of the Kuwaiti cause, which is the cause of right, justice, and legitimacy against the barbaric Iraqi aggression that was condemned by the entire world. The entire world admired the courageousness stemming from your will and your distinguished conduct of policy and government. From the beginning, you strengthened the international coalition that stood by Kuwait and, later, Operation Desert Storm, which liberated Kuwait from the talons of the tyrants. From the very first moment of the invasion, you insisted in your speeches and statements that they withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally.

"Because of this esteem for your strong international identity everywhere, with complete confidence and certainty regarding your resolute response, we hope that you will use your high prestige to gain the release of our prisoners being detained by the Iraqi regime."

Minister Dari al-'Uthman: "From the first day of the Iraqi invasion of our country, you stood resolute, Mrs. Thatcher, concerning that invasion and in your stand with the Kuwaiti cause. Or rather, this resolute stance played the main role in the liberation of Kuwait. This is evident from the enormous place you occupy in the hearts of the Kuwaiti people, who welcome you with all love and pride for your courageous position."

'Abd-al-Karim al-Juhaydali: "I am very pleased to welcome you today to our assembly. We hold you in great esteem for your defense of right, justice, and legitimacy, leading the international coalition to victory, liberating Kuwait from the Iraqi aggression that ended in failure and unconditional withdrawal. Because of your steadfast support, iron will, and just and wise policies, you are a model for future generations, who will never forget you. Welcome to free, independent Kuwait."

'Abbas al-Khudari: "From the land of friendship and peace, we salute the breath of democracy mixed with the scent of freedom. Words cannot express our deep esteem and spirit of friendship for you, but I see it in the eyes of our children and it lives in the hearts and minds of their mothers and fathers. Now under the dome of this parliament, in which the representatives of the people of

Kuwait are assembled, we rally around you to salute you, salute your honor, justice, and courage. We have learned a great lesson from you, which we will teach to our children. We will tell them that this great lady had a major share in preserving this soil and saving this land upon which we are now meeting.

"It is not for me to describe the terror of the disaster that shook us to the depths. It is not for me to say how to resolve the convulsions within us. It is not for me to tell the story of aggression, torture, tyranny, and murder, but I have the right to say that this people, despite their small number, knew how it was to be oppressed, and still triumphed!

"You were the voice of right, which came through the airways to our people at home, and you were the voice of right to which our children abroad were devoted. You terrified the tyrants, you stood for legitimacy against tyranny, and you led the oppressed over the oppressor. You stood for peace against aggression. You stood for international legitimacy and the principle of human rights. You made peace come to Kuwait.

"Dear madam: I bear the sadness and pain of the families of the abducted hostages. The mothers, wives, and children of those who were martyred are in solidarity with them. We have children, women, men, and old men in Iraqi prisons who are suffering and being maltreated by all manner of torture.

"The first priority is to gain their release. In the name of humanity, justice, and freedom we implore you. We are fully confident that you will intercede with world leaders, and especially with the permanent members of the Security Council, who respect you and hold you in great esteem, as do all free world leaders, to put pressure on the barbaric regime to release our prisoners and to send new information about all the missing, so that they may return to their nation and resume their role in life.

"Greetings and esteem from the people of Kuwait to the people of Britain, who made us victorious, and who sent their sons to assist us for right, justice and the maintenance of world peace."

#### Thatcher's Speech

"It does me great honor to receive this warm welcome from the National Assembly. I come from a parliament with an ancient past to another parliament that is beginning its first stage. I thank you for the welcome and for this warmth that does me and my family honor. I will remember this always; there is no higher honor for one than to represent his people.

"I have had the opportunity to enjoy this honor in my country for 32 years. It is a wonderful thing for man to defend the people's freedom and what this freedom entails.

"You referred in your speech to Kuwaiti prisoners and hostages. They are civilian men, women, and children,

and it is unreasonable that they be taken prisoner and hostage. We shall do whatever we can to gain their release. This matter will remain a black stain on the history of Iraq until those prisoners are released, because Kuwait is a peace-loving nation.

"The head of the Iraqi regime directed his cannon against Kuwait. This aggressor was not content to direct his guns against other people, but he also directed them against his own people. By a stroke of good fortune, I was visiting Washington on the day of the invasion. I spoke with the American president, who left us with no doubt of the need to put an end to the aggression that had occurred, and the need to restore Kuwait to its people.

"For several months, the world's eyes were concentrated on your country and on the assembling of equipment that was used to liberate Kuwait, through the bravery of the coalition forces, as history records.

"I would like to offer thanks to all the countries that participated in Kuwait's liberation. I also thank the Kuwaiti people for their stance against Iraqi aggression. I have heard about the Kuwaiti resistance and its admirable bravery. The Kuwaitis who were here should record memories of their efforts, so that future generations will know them and preserve them.

"The best policy a country can adopt is to gather its heritage and not ignore the past, but to pay attention to it. As you perform your mission, I would like to offer my best wishes to you, to all the members, and to all the Kuwaiti people. I also wish to thank you for the marvelous warmth of your welcome. I should also not be remiss in addressing the women of Kuwait who most courageously took part in the Kuwaiti resistance. I want the Kuwaiti women to have a role like the role that the British women play, who have plunged into the world of political life.

"I also wish to thank you for the honor you have done me during my visit to you."

Al-Juwaysri: "The session is adjourned until next Tuesday."

#### [boxed item] Snapshots of the Session and Reception

1. Mrs. Thatcher arrived at the assembly hall at 1235, and was greeted by Speaker 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Masa'id and several members. Thatcher was accompanied by the chief of the honor escort, Dr. Rasha al-Hammud al-Sabah.

The draft bill to name one of the streets in Kuwait after Margaret Thatcher stipulated that "the name 'Madam Margaret Thatcher' will be given to one of the principal streets in the city of Kuwait, in honor of what this great lady has done for the liberation of Kuwait and the restoration of its people and legitimacy."

When Thatcher entered the hall, all members rose and applauded her for nearly five minutes. Her head moved in slight bows, in response to the salutation and applause.

Khalifah al-Khurafi stood on his chair and applauded, and said to himself: "Thank you, thank you, Mrs. Thatcher."

When Thatcher entered, one member said: "If only they would let me greet her."

Al-Masa'id: "We have a guest now; don't be like that."

Al-[Hubayni]: "This is the way a session [is done]."

Al-Masa'id: "Please!"

2. Al-Hubayni: "The people of Kuwait are not sheep. The matter of the mini-buses must be raised in the next session."

Al-Masa'id: "It will be raised in the next session."

Al-Hubayni: "Thank you, Mr. Speaker."

3. 'Abbas al-Khudari: "Sorrow and grief rend my heart. I am talking about the Ministry of Education's policy, and I don't see the minister of education here."

Badr al-Bashar: "Bow down, bow for prayer."

4. Minister of education: "I give my turn to the minister of planning."

Minister of interior: "Shanu, give him your turn."

5. Al-Masa'id: "Is this report approved?"

Members: "No, no, no."

6. Al-Masa'id: "Hey, Shulaymi, Shulaymi!"

Al-Shulaymi: "Mini-buses can be driven by an Indian, Egyptian, Syrian, a Jew. Where is Kuwait's interest?"

Dumaythir: "The leadership should be interested in this matter."

7. Al-Juhaydali: "Please, please!"

Dumaythir: "You are squabbling among yourselves."

Al-Juhaydali: "Please, please!"

al-Khudari: "We must discuss the minister of education."

Al-Masa'id: "The decision of the assembly."

al-Khudari: "The decision of the assembly on the committee's report. This is recorded by the leadership."

8. Al-Hubayni: "I am the author of the proposal."

Al-Juwaysri: "If it is on substance, I'm with you."

Al-Hubayni: "On the proposal."

Al-Juwaysri: "If the assembly lets you."

Al-Hubayni: "The assembly lets me."

Members: "No, no, no."

Al-Juwaysri: "I am relieved."

9. When the National Assembly named one of the streets "Margaret Thatcher," Khalaf al-'Anzi said: "A pretty and [word illegible] street." [end boxed item]

### Minutes of 3 Dec National Assembly Meeting

92AE0125A London SAWT AL-KUWAYT  
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 4 Dec 91 p 4

[Article by Fayhan al-'Utaybi: "Retirement Ceiling Raised to 2,000 Dinars, Age to 40 for Women, 50 for Men"]

[Text] The National Assembly approved the report of the Fiscal and Economic Affairs Committee concerning raising the retirement ceiling to 2,000 Kuwaiti dinars, adding allowances to the retirement pension, and raising retirement age to a minimum of 40 years for females and 50 for males.

This was done in the usual session held by the assembly on 3 December 1991, presided over by National Assembly Speaker 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Masa'id, where it was decided to postpone the debate on compensations and increasing employees' salaries and subsidies, as well as the debate on the public budget, until next Saturday's session.

The assembly also discussed several committee reports and clarification requests submitted by members.

The session began at 0900, with the assembly's secretary general, Muhammad Ibrahim al-'Askari, reading the names of those absent and excused. The session then got under way as follows:

Yusuf al-Majid: "The government is allowing certain statements that touch on public interests to be published in the press, but forbids what is good for those interests. Therefore, there must be fairness in the censorship process. There is a fifth column trying to exploit certain events, especially what happened recently with the shooting in the Medical College. Therefore, the minister of interior must put an end to the weapons that now exist in the hands of citizens. The minister of finance must also reveal those who are embezzling government grants."

Minister of interior: Concerning the statement by Major General Khalid al-Jabir in the press, the report was incorrect. His family was found. It has suffered as other Kuwaiti families have suffered. On the subject of weapons, the law is clear and correct."



### Mockery or Not?

'Ali al-'Umar: "Thirty reports have been submitted to the government, but I have received no response. This is proof that this is all a mockery."

Dari al-'Uthman: "An objective, deliberate, and long look at the ideas of up to 200 questions from assembly members proves the government's interest in members' inquiries, and it does respond to them. The government does not mock the members. We are working within the framework of two cooperating authorities. We are completely anxious to respond to all the members' reports and questions."

"As a government and as members of the National Assembly, we are working for the public interest."

### Smuggling Funds

'Abd-al-Karim al-Juhaydali: "Why does the government permit debtors to smuggle their funds abroad? Can't it control that and put an end to these violations? We are suffering from a real crisis. There are 10,000 persons out of work; they have no job, no income. They worked in the army and the interior at one time. Therefore, this issue must be resolved as soon as possible, so that the citizens are not harmed. Kuwait is on the brink of a volcano. As for difficult debt, if this matter has been conceded, it is a shame for this assembly."

Badr al-Bashar: "We salute the presence of the British delegation in this assembly, in this house of democracy."

Marzuq al-[Hubayni]: "Frequently we speak of censorship, but the Ministry of Information forbids some [things], but leaves room for some others. As for controlling everyone or forbidding everyone, what is the difference among writers? Therefore, we say to the minister of information that there must be honesty when applying censorship. This was a situation of fear over Kuwait, not fear from Kuwait."

Hamad al-Tuwayjiri: "There is some fumbling over certain matters. If the government applies the Reunification Law, it must apply to everyone. The situation of Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaitis must be equitable. On the subject of veiled women, we must not raise this matter, because there are Islamic legal [shari'ah] offices to which we must refer. Therefore, we should refer to the Ministry of Awqaf [religious endowments] and Islamic Affairs, so that we will know the Islamic religious ruling, free of exaggeration that does not do the public interest any good."

'Ali al-'Umar: Giving the subject of veiled women more than its dimension is what permits the fifth column to interfere in this. Therefore, we must deal with matters wisely and objectively."

Muhammad al-[Jaharaf]: "We request the minister of higher education to give us his views about the matter of veiled women. It is the right of female students to pursue their studies in college. Religion should not take a back

seat. He who says such a thing is backward, mentally and physically. Religion is proper at all times."

Jawad al-Matruk: "When we requested severing relations with countries that supported Iraq, we looked at the international aspect and at investments in those countries. Now, when we take up the matter of Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaitis, we consider the social angle. Now, what is the political and social decision after the invasion?"

"Should we leave the Kuwaiti woman alone? The constitution protects the right of this citizen of this country. Why should we violate this law?"

### Poisoning of Two Students

Minister of Higher Education Dr. 'Ali al-Shamlan: "With regard to the complaints of veiled students, the decision is not the decision of the Medical College dean, but the decision of the Board of the University of Kuwait, which issued it in January 1984. It stipulates a kind of uniform for students. The decision was issued after the cases of the two female students who poisoned themselves. One of them was veiled, and the other wore gloves. In light of that, this decision was issued to safeguard the well-being of female students. The university does not intervene in freedom of dress for students in the university colleges."

Hadi Hayif al-[Huwaylah]: [This is] regarding the first complaint, submitted by the assistant director for administrative affairs at the Psychiatric Hospital, in which he asks to be confirmed in his current position, to which he was appointed a year ago. His competency and capability to fulfill the job's duties were confirmed by a confidential report on employee evaluation. Also, we have a request for the minister of public health, Dr. 'Abd-al-Wahhab al-Fawzan, and all officials in the ministries dealing with women's affairs, because this segment of citizens' concerns have a connection with several state ministries and agencies. We ask that a specialized committee be formed to look into the problems of these sisters and alleviate the concerns, problems, and difficulties that they face during their referrals to state agencies and ministries. This proposed committee can write the guidelines, rules, and regulations that would be appropriate and compatible with the interests and security of the country, in order to resolve their problems and decrease their concerns."

### Crisis of 5,000 Kuwaiti Women

Mazruq al-Hubayni: "There is no group without oppressors; there are those who paid the sacrifice by defending Kuwaiti soil. We must see that justice is done for those heroes, because they fought on the fronts of death, defending this nation. Accordingly, we request the assembly to devise a speedy solution to the problems of these persons, so that this problem does not get any bigger."

Talal al-'Ayyar: "Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaitis suffer from a big problem. There are about 5,000 Kuwaiti women in this group. This requires that this problem be given careful and objective study, even though appropriate solutions have been drawn up to prevent its worsening. There are different nationalities in Kuwait who live and marry in this country. This is all the more reason to support the husband of a Kuwaiti who proves he hasn't been convicted of any crime.

"As for the matter of the veiled students, it must be up to the university board to put an end to this situation. How can the university say that this is a return to the dark ages? Surely, there must be a just solution to this issue, which touches on the Kuwaiti scene."

### Warning About Sedition

Hadi al-Huwaylah: "It is very unfortunate that there are persons in this good society, based on the teachings of Islam, who are striving for notoriety and propaganda by violating those Islamic teachings and by issuing administrative decisions that "contradict custom," including the administrative decision of the dean of the Medical College preventing Muslim students, who believe in their God and in the teachings of their true religion, from wearing the veil. This decision flaunts Islamic values, in mockery and derision of God's law, as well as the constitution of the State of Kuwait, which guarantees freedom for citizens of all creeds and affiliations.

"The regrettable thing here is that the decision was issued by a person who had attained a high academic and educational status, which qualified him to ascertain precisely and accurately the effects of his deeds or statements. However, unfortunately, it is again clear that high academic standing by some persons is not the only thing that makes a man excel and be balanced in his thinking.

"We would like to have explained to us the main reasons behind the adoption of a pointless, stupid decision like this, but it is very unfortunate that the university professor and dean of the Medical College issued his decision. He does not have a cogent argument to convince people.

"Mr. Speaker: If only this professor had consulted his fellow professors, the university board, or student associates through the National Federation of Kuwaiti Students on this important and serious issue! However, this respected professor and teacher of a generation of young people who will take over the country's affairs in the near future, made his decision arbitrarily and alone, without consideration for the views of any organization or person. This gives us an unpleasant glimpse of a personality of which high-handedness is only one trait.

"Behind this speech of ours, we do not intend any favoritism or affront of any kind, nor do we intend any exaggeration of an issue, whose seriousness and effect on

Kuwaiti society only God alone knows. This is an issue that touches a person's freedom to pursue the rites of the true Islamic religion.

"Here, under the dome of this respected assembly, I implore the minister of higher education, Dr. 'Ali al-Shamlan, to withdraw this unjust decision and make it as if it had never existed, out of concern for the good reputation that this academic edifice, the University of Kuwait, enjoys. We must close the door on this matter forever, so that we do not cause more sedition among members of the community."

### Clarification by Installments

'Abbas al-Khudari: "The request for clarification that was submitted comes back to me in installments. I have touched on that in a number of sessions. The minister of state for cabinet affairs has not made a [serious] effort. We also note that the other ministries and the rest of the ministers have not responded to this inquiry. Therefore, I insist that this matter be given the importance that it deserves, because it is important and sensitive, and concerns a large sector of the citizenry."

[Minister] Dari al-'Uthman: "Be it noted that the member's comments are also in installments, since, despite the follow-up of matters, the member objects every time. He knows the extent of the efforts made in this regard. Even the speaker's office knows that the member follows up the data through the employees' secretariat. It is clear that we have not seen the end of this matter. We have not ignored this question, because cooperation is our principle. We are anxious to reply to those questions."

'Abbas al-Khudari: "Are we in the law of the jungle? We should know how many officials and workers there are in government ministries. We must reveal the ministries that do not cooperate with the minister. We are not in a club. On the contrary, we are in an assembly elected by the people. We came for the purpose of carrying out state business and for the public good. We are responsible to the Kuwaiti people for the burdens placed on our shoulders. Therefore, we must be competent to do them."

### No Cooperation

Minister of finance: "The question has a legal aspect, because [figuring] financial earnings require the end of the fiscal year, which is the end of next month. This differs from one country to another. Regarding last year's earnings, we are prepared to reply to the member."

Sa'dun al-'Utaybi: "Ministers must respond in the event of an inquiry. There must be cooperation. It is incumbent upon ministers to respond to submitted requests for clarification."

Minister of finance: "The member is asking about loans, not deposits. There is a difference between loans and deposits."

Khalifah al-Khurafi: "I have become convinced that there is no cooperation for the public good. There is a

strange phenomenon in Kuwaiti society, inasmuch as we have noted that there are some areas that are a nest of corruption. There is proof of the spread of corruption, the sale of alcoholic beverages, and other alien phenomena that harm Kuwaiti society. Therefore, there must be a rapid solution to phenomena such as these, which are harmful to the Kuwaiti people. This state does not apply the law; there is no intention to apply the law. The country has no determination. We must strike with a fist of iron. No solution has as yet been found for the problem of the stateless people [al-bidun, i.e., the Palestinians]. Surely, the law should be applied decisively and rigorously to all, because this is in the interest of all."

Muhammad al-Hajaraf: "I request reconsideration of the Kuwaiti citizen obtaining a visa for entry into the Arab Republic of Egypt."

Khalifah al-Khurafi: While I was watching the Egyptian satellite channel, I found things that offended me. I had expected the Egyptian media to be more effective and objective. Therefore, the minister of information must set up a committee for everything aired over the Egyptian satellite channel and the Middle East channel, and to follow up on whatever is aired."

Sa'dun al-'Utaybi: "I am grateful to the minister of housing for his rapid response to my question. It only took a week."

Al-Masa'id: "The session is adjourned for noon prayer."

#### Numerous Resignations

The session reconvened after the recess.

Al-Masa'id: "Some members are asking about compensations, the salary increase, and the increase of business allowances. This matter will be studied next Saturday."

The assembly then turned to committee reports. The assembly discussed the report of the Fiscal and Economic Affairs Committee concerning continuing the allowances that the public employee receives, including the allowance for pension when he retires.

Minister of Finance Nasir al-Rawdan: "We join the members who are offering a proposal to reconsider certain matters in the Social Security Law. We are afraid that this problem of retirement might worsen in the future, because the negative consequences of this amendment might not be foreseen right now. This could lead to numerous resignations by employees in the ministries in order to equal the salary at retirement.

"This is not the ideal way, because this would hurt the state treasury. The government is working on this with the National Assembly, as a single team."

Kazim Bu-'Abbas: "The committee has already approved this matter, but the government has not replied."

Badr al-Bashar: "The current minimum for retirees is 180 Kuwaiti dinars. If we consider the poor class in the

community, we must speak seriously. The government must be concerned with these matters. In this assembly, we have a way to broach the matter. There is an alternative. This is not criticism for the sake of criticism. On the contrary, there is an alternative in the event of criticism."

Minister of finance: "What is the cost that the treasury would bear in light of this matter, within the fourth [budget] schedule?"

Mubarak al-'Utaybi: "We are discussing the amendment. The author of the proposal is the best informed about the matter of cost. The reporter is not knowledgeable about that. Therefore, I propose agreement to raising the retirement ceiling to 2000 dinars."

Minister of finance: "We must know the total cost, so that we can be certain about raising the retirement ceiling."

#### Car Station

Kazim Bu-'Abbas: "The government asked for a four-day delay in responding to this matter; it has not yet responded."

Dari al-'Uthman: "The matter was discussed, and during the debate a new proposal emerged. This would affect the progress of the regulation. Therefore, it must be referred to the constitutional expert."

Expert: "Article 95 stipulates referring the matter to the committee concerned."

Khalaf Dumaythir al-'Anzi: "The government works like the proverb, 'He who puts the rod [axle] in the wheel.' Therefore, it must decide this matter."

Ya'qub al-Sharhan: "The committee has completed the proposals submitted to it. They are as follows:

- Raise the retirement ceiling to 2,000 dinars;
- Add the allowances that the retiree receives during his service to the pension, together with writing regulations for that from the aspect of specialization;
- Amend the rules of exchange, so that the number of options for exchange (15-10-05) for life, and the employee selects what is appropriate;
- Raise the minimum retirement age for women to 40 and males to 50. When that is applied, attention must be paid to exchange rules.

The assembly then voted on the committee report, and it was approved. It was referred to the appropriate authorities.

Later, the reporter for the Committee on Internal Security and Defense read the proposal concerning permitting Kuwaiti pensioners to operate private transportation vehicles to transport passengers. When the proposal was voted on, the proposal failed.

The report by the Public Utilities and Services Committee concerning eliminating the car repair station located in the 'Abdallah al-Salim area, was voted on. The proposal failed.

Al-Masa'id: "The session is adjourned until next Saturday for debate on the state's general budget, and debate on compensation, increased salaries, and increased business and children allowances."

#### [boxed item 1] Session Snapshots

The session began at 0910, and was adjourned twice. The first time at 1040, because of a lack of order, and the second at 1330.

It was noted that approximately 40 women were present to follow the session. They were pursuing the matter of Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaitis. The number began to decrease until there were only two, after the session shifted to another topic.

Deputy speaker Rashid al-Juwaysri was absent from the session.

The women present applauded both Talal al-'Ayyar and Jawad al-Matruk, who defended this issue.

Al-Masa'id said to the members: "The regulations will be enforced for anyone who does not straighten up and watch what he says."

Khalaf al-Tamimi commented when the subject of minibuses came up: "We are a civilized country; it is impossible to get a taxi."

One of the members sent a document to the minister of information, Dr. Badr al-Ya'qub, during the recess. He said: "Will you sign it?" The minister said no. Later, the member withdrew the document, and was angry.

Minister Dari al-'Uthman said to the minister of housing, Muhammad al-'Asfur: "Tell us, what have you done to Sa'dun [al-'Utaybi] to make him sing your praises so?"

When Khalifah al-Khurafi said: "We must strike with a fist of iron," Dumaythir said: Strike Shanu, who is grabbing you.

A number of employment office owners gathered in front of the National Assembly, where they complained about the decision to close their offices.

#### [boxed item 2] Notes

1. 'Ali al-'Umar: "We must reveal the truth to the Kuwaiti street."

Al-Masa'id: "I go into the Kuwaiti street."

Al-'Umar: "What for?"

Al-Masa'id: "I mean—"

2. Al-Masa'id: "The government requests referral to the constitutional expert."

Expert: "I don't understand the issue."

3. Speaker: "We gave you a turn."

Al-Bashar: "Yes, but—"

Speaker: "I am on recess."

4. Qabazard: "Bye bye!"

Minister of interior: "Many bye byes!"

5. Al-Tuwayjiri: "We must refer to the Islamic religious ruling with regard to the matter of veils."

Al-Masa'id: "Why didn't they refer to the ruling when they married non-Kuwaitis?"

Al-[Habbaj]: "Thank you, Mr. Speaker"

Minister of Interior: "You speak the truth, Abu-Manahi."

6. Al-'Ayyar: "What is the limit to what is being heard, Mr. Speaker?"

Al-Masa'id: "Unless this stops, I will adjourn the session."

Sa'dun [al-'Utaybi] "No, sir!"

Al-Habbaj: "Point of order, Mr. Speaker."

Al-Masa'id: "On what article, Abu-Manahi?"

Al-Habbaj: "Article 50. I wish to say a word—"

Al-Masa'id: "Oh God, go ahead and speak!"

7. Al-Hubayni: "Point of order—"

Al-Masa'id: "We discussed this draft before."

Al-Hubayni: "A bill for the benefit of citizens must be discussed."

Al-Masa'id: "You don't want the speaker's opinion or the [constitutional] expert's opinion."

## LEBANON

### Changes in Phalangist Orientation Discussed

92AE0105C London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
4 Dec 91 p 2

[Commentary by Samir 'Atallah]

[Text] The Phalangist Party in Lebanon has commemorated the 55th anniversary of its founding. This year, the annual "celebration" reflected the party's ruinous state and the fragmentation that has profoundly afflicted it and its leading figures. As is customary, rhetoric prevailed over political language. In general, this rhetoric called for "reconciliation," an understanding of the



"other side," and national conciliation. This is, ultimately, a good step, which is better late than never.

However, all of the speeches, which were dominated by a loud, emphatic delivery accompanied by organized clapping, centered around others' mistakes, responsibility, and misdeeds. The speech given by the party chairman, or "supreme head," Dr. Georges Sa'adah, gave the impression that the party opposes splitting and fighting, and that the recently-ended war produced neither a victor nor victory, but only victims.

The Phalangist Party was a major participant in the war. Notwithstanding, this was a war in which everyone took part. The Phalangist Party's tragedy is that it was established primarily as a political-military group under the influence of the fervor generated by World War II. Therefore, when the civil war broke out, the Phalangist Party hastened to enter it and was a major participant in it. However, it now sees that it has lost its military wing with the departure of the Lebanese Forces. It no longer has the political influence that was the reason for its establishment. Moreover, one understands from Dr. Georges Sa'adah's bitter complaints that the party has no influence at all. This year's celebration was also marked by the absence of the "old guard." However, the truth is that the party itself, by an unannounced decision, excluded the founding member of its "political office," ambassador Ilyas Rababi, who now lives in the Netherlands. It also excluded Josef Abu-Khalil, who was the editor of AL-'AMAL throughout the war and is now writing for AL-SAFIR, which is on the other side of the political thought spectrum. It also excluded Dr. Elie Karamah, who headed the party after Pierre al-Jumayyil's death, and it excluded President Amin al-Jumayyil.

The Phalangist Party has been afflicted with the malady of other parties, i.e., splits, divisions, and wings, after having maintained some unity for a long period. Resignations from the political office were rare until the seventies, when they began with the resignation of attorney Rashad Salamah, which was followed by the resignation of Deputy Edmond Rizq. This was followed by a phase of dismissals and resignations leading into new "elections," which were won by the newcomers, who, in any case, represent the Lebanese Forces more than the Phalangist Party in its familiar, traditional form.

However, none of the conflicts that have afflicted the Phalangist Party have been of a dogmatic nature, except perhaps in the seventies. Unlike the other parties, the Phalangist Party has remained a single, Maronite party, except for several transient, cosmetic attempts by which the National Liberal Party was able to attract several Muslim personalities, although it did not attract Muslims [in general].

The Phalangist Party was established in the same period that saw the establishment of the Syrian Nationalist Party, the Ba'th Party, and the Constitutional Bloc.

These other parties attracted a genuine mix of strata and groups. The Phalangist Party, on the other hand, because of the Lebanese concern [hajis], became a labor party that protects a single class. When it finally decided to enter into a dialogue with the "other side," the war had already superseded any dialogue.

The Phalangist Party is now presenting proposals for new horizons, a new outlook, and "an understanding of the other side." For the first time, the Phalangist Party appears to be a part of every Lebanese. It has almost no problem with others; however, it does have a major problem with itself, internally.

### **Report on Real Estate Company, Reconstruction Fund**

92AE0117D London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic  
22 Nov 91 pp 40-41

[Article: "Attempts To Bring Back Real Estate Company Continue, Lebanon Reconstruction Fund Starts With Saudi Green Light"]

[Text] Lebanon has been officially promised an announcement this month of the creation of the International-Arab Reconstruction Fund, after more than a year's delay due to the Gulf war and its results. The promise, which is the outcome of an assurance, was announced following meetings held in New York on the occasion of the UN session. These meetings were between the foreign ministers of the countries represented in the three-nation Arab committee responsible for the affairs of Lebanon: Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal for Saudi Arabia, Lakhdar Brahimi for Algeria, and Abdelatif Filali of Morocco. Lebanon's foreign minister, Faris Buwayz, also attended the meetings. As further assurance, it was decided to hold a follow-up meeting in Saudi Arabia. The heads of the Arab committee are expected to send joint, handwritten letters to leaders of industrialized countries to urge them to contribute to the fund. The letters will be sent out by the custodian of the two holy mosques, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia; the Moroccan ruler, King Hassan II; and Algeria's president, Chadli Bendjedid.

It has been learned that Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states have decided to contribute \$700 million to the fund when subscriptions are officially opened, with other contributions to come from the European countries (France, Britain, Germany, Italy, and others) and Japan. The United States will also contribute, if it abandons its reservations now that the hostage problem is near resolution and Lebanon has gone to the Madrid peace conference.

With the opening of the Lebanon exhibition in the British capital, this burst of optimism is being accompanied by behind-the-scenes contacts whose goal—so say informed sources in Beirut and London—is the return of Shaykh Rafiq al-Hariri to the real-estate company project, now that many of the problems that had caused this Saudi businessman of Lebanese origin to withdraw

from the project have been overcome. This has happened after the elimination of political gambits that certain parties had tried to attach to the project. Furthermore, the change that was made to the basic project for a real-estate company to rebuild Beirut's commercial center has itself been amended.

From a first reading of the project, and then from a reading of the changes, it becomes clear that the changes have given landowners priority in purchasing properties after the rebuilding process is completed. This apparently is dispelling fears that investors might corner ownership, as was implied by the economies of the project.

Among the changes considered to have removed obstacles to the project and to have reduced the problems preventing al-Hariri's continuance with it were the ones made in Section 2 (Amended) of the Real-Estate Company Law. The new text is as follows:

"The following rules shall be applied to the real-estate company:

"A. In addition to Lebanese shareholders and purely Lebanese companies who enjoy a subscription preference, the company may include shareholders who are subjects of Arab states and official or semi-official Arab institutions. They may subscribe to the company's capital in cash, which may be defined in foreign currency, provided that when the company is founded the cash contribution shall in no case exceed the value of the material tenders, and provided also that at the time of subscription an opportunity shall be given to the largest possible number of shareholders.

"This company shall be exempted from notary fees, commercial register recording fees, and the stamp tax on capital. Its material advances shall be entirely exempted from the fees for its establishment. Its shares and shareholders shall be exempted from tax due under Chapter 3 of the Income Tax Law.

"The main oversight agent may be appointed for a three-year term, and the company shall be exempted from the requirement of appointing an additional oversight agent. The real-estate company's shares may be accepted for trading on the Beirut stock market immediately, and it shall have the right to purchase up to 10 percent of its shares with no proviso that a reserve be present. The real-estate company established to manage and rebuild the war-damaged area may fill in the sea in accordance with an approved design and guidelines. It shall own with the Lebanese state the lands resulting from the filling operation. Arrangements concerning such lands shall be made by agreement with the Council for Development and Reconstruction.

"1. The decree creating the real-estate company shall be published in the official newspaper and in three local newspapers, along with a schedule of parcel numbers falling within the zone of the company.

"2. By proposal of the prime minister and the minister of justice, based on a request of the Council for Development and Reconstruction, one initial appraisal committee shall be appointed by decree. It shall be headed by a judge of at least the tenth degree and have an architect and expert as members. The committee shall be entrusted with determining the total value of the various claims belonging to owners, leaseholders, and claim-holders in general.

"3. The committee provided for in Paragraph 2, preceding, shall exercise its functions after it announces by publication in the official newspaper and three local newspapers an invitation to all claim-holders in the affected area, along with a list of the parcel numbers, to submit their written comments and records if required and to take up a place of residence within the province in which the area in question lies. A deadline of two months from the date of publication of the announcement in the official newspaper shall be given.

"The committee shall issue its decisions after examining each of the parcels in the area in question and after considering the comments submitted to it.

"4. Decisions issued by the committee provided for in Paragraph 2 above shall immediately upon issuance be forwarded to a Supreme Assessment Committee to be appointed by decree based on a proposal of the prime minister and the minister of justice, at the request of the Council for Development. This committee shall be headed by a judge of at least the fifth degree, with an architect and expert as members, and shall be charged with reviewing the decisions forwarded to it.

"5. Parcels lying within the assigned area shall be transferred to the real-estate company as material advances at the value determined for each of them by the Supreme Coordination Committee within a period not to exceed six months from the date of the aforementioned committee's decision.

"6. The files for the parcels lying within the assigned area shall be forwarded to committees formed in accordance with the provisions of the property law. Their function shall be to apportion the assessed value of each parcel among the owners, leaseholders, and claim-holders; provided that in each parcel the total accruing to these people shall not exceed the sum fixed by the appointed Supreme Assessment Committee.

"Concerned parties shall be notified at each party's place of residence, or, if no place of residence has been taken, at the office of the committee.

"Decisions of the aforementioned committees shall be subject to channels of review in accordance with the rules and time period specified in the ownership law for decisions issued by committees on ownership.

"If a concerned party or parties pursues a channel of review, the case for apportioning the assessed value among all claim-holders in the parcel in question shall be

announced publicly; provided that the total shall in no case exceed the total sum set by the Supreme Assessment Committee.

"If a dispute arises concerning an obligation, decision thereon shall appertain to the relevant courts.

"7. The real-estate company shall, for the advantage of and at the expense of the relevant administrative agency, in agreement with the Council for Development and Reconstruction, and bound by the laws in force, fund and implement roads and build squares and public gardens in accordance with the general plan and the detailed directive system set for the area.

"Areas implemented in this way shall become public properties. They replace the area's equivalent undeveloped public properties, and the latter shall be deemed to have been legally withdrawn from public ownership; provided that the new areas shall not be less than the original areas.

"The real-estate company shall assume possession free of charge of any undeveloped parts of public properties that do not belong to the new public properties that are subject to the arrangement provided by this legislative decree.

"Developed public properties that the area's plan and system note as remaining on their site shall remain the property of the relevant public agency."

A monitoring committee has been formed from heads of economic groups and Beirut's chambers of commerce and industry to follow up the subject of rebuilding the commercial center and the real-estate company project with officials, so as to develop the best formula for implementing the project.

Sources say that these preliminary changes in the project are not what will render the project implementable. What makes it so is the reaching of a general agreement that the presence of Rafiq al-Hariri is indispensable to the project because of what he represents—namely, Saudi Arabia's support for Lebanon that has been constantly affirmed, particularly during the Lebanese war and the crises that have swept the region as a whole.

Economists say that it is still impossible to estimate the costs of the project, but that they will amount to billions, or will not be less than \$2 billion initially. How could Lebanon provide this without Arab participation?

All this explains the mechanism for implementing the project. With the establishment of the real-estate company and its official launching, the parcels that the project is to take over will be assembled according to an architectural and legal plan that the Lebanese government will be responsible for approving based on the opinion of the Council for Development and Reconstruction. The company will turn to raising money to award open contracts for road construction, water and electricity lines, and parking lots, bearing in mind that the plan envisages an area of 1 million square meters for

these lots. The operation of rubble removal and repairs will then begin, after evacuees have been removed and paid compensation. The last phase will involve the construction and sale of new buildings. In this last phase, the company will act as owner, with sales to begin at favorable prices. An exciting part of the project is the planned construction of an 85-meter-wide boulevard starting at the statue of Shaykh Bisharah al-Khuri and extending north to the sea. The last point that the special ministerial committee considered is that the project envisions erecting an opera on the ruins of what was known as "the public market," besides building public gardens. If the project sees light in accordance with its planned embodiment, it will implant in Beirut a unique pattern that unites the Western model inspired by the Champs Elysee in Paris and the Eastern style that the face of Beirut embodies with its monuments and buildings of Eastern architecture.

The issue of religious trusts and state properties remains unresolved. The preliminary text of the project implies that the same rules will apply to religious trust properties as apply to private property owners who become shareholders in the real-estate company. This has caused a negative reaction among the administrators of these religious trusts, although this is moving toward resolution. As for state properties, they are either lands owned by official agencies, and these come within the company's scope just as private and individual properties do; or they are built-up parcels belonging to the state. The latter are exempted, and the government will deal with them as it wishes.

Economics experts see a resemblance between the commercial center project in Beirut and a similar project in Paris on the basis of which the La Defense area was built. In the latter case, the company completed its work and sold off; it now owns only 5 percent of the project's total shares. This took place by agreement between the French government and the company. Similar cases exist in Europe and America. In Lebanon, however, the company does not envision the same sort of ownership; rather, partners will enter into the company. They will receive shares that can be sold or that can be relinquished at double the price if shareowners feel they have been misassessed—this in order to preserve the right of owners and leaseholders. The company is therefore being turned into a Lebanese joint stock company under the system in force. As the experts have said, it will operate with its cards on the table. It will announce each piece of real estate it sells, and its board of directors will be elected by shareholders at a general meeting.

These are various facts about progress in the project of the real-estate company to rebuild the center of Beirut. If final agreement is reached—and it seems that it will be—it will as a project integrate with the international-Arab fund to rebuild Lebanon, so that by the beginning of December reconstruction will have begun in Lebanon with the expected and required energy.

## MOROCCO

**Investment, Income Tax Accord Signed With Hungary**

92AF0231C Rabat L'OPINION in French  
13 Dec 91 pp 1,6

[Article by Laila Essadki: "Two Agreements Reached on Investment and Income Tax"]

[Text] As part of an effort to strengthen the relations between Morocco and Hungary, Mr. Muhammad Berrada, finance minister, signed two Moroccan-Hungarian agreements on 12 December 1991 with the Republic of Hungary's finance secretary of state, Mr. Bela Torok. The first encourages and protects investments on both sides, and the second bars double taxation and provides measures to prevent income tax evasion.

The two accords give fresh impetus to bilateral relations between the two countries, and open up future prospects for strengthening those relations, which are expected to break out of their traditional mold.

Until 1990, four agreements governed Moroccan-Hungarian relations:

- The April 1970 technical and scientific cooperation agreement;
- The April 1972 technical and scientific cooperation agreement;
- The trade agreement signed in November, 1989;
- The agreement on international highway transport of travelers and merchandise that was signed in October 1990.

During the signing of the accords to reciprocally encourage and protect investments and to prohibit double taxation and prevent income tax evasion, Mr. Berrada underscored Morocco's intention to expand its

relations with East European countries. Morocco is a founding member of the European Reconstruction and Development Bank (EBRD).

EBRD is the first multilateral institution created since the end of the Cold war, and is meant to assist East European countries in their transition to democracy and market economies.

The bank has 41 members, including 39 countries and two international institutions (the European Commission and the European Investment Bank).

As a founding member of EBRD, Morocco was allocated 10 million ECUs [European Currency Units], or one-thousandth of its capital.

EBRD is considered to be the third type of bank, that is, a half-business and half-development bank. It also hopes to act as both a technical and financial advisor to East European leaders. EBRD will play an essential role in building the physical infrastructures that will not be highly financially profitable immediately.

To obtain EBRD loans, however, the seven East European countries of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the USSR will have to meet the political condition of adopting pluralistic democratic principles and market economies.

Economic relations between Morocco and Hungary still fall well short of the potential of the two countries' economies.

Trade is still very limited, and exports have fallen abruptly since 1989 due to the plunge in phosphate sales.

In 1990, our imports from Hungary came to 147 million dirhams [DH], or 0.3 percent of our total imports. Exports were insignificant, amounting to only DH10 million.

Thus, our export/import coverage rate was not more than 5.7 percent in 1990, compared to 55 percent in 1989, and 233 percent [figure as published] in 1988.

**Table: Moroccan-Hungarian Trade Balance**  
(in millions of dirhams)

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	Sept 1991
Imports	93	78	122	211	174	133
Exports	95	195	285	117	10	8
Volume of trade	188	273	407	328	184	141
Balance	+2	+117	+163	-94	-164	-125
Rate of coverage	102%	250%	233%	55%	5.7%	6%

The main products exchanged in 1990 include, for imports, iron and steel ingots for a total of DH54.5 million, natural and chemical fertilizers for DH26.9 million, agricultural machinery and tools for DH18 million, and iron and steel bars, sheet piles, and sections for DH18 million. Virtually all of our export sales—DH9 million—to the Hungarian market consist of phosphates.

Financially, Moroccan debt liabilities to Hungary on bills of exchange amounted to 1.84 million U.S. dollars as of 31 December, 1990.

The last loan made by Hungary to Morocco was in 1986. It was a loan for US\$905,786 to finance six electric cranes at the Jorf Lasfar port. The term was for eight



years with an interest rate of 8.25 percent. Moreover, Hungary's limited financial assistance to Morocco prompted the two delegations at the last mixed Moroccan-Hungarian commission to pinpoint a number of sectors where aid could be stepped up, to stimulate that type of cooperation between the two countries. The list includes port equipment, mining and agricultural equipment, and subcontracting industries such as textile and leather fabrication and electrical components.

The Moroccan side underscored the importance of financing in carrying out investment projects in the Moroccan market, and asked for a line of credit to finance Hungarian equipment and services. The Hungarian side promised to submit the Moroccan request to the banking institutions who have authority in the matter, to study the establishment of a line of credit.

#### **Government Urged To Free Bourequat Brothers**

92AF0231B Paris *LE MONDE* in French 25 Dec 91 p 3

[Article: "Amnesty International Demands the Release of the Bourequat Brothers"]

[Text] In an appeal published Monday, 23 December, in London, Amnesty International has asked the Moroccan Government to "immediately release" the three Bourequat brothers, who have been listed as missing for nearly 18 years. The Bourequat brothers (Midhat Rene, Bayazid Jacques, and Ali Auguste) are French nationals through their father's side but were born and reared in Morocco. It is said that they are being held secretly, in "very bad conditions." Two of them, the humanitarian organization contends, "are very seriously ill." Amnesty International believes the brothers have been imprisoned for their political opinions. The Bourequat brothers were arrested 8 July 1973—officially for an identification check—and have neither been indicted nor tried in court; they may, Amnesty thinks, be held because of the past activities of their father. The latter worked with Muhammad V, who was the father of King Hassan and who set up the Moroccan counter-espionage organization. In addition, Moroccan humanitarian organizations indicated Monday that the health of eight political prisoners on a hunger strike since 26 November in the Oukacha prison near Casablanca was "deteriorating dangerously." Several members of their families began hunger strikes on Friday in a show of solidarity. The Oukacha prisoners, who were sentenced in 1986, notably for "disrupting public order," claim political prisoner status.

#### **Committee: National Day for Political Detainees**

92AF0231A Rabat *L'OPINION* in French  
18 Dec 91 pp 1, 4

[Article: "The Foundation of Democracy and Human Rights"; first paragraph is *L'OPINION* introduction]

[Text] "A campaign to collect a million citizen signatures."

The National Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of All Political Prisoners organized a national day in Casablanca last Saturday whose theme was "Liberty for all political prisoners and the return of exiles and kidnap victims."

All political parties who are members of the committee were present at the national event, as were the unions and cultural associations. The public responded in large numbers to the National Committee's appeal. There was also an extremely well-staffed police contingent on hand, so much so that 20 August Square, which is near the gathering place, seemed besieged by government forces.

The large public crowd demonstrated its maturity and realism by indicating that it was ready to mobilize to attain national objectives.

Most of the participants were young people ready to take up the torch to defend the country and its territorial integrity, and ready to pay whatever price is necessary, including the supreme sacrifice.

Many mothers of political prisoners took part in the national day.

In the very special atmosphere that prevailed, the bar president and attorney Muhammad Abdelhadi Al Kabbab, who presided over the meeting, invited the audience to recite verses of the "Fatiha" in remembrance of the martyrs who died in the struggle for democracy.

He then pointed out that the painful events of 14 December, 1990 were already one year old.

The 14 December issue, he said, would remain alive until Morocco became a country of democracy, freedom, and justice, until political prisoners were released, and until exiles and those kidnapped returned home.

The attorney Mr. Kabbab vigorously condemned the refusal of Casablanca authorities to allow the day to be celebrated at the Maarif Cultural Complex. It is a violation of the Constitution, he said, and of the code of public liberties.

He then saluted the national press, which is supporting the Committee, and asked that it make fresh efforts to win the fight. The press, he added, is one of our arms in the struggle.

Following Mr. Kabbab, the brother Noubir Amaoui, who is secretary general of the CDT [Democratic Labor Confederation], arose to speak about the events of 14 December and asked that the report of the investigatory commission be published. The officials have remembered nothing, he said, but we will not forget our martyrs.

After he spoke, the lawyer Abderrahmane Ben Amr got up to read the various telegrams received by the Committee on the occasion of the national day to remember the victims of the 1981 and January 1984 events, the Kenitra and Marrakesh prisoners, the exiles who met 8

and 9 December, 1991, in Maastricht, and the families of the former Tamasart prisoners.

Mr. Abderrahmane Akkar read the official message written by the Committee for the day.

On behalf of the families of political prisoners, Najiba Labrime told the audience about the hunger strike that was being observed in the prisons of Oujda and Oukacha and that is in its third week.

She asked that the national day be a starting point for a concerted effort to empty the prisons of all their political prisoners.

At the end of the meeting, the lawyer Abdelhaq Mantrach read the general communique.

### Major Banking Group To Expand Operations

92AF0188A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
9 Dec 91 p 9

[Article by Muna al-Bustani]

[Text] Rabat—The SOBAR corporation, owned by Moroccan businessman Ali Kettani, is considered to be one of Morocco's major private groups, with Wafabank constituting its backbone. This bank's capital will soon be substantially increased by \$50 million, to \$100 million.

AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned that the bank's capital will be opened to new international partners, including two financial establishments, one Italian and another Spanish. Bank officials have not ruled out the possibility of an Arab partner participating in this operation.

The SOBAR corporation has a 65 percent share in Wafabank capital, which is currently about 106.8 million Moroccan dirhams. The French Suez Financial Company, which owns 18 percent of Wafabank capital, is the most important international partner in this bank.

Wafabank has benefited from setting a strategy that enables it, through its close partnership with the Suez group, to be closely in touch with current developments in the international financial and banking sector. This has enabled it, during the last decade, to develop from an establishment engaged in traditional commercial banking activity into a major financial group. The group will expand by establishing a specialized company for each profession within the framework of what is known as the strategy of comprehensive financing services, in the hope that the this financial group will offer its clients something similar to a "financial supermarket" by offering a wide choice of financial services in the same location.

Thus, the scope of the activities of the Wafabank group include: commercial banking activities (Wafabank), business banking specializations [words illegible], leasing (Wafa Leasing Company), insurance (Wafa Insurance Company), data engineering (Wafa Data), real estate (Wafa Real Estate Company), and commerce (Wafa Trade Company).

The Wafabank group is the financial division of the SOBAR holding company, and represents the most important aspect of its activities in the various sectors of Morocco's economy. SOBAR manages 30 companies, employs about 10,000 people, and its transactions total \$300 million.

Businessman Ali Kettani began his activities in the textiles sector, and after Morocco's independence, he moved from the textiles trade to industrial investment in this sector. In 1957 he established the Manatex, Kovitex, and Textnor companies.

The success of these companies provided the financial means for SOBAR to enter a new field, namely the financial sector. In 1968, Ali Kettani obtained a major share of the Compagnie Marocaine de Credit et de Banque, CMCB, whose name became Wafabank in 1985. Since the sixties, the scope of SOBAR began to expand. In addition to the textile sector, in which it owns six major companies; and to the banking sector, which became a financial group with diverse specialties; SOBAR entered the fields of home appliances, food industries, maritime and land transportation, real estate, and others.

Thus, SOBAR became one of the largest Moroccan private corporations and Wafabank, which belongs to it, became the second largest private bank in Morocco after the Banque Commerciale du Maroc, which the North African Omnium (ONA) group owns. The Wafabank group developed its relations with international partners, even on the level of its own specialized companies and the expertise of a number of specialized establishments managed by the French Suez group, such as "Loca France" in the field of leasing, and "Sovinko" company in the field of consumer lending. The Wafa Trade group activities recently developed within the framework of Wafabank, thereby becoming a holding company managing several other companies under it in the field of revitalizing foreign marketing. It has set up establishments with limited specializations, such as Finabro, Soframad, and Meditrade. Through its branches, the Wafa Trade partnership developed its ties with foreign establishments, such as the French Promodis and the Credit Populaire d'Algerie. The Wafa Trade company also owns the al-Mahajir Market, which is active in uses merchants' shops under a system that exempts them from paying customs in major Moroccan ports. Wafa Trade's activity will soon include the American market. It will set up a company there specializing in Moroccan agricultural exports.

Wafabank group is seeking to expand its international presence. In addition to representative offices in Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, [Anvers], Liege, Amsterdam, Lyon, and Paris, and to its branch in Brussels, the bank opened two offices in Algiers and Abu Dhabi, and will soon open

two offices in Jiddah and Tripoli. It will also open a branch in Paris and six agencies throughout France. Meanwhile, a number of specialized companies belonging to Wafabank group are tending toward internationalization.

The Wafabank group accounts are managed by Price Waterhouse and seeks advice from international offices in working out the basis of its development strategy. Within this framework the group deals with French branches of international companies such as Booz, Allen, and Hamilton; Anderson Consulting, Mack; and High Management.

Relationships with these establishments has enabled the group, in addition to entering into partnership with the French group Suez, to keep abreast of international developments in the finance and banking business. This is evident in the group's participation in creating a market for new business for Moroccan banks through its specialized partnerships. It also contributed to introducing currency activities in Morocco.

The group's expected partnership with Italian and Spanish banks is a new element that will allow it to benefit from more specific international experience and expertise in the field of finance.

Apparently the cancellation of bank loan regulations that was implemented this year had a positive effect on Wafabank. AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned that the bank is expected to realize 132 million dirhams (\$14.66 million) in after-tax profits by the end of the current year, and to handle transactions valued at one billion dirhams (\$111 million).

Abd al-Hak Benani, vice president and general manager of Wafabank, expects positive effects from the Moroccan banking sector's efforts to establish an international financial zone in Tangier.

Ali Kettani, delegate chairman of SOBAR Group and Wafabank, told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that his membership in the appropriations committee does not allow the SOBAR holding company to take part in the sale of 112 public sector companies to the private sector. "But," he added, "this does not preclude the possibility of providing financial assistance and guidance to customers if they need it. This is done through Wafabank or any of its specialized companies contributing to the capital of the company that receives appropriations."

## OMAN

### Ministers' Shuffle Allegedly Supports Development

92AE0136A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
13 Dec 91 p 2

[Article by 'Isam Hashish: "Recent Cabinet Shuffle in Sultanate of Oman Reflects Ambitious Strategy for Economic, Social Development"]

[Text] Muscat—The cabinet shuffle by Sultan Qabus Bin-Sa'id affecting seven Omani Government ministers confirms predictions that the government is in the process of adopting forceful and decisive positions on issues of national concern to the sultanate and is preparing to implement an ambitious and effective strategy to implement development plans in the economic and social fields.

Informed sources say that the creation of the Consultative Council in the Sultanate of Oman—it will start work with the beginning of the coming year—represents a new stage in the system of government in the sultanate and requires reorganization of the administrative apparatus of the state. New faces must be promoted to ministerial rank for the first time, while experienced talents must also be utilized to form an integrated, homogeneous task force to energize government work and performance, and to implement the goals of comprehensive development.

### Vital Issues

The sultanate faces an important series of national issues. Efforts and energies are being mustered to resolve them safely. One of the most important issues is the question of diversifying sources of national income and not relying on oil as a sole source of income. The national work force must be made indigenous, thereby providing an opportunity for natives of the country to participate in the development of their land without relying on guest workers. The concept of consultation must be deepened, as a system that shares in national decisionmaking by advancing opinions and ideas that work to turn the wheels of action, solve problems, and propose legislation required by the times.

These three main issues include many important details with profound implications. Sultan Qabus' government is eager to make them firm pillars of plans for development action.

### Industrial, Agricultural Development

Sultan Qabus' proclamation of 1992 as a second "year of industry," in which efforts and energies will be dedicated to developing industrial activity in the sultanate so as to enable industry to assume an important place among income-yielding sectors, is considered to be an important support to promote this sector. The royal decree effecting the reshuffle gives Engineer Maqbul Bin-'Ali Sultan, head of the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry, responsibility for the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The ministry's former head, Salim Bin-'Abdallah al-Ghazali, known for his talent and energy, has been transferred to take charge of the Ministry of Communications in a move designed to stimulate government performance.

The issue of rationing water consumption and finding new water sources is considered fundamental for the agricultural sector, which represents the largest source of national income after oil, and comprises the largest part of the native work force.

The sultanate is launching a broad campaign to ration water consumption. The alarm has already sounded in the form of falling groundwater levels, due to extravagant consumption of this reserve and haphazard expansion of agriculture, especially in the fertile al-Batinah Plain, which is known as the sultanate's main food basket.

The decree reshuffling the cabinet has entrusted administration of the Ministry of Water Resources to Hamid Bin-Sa'id al-'Awadi, a former military man of proven talent and resolve.

#### Benefiting From Native Cadres

The issue of "Omanizing" important jobs holds major importance on the domestic front in the sultanate. This will provide an opportunity to use qualified, trained native cadres to supply the country's labor needs and lessen dependence on guest workers. Although the fourth five-year development plan (1991-1995) will provide about 162,000 new jobs, figures show that Omanis will hold only 62,000 of them and that more guest workers will be used in coming years to fill needed positions. The important question is how to replace the guest workers in these jobs with qualified, trained Omani workers afterward.

The sultanate, in fact, embarked on the experiment of creating a Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training. However, after evaluation showed that the results were not up to expectations, royal decrees reorganized the administrative structure. The ministry was abolished, and its functions were assigned to the Ministry of Social Affairs, which was renamed the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. The decrees created an independent public organization for vocational training, headed by Bakhit Bin-Sa'id al-Shanfari.

#### Popular Participation

In the area of popular participation in decisionmaking, represented by the creation of the new Consultative Council, decrees regulating its activities and formation were issued a few weeks ago. It constitutes a historic, qualitative transition in the sultanate, opening the door to further additions in the form and manner of popular participation in decisionmaking on economic and social development plans.

The new council is composed of 59 members, representing the 59 administrative divisions [wilayas] of the sultanate. It is headed by Shaykh 'Abdallah Bin-'Ali al-Qutbi, former head of the State Advisory Council.

He was selected again because of his talent and broad experience in the field. Representatives of the country's administrative divisions were chosen by direct choice from well-informed persons in each administrative division, without any suspicion of government influence, so that the selection would flow from the people themselves. The new council has been entrusted with broad powers and prerogatives that were not granted to its predecessor, the State Advisory Council. These include

reviewing legislation; offering ideas, studies, and opinions; and suggesting amendments to government plans. It also has the power to question ministers and monitor government performance, as well as other activities. It represents a qualitative change in the performance of the system of consultation in Oman.

By virtue of these steps, involving a cabinet reshuffle, creation of a Consultative Council, and restructuring the state administrative apparatus, Omanis believe the triangle of action has been completed to implement a strategy of comprehensive growth, so as to realize hopes for the coming period.

## SAUDI ARABIA

### Shaykh Comments on Peace Conference

92AE0135B Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 15 Nov 91 p 4

[Munir al-'Arab: "Al-Jaza'iri Tells AL-UMMAH AL-ISLAMIYAH 'I Prayed With Shaykh Ibn-Baz For Peace Conference Success'"]

[Text] Jiddah—Shaykh al-Jaza'iri, a teacher at the venerable Prophet's Mosque, rejected the position of some Islamic groups and leaders who reject the peace conference.

In statements to AL-UMMAH AL-ISLAMIYAH, the shaykh implored the rejectionists to have mercy on their Palestinian brothers who are being uprooted every day from the occupied Arab lands. He indicated that the Palestinian intifadah has become a kind of suicide, with unarmed people opposing a brutal enemy armed to the teeth. He asked how stones could confront guns, regardless of how we exaggerate the moral impact of this.

The shaykh asked everyone to support the joint Palestinian delegation at the peace conference.

He said, "The Prophet—on whom be God's blessing and peace—concluded treaties and covenants with the Jews when he emigrated to Madinah. When they breached and violated the treaty, he fought them, and God, who is praised and exalted, aided him against them."

He added: "Let us make a contract of peace with the Jews. If they break it, we will fight them after we catch our breath and prepare ourselves for it."

He said that he had met in Riyadh with Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz Ibn-'Abdallah Ibn-Baz, general head of the Department of Academic Research, Fatwas [Islamic religious rulings], Preaching, and Guidance. "We discussed the subject of the peace conference. Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz and I prayed for the success of the participants."

Shaykh al-Jaza'iri pointed out that there are many assurances and guarantees for whatever emerges from the conference. These include the participation of the United States—the greatest country in the world today—



as well as the participation of the United Nations, which includes all the Arab states in its membership.

Recalling the past, the shaykh explained that Muslims lost Palestine for their sins. When, in the past, they rejected peace with the Jews, they were not fit for it because of their sins also. "By God," he said, "they are our sins. Perish the thought that God should act unjustly toward his worshippers! But it was our turning away from our religion, when we turned the Koran—our constitution and path—into words to be intoned at graves and over the dead."

At the end of his statement, Shaykh al-Jaza'iri stressed that Palestine will return to the Muslims when they are truly Muslims. "Then," he said, "the divine promise will be fulfilled. We shall fight them and take what they took from us. Even the stones will speak [to warn Muslims] and say, 'O Muslim, there is a Jew behind me!' Now, however, they will not speak to say, 'O Arab, there is a Jew behind me!'"

#### **Afghans Receive 7.5 Million Riyals From Refugee Fund**

92AE0115F Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 30 Nov 91 p 1

[Article: "By Direction of Prince Salman, 7.5 Million Sent to Saudi Relief Committee in Pakistan To Support, Care for Afghan Mujahidin"]

[Text] At the direction of Prince Salman Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, the governor of Riyadh and chairman of the General Organization for Afghan Mujahidin Donations, 7.5 million Saudi riyals has been sent from the organization's account to the Saudi Relief Committee in Pakistan, for the support and care of Afghan mujahidin and refugees.

The organization urged citizens and residents to remember their brothers, the Afghan mujahidin, in these circumstances through which the Afghan jihad is passing, with the beginning of the harsh winter season.

Moreover, the Afghan refugees who were driven from their homes and funds are suffering from God alone knows what hardships and miseries of life and difficulties of emigration.

The organization calls on citizens and residents to donate to their Afghan brothers in order to help them face the difficult circumstances that they are encountering. God does not miss an opportunity to reward the good deed. He said: "Believe in God and His prophet and give out of the substance of whereof he has made you heirs. For those of you who believe and give, they shall have a great reward." [Koran 57:7]

#### **Saudi Adviser Discusses Guaranteed Oil Supply**

92AE0115A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
14 Nov 91 pp 10

[Article by Ibrahim al-[Mahna], adviser to the Saudi Arabian minister of petroleum and mineral resources: "Gulf Oil, the Question of Guaranteed Supply"]

[Text] Political, economic and geographic interaction had distinguished the history of the Gulf region for a long time before the discovery of oil there. The role of the huge oil reserves has highlighted the geopolitical dimension of the region, because of oil's importance to the world economy.

I would like to mention here one issue that has been often discussed during the past decades. That is the question of "guaranteed supply." My aim is to underscore the fact that the Gulf oil supply enjoys a considerable guarantee and, perhaps, one that is superior to any other world region.

The question of guaranteed supply is relative and is not necessarily tied only to political and military factors. It is customary, in this regard, to ignore the factor of "oil economies," in light of the narrow definition of the concept of guaranteed supply, despite the importance of the cost factor of drilling for and producing oil to guarantee a supply of crude. What benefit is derived from obtaining access to oil, whose cost of production is enormous, or which cannot be extracted from the depths of the earth through the use of currently available technology?

I believe that the true guarantee of supply lies in obtaining oil whose cost of production is relatively cheap and that is available in abundant quantities. Other factors, such as relations between management and labor, would also play a role in defining the degree of true guarantee in this supply.

In accordance with the definition of guaranteed supply that I mentioned, I think that the Gulf region is the most stable source of oil in the world. Oil is available in great quantities, and its production cost is considered the lowest of its type in the world. Moreover, the cost of drilling for crude in the Gulf is also the lowest of its type in the world.

Huge reserves of crude in the Gulf region are being produced by national oil companies that follow long-range policies. National oil corporations do not suffer from worry over quarterly production expectations. Despite the fact that they are aimed at achieving profits, they aspire to achieve great profits over the long term, instead of concentrating on short-term profit. This is a matter that involves more than guaranteed supply. These corporations also enjoy stable relationships between management and labor. They have not experienced labor disputes.

Because guaranteed supply is a relative question, as I have said, there might be supplies that are totally guaranteed from any region in the world, and over the long term. However, these guaranteed supplies might be subject to a turndown in production volume, natural disasters, wars, political disputes, etc.

North African oil production has been on the decrease for several years, while the Soviet Union's production was subject to many difficulties throughout the present century (including World War I, the 1917 Revolution, World War II, and now the political crisis that is still ongoing there). Furthermore, North Sea production is affected by limitation on services and weather vicissitudes.

In comparing these main production areas with the Gulf region, the Gulf region is considered the most guaranteed. It has about 65 percent of the world's crude oil resources, and production rates there are rising instead of decreasing. Except for the danger to oil exports in 1973, the oil supply from the Gulf region has been upset only twice since production began there. The first time was during the Iranian Revolution, and the second because of the Iraqi-Iranian War, which went on from 1979 to 1989. When it reached its apex, the war led to a downturn in supply of about 8 million barrels per day, as a result of the deteriorating production by the two embattled nations. Despite that, the shortfall was compensated for by the Gulf region itself. The second time that the Gulf region's oil supply was upset was because of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. That led to a downturn in supply by more than 4 million barrels per day, but the shortfall was again made up immediately by the Gulf region itself, where Saudi Arabia compensated for most of the losses in supply.

From these events, the following becomes clear:

1. The Gulf region is a guaranteed source of supply. Even when upheaval occurs in one of the area's nations, the rest of the producing countries restore stability to the market by compensating for the loss in supply.
2. I hope that we will have learned from our past mistakes and from unpleasant experiences in the Gulf region. Some in Europe believed that World War I was the war to end all wars. They were mistaken in their belief, since it was followed by World War II. However, now we see a time of peace in the West; World War III has not occurred, perhaps because of the enormous mutual damage that could result from it. Nevertheless, it is clear that peace will continue to prevail for the near future.

In the Middle East, we believed that the Iran-Iraq War would be the war to end all wars, but we were also mistaken. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the world stood against the Iraqi attack on its small, peaceful neighbor.

This war was more painful than the war that preceded it (the Iran-Iraq War). It changed the political climate in the region. People want peace, economic development, and the stability of their freedoms. This climate has been

directed toward events in the entire Middle East region. The peace conference that was recently held in Madrid brought new hope for the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

3. Stability in world oil markets is one of the goals of the Gulf nations' oil policies. It is a principal pillar of Saudi oil policy. The government of the custodian of the two holy mosques, King Fahd Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, has always supported stability in markets and the avoidance of any extreme fluctuations.

The oil pipeline, extending east-to-west across Saudi Arabia, has brought geographical diversification to Saudi crude oil supply export centers. This line will soon make it possible to ship half of the country's oil production through export centers on the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia has constantly striven to cover any shortfall in world crude supplies, within the framework of its concern to safeguard stability in markets. Moreover, it is currently working to strengthen its production capability to meet expected growth in world demand.

Saudi Arabia also is trying to achieve international integration in the oil industry. Its joint projects in the fields of refining and distribution, such as the joint project with the Texaco Company, which is well known under the name "Star Enterprise", have achieved great success.

Integrating production processes with refining and distribution represents one of the pillars of Saudi policy aimed at strengthening stability in world oil markets. As the Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Hisham Nazir said during his recent speech at Harvard: "Achieving stability in the oil market is only possible through close cooperation between producers and consumers. Integration in the international oil industry represents one aspect of this cooperation." Minister Hisham Nazir also stated that "mutual security" between producers and consumers was more beneficial than the one-sided and limited concept of "guaranteed supply". In any event, oil is plentiful in the Gulf region, and the world may rest assured that the Gulf area's supply will continue for decades to come.

#### **Industrial Development Fund Finances 44 Projects** *92AE0115E Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 22 Nov 91 p 3*

[Article: "Industrial Development Fund Annual Report; 18.053 Billion Riyals in Credits for Fund-Financed Projects"]

[Text] Credits for projects financed by the Saudi Industrial Development Fund [IDF], totaled 18.053 billion Saudi riyals, of which 12.916 billion riyals have been disbursed. Payments of 9.081 billion riyals were made to the fund by investors.

The minister of finance and national economy, Professor Muhammad Aba al-Khayl, made this clear in a statement upon issuing the Saudi IDF annual report for Hijra fiscal year 1410-1411 [1990-1991]. His excellency said that the fund was operating two programs for financing cold storage warehouses and date-packing projects. The fund's credits for the first project, as of the end of Hijra fiscal year 1410-1411, totaled 380 million riyals, while the second program was 95 million riyals.

The minister of finance and national economy also referred to the number of industrial projects that the IDF has financed in various areas of the kingdom since its inception. They have amounted to 1,374 loans granted to share in establishing and expanding 1,112 industrial projects.

During the past Hijra fiscal year, the IDF made 62 loans totaling 953 million riyals to participate in the establishment of 44 new projects and the expansion of 18 other industrial projects.

The engineering products sector led the sectors in obtaining loans this year. Its loans totalled 313 million riyals. It was followed by the chemical products sector, with approximately 268 million riyals, and the consumer products sector with 252 million riyals in loans.

Among the new loans granted to the engineering sector during this year was 80 million riyals to construct a factory in Riyadh to maintain, restore, and rebuild aircraft engines.

The cost of projects for which the fund made loans to the engineering sector this year was approximately 707 million riyals.

Eight projects concerning production operations were begun in this sector; they are for the production of electrical tools, solar energy equipment, and metal pipes. Projects financed by the IDF in this sector achieved revenues totaling 6.589 billion riyals during Hijra fiscal year 1410-1411. This is equivalent to 28 percent of total sales by industrial projects this year.

In the chemical products sector during Hijra fiscal year 1410-1411, the IDF made 19 loans amounting to 268 million riyals. Among new loans granted was one for 45 million riyals to help to construct a plant to produce chlorine, chemical soda, and hydrochloric acid. The fund also granted two other loans to construct two factories in al-Dammam and another in Jiddah.

Among projects that began commercial production during Hijra fiscal year 1410-1411 in this sector was a plant that is considered the first of its kind in Saudi Arabia. This plant will produce pharmaceuticals and drugs in the industrial city of al-Qasim, with a production capacity of 126 million units per year. This is the largest plant of its kind in the Middle East.

Total revenue of companies operating in this sector was 5.071 billion riyals during this fiscal year, which is an

increase of 22.1 percent over revenues of Hijra fiscal year 1409-1410 [1989-1990].

In the consumer products sector, the IDF made 18 loans during this fiscal year for approximately 252 million riyals. Among the new loans for this sector was a loan for 50 million riyals to participate in building a factory in Jiddah to produce and package milk, vegetables, and tomato sauce.

The fund also loaned 27 million riyals to build a plant in al-Dammam to manufacture non-woven products of artificial fibers, in addition to a loan for 10 million riyals to participate in constructing a factory in Riyadh to produce wood furniture.

Revenues from projects financed by the IDF in this sector totaled 7.566 billion riyals during Hijra fiscal year 1410-1411.

In the building materials sector, total loans made by the fund from its foundation to the end of Hijra fiscal year 1410-1411 totaled 2.829 billion riyals.

#### Minister Explains SABIC Production Objectives

92AE0115D Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 27 Nov 91 p 25

[Article: "SABIC Complexes in al-Jubayl Include Six Companies; Expansion Projects To Strengthen SABIC's Position in International Markets"]

[Text] Al-Jubayl—On 26 November 1991, the minister of industry and electricity, Engineer 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abdallah al-Zamil, conducted an inspection tour that included several SABIC [Saudi Arabia Basic Industries Corporation] complexes in the industrial city of al-Jubayl. They are: al-Razi, Gaz, Hadid, Ibn-Zahr, Sharq, and Petrokemya.

His excellency, accompanied by Professor Ibrahim Bin-'Abdallah Bin-Salmah, chairman of SABIC's Board of Directors and the appointed member, inspected the progress of production processes in these complexes and the status of the expansion projects underway within them.

This visit coincided with the approaching start of production in some of these expansion projects. During the tour, the minister expressed his satisfaction with the progress of the production performance of the SABIC complexes in general, and the fact that progress in implementing the expansion projects was on schedule. He pointed out that the added production capacity of the expansion projects will help to strengthen SABIC's position in international markets and help to comply with the demands of these markets for products and new varieties of products. This will bring more stability and cohesion to these markets.

On another level, the minister made it clear that the additional capacity—with the present capabilities—will enable SABIC and the industrial processing sector to

have a greater role in overall local production. These products will provide broader horizons and greater investment opportunities for local investors. These products will also form new support for desired agricultural and developmental plans and programs.

It is worth noting that the expansion projects, which will continue to be created until 1993, will include the following complexes:

- The complex of the Saudi Methanol Company (al-Razi), to increase annual capacity of methanol to 1.2 million tons from the current 640,000 tons.
- The complex of the National Methanol Company (Ibn-Sina), to add 500,000 tons of [enriched] butyl methylic ether, in addition to the current capacity of 770,000 tons of methanol.
- The complex of the Saudi-European Petrochemical Company (Ibn-Zahr), to raise the annual capacity of [enriched] methyl tri-butyl ether [MTBE] to 1.2 million tons, compared with 500,000 tons at present, and to add 200,000 tons of polypropylene.
- The complex of the Saudi Iron and Steel Company (Hadid), to increase the annual capacity to 2 million tons of rebar and reinforcing rods, compared with 1.6 million tons currently.
- The complex of the National Plastics Company (Ibn-Hayyan), to increase the annual capacity of polyvinyl chloride material to 300,000 tons, compared with the current 200,000 tons, along with 300,000 tons of vinyl chloride monomer.
- The complex of the Arab Petrochemical company (Petrochemia), to add 500,000 tons of ethylene, 300,000 tons of propylene, 100,000 tons of [butadane], and 70,000 tons of benzene, in addition to the current production of 650,000 tons of ethylene, 100,000 tons of polystyrene, and 50,000 tons of butane-1.
- Saudi Petrochemical Company (SADAF), to add 60,000 tons of styrene.
- The National Industrial Gas Company (Gas), to increase annual capacity of nitrogen to 489,000 tons, along with 876,000 tons of oxygen.
- The complex of the Eastern Petrochemical Company (Sharq), to double its current production of ethylene glycol and linear low density polyethylene to 660,000 tons and 280,000 tons, respectively.
- The complex of the new Saudi Arabia Fertilizer Company (SAFCO) in al-Jubayl, to add 500,000 tons of ammonia and 600,000 tons of granular urea to the current production in al-Dammam, which is 330,000 tons of urea, 100,000 tons of sulfuric acid, and 20,000 tons of melamine.

#### Trade Balance for First Quarter 1991 Shows Surplus

92AE0115C Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 17 Nov 91 p 18

[Article by 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Jabarayn: "Foreign Trade Statistics for First Quarter 1991; Exports of 40.5 Billion Riyals, Imports Rose 2.5 Percent; Kingdom's Trade Balance Achieves Surplus of 20.129 Billion Riyals"]

[Text] The Ministry of Finance and National Economy's General Statistics Agency issued a report on foreign trade statistics for the first quarter of 1991, and compared them with the first quarter of 1990.

Saudi Arabia exports through the first quarter of 1991 totalled 40.5 billion Saudi riyals, an increase of 11.213 billion riyals, or 38 percent, over the first quarter of 1990. This increase is attributed to the rise in value and amount of oil exports, since the amount exported during this quarter totalled 612 million barrels, compared with 425.9 million barrels during the same period in 1990. The value rose 47 percent, totaling 37.379 billion riyals during this quarter, compared with 25.440 billion riyals during last year's first quarter.

Non-petroleum exports registered a downturn of 18.9 percent, totalling 3.121 billion riyals for the first quarter of 1991. The breakdown was as follows:

- Chemical and plastic products, 2.389 billion riyals;
- Ordinary minerals, 172 million riyals;
- Transportation equipment, 114 million riyals;
- Agricultural products, 100 million riyals;
- Miscellaneous exports, 346 million riyals.

These exports were valued at 3.746 billion riyals for the first quarter of 1990 and, respectively, were: 2.019 billion riyals, 406 million riyals, 307 million riyals, 214 million riyals, and 900 million riyals.

Saudi Arabian imports for the first quarter of 1991 registered an increase of 2.5 percent, compared with the same period of 1990. Imports increased from 19.882 billion riyals to 20.371 billion riyals during the first quarter of 1991. Details of goods imported are as follows:

- Foodstuffs in the first quarter of 1991 amounted to 3.457 billion riyals, compared with 3.123 billion riyals for the same period last year, a rise of 10.7 percent.
- Furniture and clothing totaled 1.281 billion riyals, compared with 1.830 billion riyals for the same period of 1990. This was a decrease of 30 percent.
- Medicine was 467 million riyals, compared with 457 million riyals for the same period of 1990, an increase of 2.2 percent.
- Chemical products amounted to 2.105 billion riyals, compared with 1.795 billion riyals for the same period of 1990, a rise of 17.3 percent.
- Wood and wood products totaled 337 million riyals compared with 296 million riyals for the same period in 1990, an increase of 13.9 percent.
- Gold, jewelry, and gems were 1.161 billion riyals compared with 1.283 billion riyals for the previous year 1990, a decrease of 9.5 percent.
- Iron and iron products totaled 1.663 billion riyals compared with 2.039 billion riyals for the same period of 1990, a decrease of 19.9 percent.



- Tools, equipment, and electrical materials were 4.004 billion riyals compared with 3.111 billion riyals for the same period in 1990, an increase of 28.7 percent.
- Automobiles and parts totalled 2.149 billion riyals compared with 1.585 billion riyals for the same period of 1990, a rise of 35.6 percent.
- Communications equipment totalled 1.51 billion riyals compared with 1.922 billion riyals during the same period of 1990, a drop of 21.4 percent.
- Other miscellaneous goods totalled 2.267 billion riyals compared with 2.441 billion riyals for the same period of 1990, a decrease of 7.1 percent.

The ranking of countries exporting to Saudi Arabia during the first quarter of 1991 was:

- United States, with imports valued at 4.092 billion riyals during this period;
- Japan, with 3.813 billion riyals;
- England, with 2.135 billion riyals;
- Germany, 1.615 billion riyals;
- Switzerland, 1.108 billion riyals;
- France, 1.056 billion riyals;
- Italy, 936 million riyals;
- South Korea, 553 million riyals;
- Netherlands, 477 million riyals;
- Belgium, 397 million riyals.

Saudi Arabia's balance of trade achieved a surplus of 20.129 billion riyals, compared with a surplus of 9.405 billion riyals during the same period of 1990.

#### **Daba' Port First Stage Completed**

92AE0115B Riyadh AL-JAZIRAH in Arabic  
12 Oct 91 p 6

[Article by Muhammad Hasan al-(Jahni): "Port To Accommodate 3 Ships at Once; 700,000-Ton Annual Capacity"]

[Text] On the occasion of first stage completion of the commercial port of Daba', AL-JAZIRAH talked with the port's director, Engineer 'Atiyah 'Abd-al-Rahman al-[Muwaylihi], about this accomplishment. He said that the port's first stage cost 88.39 million Saudi riyals, and that the port of Daba' is located approximately 480 km north of Yanbu' and 180 km southwest of Tabuk.

Work has been completed on three piers to be used for merchandise, which are 10.5 meters deep, along with the installation of equipment to accommodate roll-on/roll-off ships in the merchandise piers; a pier for fishing boats, with a length of 100 meters and a depth of six meters; a pier for border guard launches, with a length of 60 meters and a depth of six meters; an internal channel with a depth of 11 meters; and, fencing to enclose the port that is approximately 8,000 meters in length.

The port of Daba' can receive ships with a total cargo load of 30,000 tons, and is capable of accommodating three ships at the same time. The port can handle

700,000 tons of cargo annually. This port will serve the northwestern region of Saudi Arabia and will lead to tangible savings in transportation and goods costs. The distance between that region and the nearest port in Saudi Arabia will be reduced by about one-fourth.

The distance between Daba' and one of Egypt's ports is approximately 160 km and can be crossed in four hours. Daba' has a future expansion capability that will be completed in two stages. The first will include three warehouses with 20,000 [square] meters of floor space, open storage areas of 300,000 square meters, a mosque, a port administration building, a distillery, power plant, a center for navigational control, and employee housing. The second stage will include four general merchandise piers; three for livestock; two for loose grain, with expanded open storage areas; and six warehouses.

#### **Medicine Production Aims for Self-Sufficiency**

92AE0135A Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 7 Dec 91 p 15

[Article: "Kingdom Moves Toward Producing Its Medicine Needs Locally"]

[Text] Founded on 1 May 1986 to produce human medicines, the Saudi Pharmaceutical Production and Medical Equipment Company is a Saudi corporation with an announced capital of 300 million Saudi riyals (fully paid now). Its goal is to establish in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia an advanced pharmaceutical industry able to produce, market, and develop pharmaceutical materials and medical preparations and equipment. This includes the construction, acquisition, and operation of factories and the furnishing of facilities to produce medicines, extracts, active ingredients, and necessary packaging materials. The corporation also markets these products and acquires and registers trademarks and transportation vehicles as necessary. It concludes agreements and obtains franchises, so as to keep up with the tremendous development occurring in the kingdom overall, and in the medical sector in particular. It thus keeps step with development plans in the kingdom and the Gulf region, and with Arab aspirations for achieving Arab self-sufficiency in medicines.

The establishment of the Saudi Pharmaceutical Production and Medical Equipment Company can be considered an important turning point in Saudi Arabia's ambitious overall course of development and in the development plan for the Saudi health sector in particular. It can also be considered an important step in the kingdom's successful course toward achieving the goals of industrialization, modernization, advanced technology transfer and absorption in all fields; diversifying the national economy and income sources; and reducing reliance on oil.

More than 70,000 Saudi citizens, along with a group of physicians and pharmacists, participated in founding the Saudi Pharmaceutical Production and Medical Equipment Company. They own 75 percent of the shares. The

Arab Pharmaceutical Production and Medical Equipment Company (ACDIMA) contributed 25 percent of the corporation's capital. The goal was to utilize all available domestic and Arab capacities in order to achieve the company's goals.

#### Drug Factory in al-Qasim

The company accordingly established its first and most important project, the pharmaceutical factory in al-Qasim, the first and only factory of its kind in the kingdom. It was built to the most modern specifications and with the help of the best international talents in the design, construction, and equipping of pharmaceutical factories. Located in the al-Qasim industrial zone, the factory has an area of 150,000 square meters. It is composed of five production sections designed to be completely isolated from each other and from the remaining sections of the factory through the use of a highly advanced and complex ventilation system and high-quality air filters to assure full protection and complete isolation of these highly sensitive sections in accordance with the highest requirements of this advanced and complex industry. The sections have been built to facilitate future expansion.

The factory also includes a building for services and conveniences, an enormous storage warehouse, a building for receiving and delivering goods, another for administration and laboratories, and a number of other support buildings.

The factory, which began production in the first half of 1990, was designed to produce high-quality pharmaceutical preparations that realize the pharmaceutical company's quality and variety goals. It was designed to guarantee maintenance of good manufacturing procedures on all levels of production and to enable production of 120 different varieties of preparations representing the most important pharmaceutical groups and therapeutic categories. These include tranquilizers, allergy drugs, rheumatism drugs, vitamins, cough medicines, and digestive system drugs. Three of the factory's five sections have already been put in operation. The remaining sections will be put in operation during 1992.

The company now is developing and producing a number of products under its own name and bearing its own trademark.

It also produces other products under license from various highly-reputable international pharmaceutical companies.

During this year, the antibiotics and liquid and dry tonics sections were put in operation, and marketing of these products began. Preparations are now under way to begin operating the disinfectant preparations section.

The factory has an annual production capacity of 800 million capsules and pills, 23 million bottles of tonic, 15 million injection ampules, 85 million bottles of mouth

drops, 15 million bottles of eye drops and ear drops, and over 10 million tubes of ointment and creme.

On the basis of a thorough study of the medicine market and its needs in the kingdom, a production policy list has been drawn up. It includes the pharmaceutical products that the factory currently produces or plans to produce in the future in the various stages of its operation.

The second half of 1990 saw the start of kingdom-wide sale and distribution of the company's preparations to government agencies and to specialized and university hospitals. The company signed a 73-million-riyal contract with the Ministry of Health under which the company will supply the ministry with its antibiotics needs from the production of the al-Qasim pharmaceutical factory. Delivery has already begun in record time.

#### Projects in Process of Implementation

The company is participating in two medical equipment projects currently in the process of implementation:

1. The National X-Ray Film Company is a joint project involving the Pharmaceutical Company, the National Manufacturing Company, and a number of domestic investors, with technical cooperation from the Belgian firm of Agfa-Gevaert. It aims at producing the kingdom's needs in X-ray film.

2. The Arab Medical Products Manufacturing Company ('Inayah) is a joint project involving the Pharmaceutical Company, the Saudi al-'Alyan Holding Company, and the American Kimberly Clark Company. It aims at producing the kingdom's needs in single-use hospital equipment.

Work on building and equipping these projects is expected to be completed by the end of 1991. The two projects are to begin actual production in the second quarter of 1992.

#### Future Company Projects

1. The company has obtained a permit to establish a branch named "The Saudi Antiseptics Company (Mutahhirat)" to produce various antiseptics. The project has made good progress and is expected to enter the implementation phase in the first half of 1992. As a result of studies of the market and its requirements, a list of products that the factory will produce in the future has been compiled.

2. The company has also obtained a permit to establish a branch named "The Saudi Plasma Production Company (Plasma)" to produce human blood derivatives. The project is still in the stage of market studies. However, on the basis of this study, the company has drawn up a list of products that the factory will produce.

3. The company has made good progress in studying and preparing a project to produce veterinary medicines. It is also currently studying a project to produce surgical thread.

### Phosphate Reserves Reach 4.470 Billion Tons

92AE0135C Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic  
10 Dec 91 p 23

[Article: "Kingdom Is One of World's Countries With Largest Phosphate Reserves, 4.470 Billion Tons"]

[Text] The Petroleum Ministry's deputy minister for mineral resources, Professor Ibrahim Ahmad Khabiri, has ended a field tour of the al-Jalamid area east of the city of Turayf. The purpose of the tour was to gather information about the progress of work at a mining site considered one of the most important phosphate sites in the kingdom.

Commenting on his tour, Professor Ibrahim Khabiri said that its purpose was to get a more detailed, close-up view of the results reached by economic feasibility studies of phosphate ore at a site where studies have confirmed the discovery of many deposits that place the kingdom high among the world's countries in total phosphate resources.

The Petroleum Ministry's deputy minister for mineral resources stated that steps to explore, prospect for mines, and delineate many metal and non-metal deposits in the kingdom are proceeding in tandem with the development policies of all the state's agencies and institutions. He said that "whereas in past years, we were able to overcome sand barriers and rough mountain areas by covering large parts of the kingdom with technical maps in order to reach mineralogically promising areas and learn what ores they contained, it is a real achievement to have brought our studies to the stage of detailed operations related to exploiting and evaluating the ores and determining the quantities, kinds, sizes, and dimensions of their reserves, as well as methods and means for extracting, treating, and concentrating them. With God's help this has been done, translated into reality by all the supporting efforts and actions which, in themselves, are an effective means of developing fields that fit in with the needs and future of some of the kingdom's industrial and agricultural installations."

It should be mentioned that the kingdom's primary reserve of phosphate deposits is estimated at about 4.470 billion tons, with a phosphorus oxides concentration of 19.4 percent. Of this, 310 [million] tons are proved reserves in the al-Jalamid area, with 23 percent phosphorus pentoxide.

Preliminary economic feasibility studies of al-Jalamid phosphates by the General Administration of Mineral Wealth in cooperation with the American geological mission are known to include: geological studies, engineering studies, ore treatment, and an economic study.

An 8.3-square-km section of the al-Jalamid area, containing 120 million tons of phosphate ore, was chosen for the study. The study indicated:

- Large, commercially exploitable resources consisting of phosphate deposits are present.

- Phosphate concentrates could be extracted either at a 33-percent phosphorus pentoxide concentration by flotation, or at a 35-percent phosphorus pentoxide concentration by heating (calcination).
- Nitrophosphate fertilizer industries could be established, based on the concentrates produced and with lower operating costs than in other countries.
- If such an industry is established in the kingdom, it will be the closest manufacturing site to Asian markets, which are expected to be among the world's largest consumption markets.

The deputy minister was accompanied on this tour by the assistant deputy minister for surveying and mineral prospecting, Dr. Muhammad As'ad Tawfiq, and the head of the American geological mission in the kingdom, Mr. Paul Williams, as well as a number of specialists and geologists from the ministry.

### SUDAN

#### More Administrative Changes in Key MFA Posts

92AF0205C London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
10 Dec 91 p 4

[Report by 'Uthman Mirghani]

[Text] London—Mr. 'Ali Muhammad 'Uthman Yasin, the first deputy of the Sudanese Foreign Ministry [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], issued a resolution on new appointments to senior posts of different administrations in the Ministry. The senior posts of four out of nine administrations were given to supporters of the National Islamic Front [NIF] who entered the ministry through political appointments.

The resolution specifies the appointment of Mr. Ahmad Sulayman as general director of the Political Affairs Administration in the Foreign Ministry. He will replace Ambassador Amin 'Abd-al-Latif. It was also decided to appoint Mr. Qutbi al-Mahdi as deputy general director of political affairs.

Ahmad Sulayman and Qutbi al-Mahdi are reportedly well-known elements of the NIF. They are not diplomatic cadres, but rather, they received political appointments to the Foreign Ministry.

The new resolution, which was issued last week, also specifies the appointment of Mr. Hashim al-Sayyid as chief of the African Administration. He, too, was granted an ambassadorship by political appointment.

In addition, Mr. 'Abd-al-Rahim al-[Talib] (who also became an ambassador by political appointment, not by coming up through the diplomatic corps) was appointed director of the Information Administration, and Dr. Ibrahim al-[Kabamashi] was appointed deputy general director of Technical Cooperation and Liaison.

Among the diplomatic cadres, Mr. al-Rashid Khadr was appointed director of the East Europe Administration,

and Mr. Muhammad 'Abdallah al-[Umarabi] was appointed director of the Training Administration, Mr. Ibrahim Ahmad Hamzah was appointed director of the Peace Administration, Mr. Faruq Mustafa was appointed director of the Islamic States Administration, Mr. Nuri Khalil Sadiq was appointed director of Technical Cooperation, and Dr. 'Ali Yusuf Ahmad was appointed director of the Protocol Administration.

The Foreign Ministry saw many dismissals and appointments last month.

A former Sudanese diplomat told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that purges from the Foreign Ministry since June 1989 have reduced the number of diplomats in the ministry from 320 to 160.

The diplomat added that 38 of the ministry's 55 ambassadors have been dismissed, while a number of ambassadors who are not diplomats have entered the ministry through political appointments.

He accused the NIF of "acting to purge diplomatic cadres and attempting to take control of the Foreign Ministry."

### Emigrants to Libya Warned of Potential Perils

92AF0205A Khartoum AL-INQADH AL-WATANI  
in Arabic 21 Nov 91 p 5

[Text] "Libya is the land of all the Arabs." This is not an empty slogan. It is translated into reality in Libya. Any Arab can enter the Libyan Jamahiriyah without an entry visa and can live there in full freedom.

The Sudanese have benefitted from this policy more than citizens from other Arab countries because of the respect and esteem enjoyed by Sudanese abroad due to their self-confidence and sense of honor, and because of the close relations between the Libyan and Sudanese peoples. These relations were crowned recently by the declaration of integration between them.

In this report, we will add to the above statements the facts of our special investigation into the conditions of a large number of Sudanese emigrants in Libya.

Because our investigation reflects an unfavorable, adverse situation for a large group of Sudanese who emigrated to Libya, we must be painstaking in defining the reasons for the tragedies facing them. These Sudanese emigrated in search of work. They left with every hope of a comfortable entry that would rid them of life's mounting hardships. However, they have come to face a difficult, bitter reality,

This report aims to attract the attention of persons who wish to emigrate to Libya to obtain work, but lack work contracts, [and to inform them] so that they do not find themselves surprised by reality after arriving in Libya.

To be fair, we should say that the Libyan authorities have no role in this difficult reality, nor are they to be

blamed for it. On the contrary, they are enduring many hardships caused by the presence of large numbers of unemployed Arab citizens. However, they are nonetheless allowing everyone to compete for positions in the public and private sectors on an equal footing with Libyan citizens. Moreover, no one is denied entry into Libya, despite the presence there of many citizens from neighboring countries, especially Egypt and Sudan.

In short, as made clear by the information and comments obtained from officials and emigrants interviewed for this report, the emigrants themselves are primarily responsible for the difficulties which they are experiencing. Authorities of the Sudanese Interior Ministry Visa Department bear secondary responsibility.

The emigrants are responsible, because the vast majority of them go to Libya lacking academic qualifications, work contracts, and hard currency to cover their expenses.

The Visa Department in the Interior Ministry bears secondary responsibility because it has yet to establish criteria for Sudanese traveling abroad through Khartoum Airport or the Sudanese-Libyan border. It must do so to limit the perils to which emigres expose themselves, even in a situation where special treatment is accorded to Sudanese, as is the case for Sudanese wishing to enter Libya [a Sudanese requires no visa to enter Libya—FBIS].

It is particularly dangerous to travel through the desert via al-Kufrah. Many Sudanese who travel this route enter Libya without passports. When they cross the desert, they expose themselves to gangs of armed robbers and dehydration. Some become lost, most carry no money with them, and some have only the proceeds of the sale in al-Kufrah of the camels which they bring into Libya!

Many of them can find only marginal work in the streets and on the fringes of markets, such as selling newspapers and used clothes and shoes. Others engage in disgusting occupations, such as selling tobacco in the streets, which dishonors the image of the Sudanese citizen!

Thus, they face many problems, especially earning a livelihood and finding housing. They burden their relatives and friends who do have housing. Those having no friends and relatives with housing sleep in public squares, exposing themselves to enormous risks and sicknesses due to the cold and rain that characterize Libya's Mediterranean climate.

Others are cut off from all means after arriving in Libya and cannot even find a way to return to Sudan!

Sudanese who obtain work contracts after entering Libya are subject to Libyan law and treated as Libyan citizens. Accordingly, they must spend the Libyan dinars that they earn only in Libya, and are prohibited from converting them into hard currency through the bank. At best, they can buy goods and commodities in the Libyan



market and send them to Sudan. Or, they attempt to obtain dollars illegally in the black market. In the latter case, the buyer risks being fleeced by counterfeit currency middlemen and having his money confiscated at the airport.

#### Interviews With Sudanese

In my tour of Tripoli, I met with a number of Sudanese emigrants. Some had been in Libya for several years, others for several months. However, all of them have shared the same or similar situation as that mentioned at the beginning of this report. The following is a sampling of the persons whom I met.

#### Al-Tum 'Abd-al-Rahman Khabir

[AL-INQADH AL-WATANI] When did you come to the Jamahiriyah?

[Al-Tum 'Abd-al-Rahman Khabir] I came here in 1971 on loan from the Office of Employment for Sudanese Working Abroad. I am now working in commerce.

We then discussed the conditions of his fellow Sudanese. Al-Tum says that the worst problem is not being able to convert their incomes into hard currency. People end up putting their money into expensive clothes. He called for the speedy establishment of a joint bank to facilitate remittances.

Al-Tum says that most Sudanese arrive in Libya without qualifications and are forced to engage in marginal occupations such as selling tobacco, newspapers, and shoes. Some of them turn to selling drugs and stealing cars. The absence of a Sudanese club exposes some to many hardships. People do not find housing and are forced to spend the night in public squares and parks, exposing themselves to death as a result of the cold.

#### Interviews at the Consulate

We went to the consular section at the Sudanese embassy in Tripoli and met with Mahmud Bashir al-Nayir, the chief of the consular section, and Muhammad 'Abdallah Idris, the deputy chief of the section. We presented them with the problems that we wanted to discuss about the conditions of Sudanese in Libya, and which are mentioned at the start of this report. As soon as we seated ourselves in the section chief's office, Muhammad 'Abdallah Idris hastened to say that Sudanese are generally welcome in Libya, but the degree of welcome depends on the immigrant's occupation.

"Professionals have no trouble finding work or assimilating into Libyan society. Non-professionals lacking degrees or qualifications have great trouble finding work. They turn to marginal professions. Instead of benefitting themselves or their families in Sudan, they become dependent on others. Most of the time, they become dependent on Sudanese families in Libya, many of which are experiencing difficult living conditions themselves.

"Non-professionals constitute the vast majority of Sudanese in Libya. Most of them come through Malit or Hamrat-al-Shaykh to al-Kufrah, usually without passports. The Libyan authorities at the border permit Sudanese citizens to enter on any identity document.

"The roads from Hamrah al-Shaykh and Malit to al-Kufrah pass through the desert. People die in traffic accidents and armed robberies. There is a problem identifying the bodies of Sudanese citizens, because they lack identity papers and are indistinguishable from many Africans who travel on the road between al-Kufrah and Benghazi. We are thus determined to stress the need to prohibit citizens from travelling unless they have official papers and documents.

"We also stress the need to investigate those who leave Khartoum for Libya, because habitual criminals travel to Libya and damage Sudan's reputation, as well as some women who come via Cairo."

Muhammad 'Abdallah then turned to problems faced by Sudanese workers in Libya when they attempt to bring goods back into Sudan. He called on local authorities in the Darfur Region and the Kordofan Region to facilitate the entry of these goods, because they can help solve many difficulties in these two regions, especially since there is a commercial protocol between Sudan and Libya, and these [persons attempting to bring goods into Sudan] have no other alternative, due to the difficulty of converting [their Libyan dinars into hard currency].

"Sudanese who work under Libyan employment contracts are compelled to spend their salaries in Libyan dinars. Because they cannot convert their salaries through official channels, they find it difficult to meet the Sudanese Government's requirement to remit a certain portion of their wages. Efforts are being made in cooperation with the Agency for the Affairs of Workers Abroad to find a solution.

"Sudanese employees on loan who work under official employment contracts also complained recently that the percentage of their salaries which they are required to remit is too high. The Agency for the Affairs of Workers Abroad responded to our request to lower the percentage and set new categories. Sudanese citizens working in Libya have received this measure favorably."

#### Students

[AL-INQADH AL-WATANI] Does anything prevent Sudanese students from studying in Libya? Can students who interrupt their studies in Sudan to join their families in Libya adjust to the curriculum and pedagogical method in Libya?

[Muhammad 'Abdallah Idris] There are more than 2,000 Sudanese students in Libyan universities and institutions of higher education, and they have no problems of note. However, we have recently noticed that a large number of Sudanese high school graduates have come to

Libya to gain admission to Libyan universities and institutions of higher education.

We tell them that they can gain admission to Libyan universities either through scholarships granted by the great Jamahiriya, for which competitions are conducted in Sudan, or by directly applying to Libyan universities. There are many Libyan universities, including al-Fatih Nasir University in Tripoli; 7 April University in al-Zawiyah and the Gulf of Surt and Sabha; Qar Yunis in Banghazi, 'Umar al-Mukhtar, and al-Bayda'. There are also a large number of institutions of higher education.

Regarding adjustment to schools in Libya, we have the problem of Sudanese citizens trying to have their children admitted to Libyan schools without having certified diplomas for their children. They then ask us to certify them!

We tell them that they must have these diplomas certified by the Foreign Ministry or the Education Ministry in any region in Sudan, be it in Khartoum, Central Region, Kordofan, or others. These diplomas must state that the student successfully passed a given academic stage or academic year and was advanced to the next class, because the pertinent agencies here in Libya are not satisfied with a statement saying only that the student passed.

#### A Consulate in Banghazi

[AL-INQADH AL-WATANI] In our meetings with fellow Sudanese in Banghazi, we frequently heard the complaint that the consulate focuses its activity only in Tripoli and disregards Sudanese working in other Libyan cities. The latter have thus experienced the additional hardship of having to travel to Tripoli to take care of their consular business. Could you comment on this matter?

[Mahmud Bashir al-Nayir] Efforts are being made to open a Sudanese consulate in Banghazi to handle and monitor the problems of citizens in eastern Libya, given the presence of large numbers of Sudanese in Banghazi, Surt, Sabha, Ajdabiya, al-Bayda', and other cities, because citizens truly suffer from having to come from these areas to Tripoli to take care of their consular business.

These people need an official presence in the area, because their employers do not let them leave work for more than a day, if at all, and because most of the trucks that transport citizens and goods by land from Libya to Sudan leave from Banghazi and Ajdabiya.

In addition, the consulate is now sending teams to tour outside Tripoli to learn about and solve citizens' problems of citizens and to handle their consular business in their locations.

#### What Is the Ambassador's Opinion?

[AL-INQADH AL-WATANI] Finally, I went to 'Abbas Ibrahim al-Nur, Sudan's ambassador in Tripoli. We spoke with him about the conditions of Sudanese in Libya and asked him to shed light on them.

[Abbas Ibrahim al-Nur] First, let me emphasize to the people and brothers in Sudan that the great Jamahiriya is the land of all Arabs. It has affirmed this by receiving Arabs without requiring an entry visa or residence permit. Sudanese in Libya feel at home physically and linguistically.

However, we advise those wishing to come to the Jamahiriya to find work and solve personal problems that employment opportunities are limited. The Jamahiriya's infrastructure of roads, housing, and communications has been completed. There are no new projects requiring manpower. Existing projects, such as the Great Man-made River, are being carried out by large machines.

Unemployed Sudanese outnumber employed Sudanese two to one. Every Sudanese household has three or more unemployed persons. We advise Sudanese wishing to migrate to the Jamahiriya to first obtain a work contract and housing. Otherwise, they will add more [unemployed] workers.

[AL-INQADH AL-WATANI] What about currency conversion?

[Abbas Ibrahim al-Nur] Conversions are a problem for those wishing to convert their incomes into dollars. Such conversions would be enormously costly for the Libyan Jamahiriya, because the Central Bank rate is 1 Libyan dinar for every \$3. All Arabs are treated as Libyans. Nonetheless, our follow-up to solve this problem is proceeding well, but it has not been completed.

Another problem regarding conversions is that most Sudanese citizens lack money to convert, because they spend most of their money on guests.

[AL-INQADH AL-WATANI] What remedies does the embassy have for those who come here without official documents?

[Abbas Ibrahim al-Nur] The lack of official documents is a serious matter for anyone involved in an accident or any problem. The embassy issues some temporary documents. However, for those who die in accidents, the embassy can do nothing. Frequently, we transmit cables sent by the Foreign Ministry on behalf of persons who have lost their relatives, and we do not know whether they are dead or alive. Most of them come via al-Kufrah in the desert. Some of them ask the embassy to return them to the Sudan, but the embassy has nothing to pay them.

Those who wish to come to the Jamahiriya as tourists or for medical treatment can do so easily. There is good transportation and there are good, organized tours, especially through the Libyan and Sudanese airlines.

### Foreign Financing Needed for Power Generation

92AF0205B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
13 Dec 91 p 10

[Report by Muhammad Ibrahim Tahir]

[Text] Khartoum—Sudan is attempting to obtain foreign financing to implement electricity projects to double the country's electrical capacity by the year 2000. Studies show that Sudan will need 1,000 megawatts [MW] of power by 2000, while current capacity is only 260 MW of thermal energy and 227 MW of electrical energy.

It has been decided to complete the fourth energy project at the Bahri [North Khartoum] Station northeast of Khartoum by December 1993. Work on this station, which now uses gas turbines to produce 60 MW, started in April 1989. The turbines were donated to Sudan by the Italian Government. They operate alongside commercial turbines costing \$105 million, of which the African Development Bank provided \$53 million and the World Bank provided \$40 million. When finished in December 1993, the Bahri Station's capacity will total 220 MW. Efforts are now being made to obtain financing for the fifth and sixth energy expansion projects, each of which is slated to have a 60-MW capacity.

To establish the fifth energy unit, the Sudanese Government applied to the African Development Bank for \$70 million in financing. It also applied to the European Bank for financing for the sixth energy project.

However, Sudan is now moving toward hydroelectric power, because it is cheaper than thermal generation. In this context, the \*al-Hamdab [?] reservoir project is considered the only possibility for solving Sudan's energy crisis. It is scheduled to be built during 1995-2000 and will have a capacity of between 600 and 1,000 MW. Under an earlier plan, this project was to have been begun before 1995 to cover Sudan's electricity deficit.

Another power generation project is the upper 'Atbarah River Reservoir project (the Setit Reservoir). It will facilitate additional storage in the Khashm al-Qirbah Reservoir in eastern Sudan and provide about 20 MW or 70 MW of hydroelectric power, depending on the design to be agreed upon. This project was incorporated in the 1987-1990 plan, but it has been completely neglected.

Initial studies conducted in 1984 regarding the al-Hamdab Reservoir project indicate that, if this reservoir is not built by 2000, a thermal generation station with a 300-MW capacity will have to be built. According to initial estimates, this alternative will cost about \$300 million [to build] and will produce 1,700 MW/hour yearly at a cost of \$60 million per year for operating fuel.

The construction of such a thermal station would entail the continued importation of fuel to meet domestic energy needs at a time when the country is burdened by such imports. The envisioned station would require the importation of 1,800 tons of fuel per day, transported by two

trains daily from Port Sudan to Khartoum, while existing thermal stations are supplied by one train per day.

The trend toward building a thermal station to provide Sudan's energy needs during the decade will require a re-examination of the existing rail transportation capabilities. Projected needs call for 20 locomotives, eight switching locomotives, and about 400 container cars to transport fuel from Port Sudan to Khartoum.

This will, in turn, necessitate the further expansion of production channels, and then the expansion of crude oil storage and refinement capacities at the Port Sudan refinery, which was built in 1961 and now suffers from many defects. The cost of refurbishing production lines at the oil refinery at Port Sudan is estimated at about \$400 million.

It is to be noted that Sudan has suffered from continuous power outages since 1982. As a result of electrical disruptions during this critical period, Sudanese industrial production has declined, industrial capacity utilization dropped to 35-40 percent, and close to 27 percent of electrical equipment and appliances in organizations and homes have been damaged.

### UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

#### Crown Prince Re-Forms Executive Council

92AE0123A Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic  
26 Nov 91 pp 1, 21

[Article: "Khalifah Promulgates Law Creating Economy and Customs Departments, Decree Re-Forming Executive Council in Abu Dhabi"]

[Text] His Highness Shaykh Khalifah Bin-Zayid Al Nuhayyan, crown prince of Abu Dhabi, deputy supreme commander of the Armed Forces, and head of the Executive Council in his capacity as deputy to the ruler of Abu Dhabi, has promulgated Law 3 of 1991, creating departments of economy and customs. The law provides for each of these departments to be responsible for drafting its system of regulations, rules of procedure, and administrative structure prior to their being promulgated by royal decree, as provided in Law 1 of 1974. The law provides that it shall go into force from its date of promulgation and publication in the official gazette and that every provision at variance with its provisions shall be rendered null and void.

His Highness also promulgated a decree to re-form the Executive Council of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi under His Highness's chairmanship. The text of the decree is as follows:

The Executive Council of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi is re-formed under our chairmanship. The following ministers shall be members:

- Shaykh Sultan Bin-Zayid Al Nuhayyan, deputy chairman and head of the Department of Works;

- Shaykh [Tahnun] Bin-Muhammad Al Nuhayyan, deputy chairman and head of the Department of Municipal Government and Agriculture at al-'Ayn;
- Shaykh Surur Bin-Muhammad Al Nuhayyan, head of the Department of Water and Electricity;
- Shaykh Sa'id Bin-Zayid Al Nuhayyan, head of the Department of Harbors;
- Shaykh Sultan Bin-Khalifah Bin-Zayid Al Nuhayyan, chief of the diwan of His Highness the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, member;
- Shaykh Muhammad Bin-Butti Al Hamid, head of the Department of Abu Dhabi Municipal Government and City Planning;
- Muhammad [Habrush] al-Suwaydi, head of the Department of Finance;
- Shaykh Sa'id Bin-Tahnun Al Nuhayyan, member;
- Sayf Bin-Ahmad al-Hamili, head of the Department of Social Services and Commercial Buildings;
- Shaykh Khalifah Bin-Hamdan Al Nuhayyan, head of the Department of Economy; 11.
- Shaykh Hamdan Bin-Mubarak Al Nuhayyan, head of the Department of Civil Aviation;
- 'Ali Bin-Ahmad al-Zahiri, member;
- Muhammad Salih Bin-[Badwuh], head of the Department of Customs;
- Muhammad Sultan Bin-Surur al-Zahiri, head of the Department of Organization and Administration;
- Khalfan Ghayth Khalfan al-[Muhayrabi], head of the Department of Purchases;
- Muslim Sa'id 'Abdallah al-Qabisi, head of the Department of Planning.

His Highness Shaykh Khalifah Bin-Zayid Al Nuhayyan promulgated a royal decree appointing Shaykh Ahmad Bin-Sayf Al Nuhayyan deputy in the Department of Civil Aviation, and another decree transferring Hadif Muhammad Hawfan al-Mansuri, deputy in the Department of Harbors, to the diwan of the representative of the ruler of Abu Dhabi in the Western Region, with the title of department deputy.

His Highness also promulgated a decree appointing Hasan Musa al-[Qamzi] deputy in the Department of Harbors, and another royal decree appointing Jum'ah Sa'id Harib deputy in the Department of Municipal Government and Agriculture in al-'Ayn.

His Highness Shaykh Khalifah Bin-Zayid Al Nuhayyan also promulgated a royal decree appointing Shaykh Hamad Bin-Tahnun Al Nuhayyan to the General Organization for Industry, with the rank of department deputy.

His Highness promulgated another royal decree restructuring the managing board of the General Organization for Industry as follows:

- Shaykh Hamad Bin-Tahnun Al Nuhayyan, chairman;
- Sa'id Quraysh al-Mazru'i, deputy chairman;
- Suhayl Suhayl Faris al-Mazru'i, member;
- Muhammad Daghir al-[Marar], member;
- 'Ali Sayf al-Nasiri, member;

- Al-Tahir Musbah al-Kindi al-[Marar], member;
- 'Isa 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Atiq, general director of the organization, member;
- Muhammad 'Abdallah Salih al-Suwaydi, member;
- 'Abdallah Yusuf 'Abdallah al-[Zi'abi], member.

His Highness promulgated a royal decree making Shaykh Muhammad Bin-Butti Al Hamid representative of the ruler of Abu Dhabi in the Western Region, responsible for the affairs of the Jabal al-Zannah region, in addition to the Western Region.

These decrees provide for their implementation from the date of their promulgation and publication in the official gazette.

### Parliamentary Life Buds Again in Gulf

92AE0137A *Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic*  
21 Nov p 9

[Commentary by Muhammad Muhammad Sa'id al-Sahi, member of UAE (United Arab Emirates) National Assembly: "Parliamentary Life Buds Again in Gulf"]

[Text] When the Arab man experiences an occurrence or an incident, or hears news about an invention he can say: "My Arab forefathers were there before."

When the media reported news of the peace conference, when the Arab man looked toward Madrid and reminisced over the historical past, he wasn't only remembering the sculptures, inscriptions, and drawings for which the Arabs were famous in their architectural art, and which bring to mind the ancient palaces and gardens. But he also reminisces with sadness and pain over past memories when the Arab and Islamic civilization was at its peak, embraced all branches of knowledge and established political regimes of which the Arab and Islamic culture was proud.

When I heard the glad tidings from the media on Friday morning, 15 November 1991, that parliamentary life, with the approval of the Custodian of the Two Holy Places would shortly be restored in the sisterly Kingdom of Saudi Arabia within a few weeks, I was overjoyed and felt that parliamentary life was again budding in the Arab Gulf. The beginning of this revival was the establishment of the Omani Consultative Council, the Kuwaiti National Assembly, the Qatari Advisory Council, and the UAE National Assembly. It is hoped that the Bahraini National Council will be restored to its previous status alongside its brothers in the Gulf. We in the Gulf are looking forward to the joy of seeing a united GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] parliament.

It is neither strange nor a distant hope for our generous Arab Gulf to practice parliamentary life. We will not be exaggerating when we say that the sons of the Gulf have experienced and practiced parliamentary life, as this is evident in our historical roots. This is because the Arab Gulf belongs to the Arab civilization that once prevailed and which is linked to the Pharaonic, Babylonian, and Assyrian civilizations, as



well as the Yemeni civilization when the Arabs in the Arabian Peninsula practiced parliamentary life. The Holy Koran has referred to this in the story of the rule of Queen Sheba who did not make any decision except after consultation with the people. This is categorical proof that the practice of the principle of consultation is historically rooted in the Arabian Peninsula and the Arab Gulf. God Almighty said in al-Naml chapter [surah of the Koran]: "She said: 'No affair have I decided except in your presence'." [27:30-38]

When the dawn of Islam broke and the Islamic call [da'wah] in Madinah became strong, the Prophet established the Islamic state and laid down its constitution in the famous document. In it, he explained the political regime of the Islamic state. The Holy Koran has established the principle of consultation in the Almighty's saying "consult them in the affair," and His saying: "conduct their affairs by mutual consultation." [Koran 17:38] On the basis of the Koran, the Prophet decided on the principle of consultation. He consulted his companions on all matters of life, whether peace, war, or personal dealings. The companions and the caliphs after the Prophet pursued this path. A woman confronted the powerful and just caliph 'Umar Ibn-al-Khattab. The outcome of the encounter was his famous saying: "The woman was right and 'Umar was wrong." Although later some changes occurred in parliamentary practice, the tree of parliamentary life in the Arab homeland and its Gulf did not die; it remained alive but has been practiced in different manners and forms in our contemporary life.

In the Arab Gulf, and especially in the United Arab Emirates, parliamentary life is still being practiced in a normal manner and even more directly through the Emir's audiences in every emirate, and during field tours when the ruler meets the people and the citizen expresses his views and gives advice to the ruler in front of those attending and without being interrupted. This method is the sound practice of consultation and democracy which is lacking in many Third World and developed countries. In our system, the citizen faces the ruler directly and expresses his views for the benefit of the safety, security, and interest of the homeland.

At the inception of the UAE, those who prepared its constitution did not overlook the principle of the people practicing consultation and democracy. Its articles provide for the establishment of a legislative authority alongside the executive body, namely the UAE National Assembly. Political actions in the UAE are carried out through the UAE Supreme Council, the cabinet, the National Assembly, and the judiciary authority.

As we look to the future permanent constitution, the committee charged with studying the constitution is taking into consideration the principle of consultation and democracy that is rooted in our long history of practicing parliamentary life.

It is hoped that soon the tree of consultation and democracy in our generous Gulf will bear good fruit.

Tomorrow is unlike yesterday, and whoever is waiting for tomorrow won't wait for long.

### Wadi Zikt Dam Nears Completion

92WN0186Z Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic  
18 Nov 91 p 5

[Article by Mahmud 'Abd-al-Karim: "Wadi Zikt Dam Construction Has Entered Final Phases, 3 Million Cubic Meters of Water To Be Impounded That Used To Drain Uselessly Into Gulf"]

[Text] The countdown has begun to the completion of Wadi Zikt dam, one of the dams that Citizen-Sultan 'Ali al-'Uways has undertaken to construct in al-Fujayrah. It is the second dam that al-'Uways is erecting in the area, with work also proceeding on Wadi al-Tawiyayn dam in the al-Tawiyayn area of al-Fujayrah.

Signs and information indicate that the building of Wadi Zikt dam has reached its final stages. The building of the main body of the dam has been completed, and work is proceeding on its subsidiary parts.

The decision to build Wadi Zikt dam at this site was subject to strict technical, economic, and social criteria. It is about 6.5 km inland from the village of Dadna, which, in turn, is about 50 km from the city of al-Fujayrah.

The dam, which will cost a total of 28.641 million Emirian dirhams, is approximately 230 m high and 21 m high, with a base 145 m wide. It will store 3 million cubic meters of water. The dam can feed an area of 23 hectares [figure as published; possibly the area of the dam's lake—FBIS].

Hundreds of farm owners throughout the area will benefit from the dam. It will also provide millions of gallons of drinking water to residents of the valley, Dadna, and nearby areas. It thus counts as one of the huge dams being erected in various areas of the country for maximum utilization of water resources. It will also have an important safety function, protecting the area's residents from the danger of flash floods, which used to rush down from high in the region's mountains on their way to draining uselessly into the sea.

Expressing their feelings about the huge project, citizens in the Wadi Zikt area said that its main benefit will be clearly visible when runoff comes down from the mountains. It will provide large amounts of water that will work to increase the country's green area.

### It Will Protect Our Homes From Floods

Sa'id 'Abdallah Rashid, a Wadi Zikt resident whose home lies in the middle of the area scheduled to become the dam's lake, and who works gathering honey from the mountains, said: "The dam will be a great blessing, for the runoff used to rush down from the mountains and make its way into the valley, which would lead the water to flow uselessly into the sea. The water would go to

waste; no one would benefit from it, except that it would irrigate farms on the day of the downpour."

He added: "The dam project will make the water that used to flow toward the sea stop behind the dam. It looks like a giant in relation to the mountains that surround it on both sides. Much water will thus be provided to be used year round. It can be used in times of drought and when there is no rain."

He said: "The heavy rain that used to cause flash floods has not fallen for three or four years, but we hope to God that this year's rains will be more than those of previous years."

Seventy-year-old Khamis Bin- Hammud, a Wadi Zikt elder who was born in the area, said: "The dam is a great project undertaken by a man dedicated to his country and the people of his country, one who knows the cost of losing a drop of water and also knows what the tremendously powerful runoff from the mountains means for homes and people. The dam will, therefore, be very beneficial to us all."

He said: "One year the rain fell on the valley and drowned our crops and flocks. The water entered our houses and ruined everything in them. The electricity was out for days. The water finally made its way to the sea without any benefit; instead, there was great damage that year. However, with the building of this great project, the benefit from impounding such great amounts of water will increase, and the danger of homes collapsing and farms being inundated will decrease."

#### Preventing Water Waste

The elderly retiree Sulayman 'Abdallah Sulayman, who is about 70 years old, said: "The dam will stop the runoff. It will provide us with abundant drinking water that can be used for months, rather than being lost in this way."

He added: "The dam comes to protect our farms and houses. Not a year used to pass without their being hit by torrents rushing down from high in the mountains into the valley, carrying boulders that would smash everything in their path. However, with the presence of the dam that has been beautifully engineered so that the solid mountain was utilized as part of its structure, we shall no longer fear the torrents. Given the dam, they will be a blessing from God!"

Sixty-year-old Muhammad Bin-Ahmad, who owns a farm in lower Wadi Zikt, said: "I have suffered greatly from water shortage in recent years, although my farm is located at the end of a valley that was renowned for abundant water. However, several years have passed—praise God!—in which there has been little water. But God has sent us this good man, Sultan al-'Uways, to erect a dam in our area, which greatly needs water. It will protect our homes from the danger of the flash floods that used to sweep down from high in the mountains surrounding our village on every side. With their swiftly-moving heavy stones and boulders, these floods would

sweep away and destroy everything in their path, including our houses, on the way to the sea, where their large amounts of water went to waste."

'Ali Bin-'Abdallah, who also has a farm in the area, said: "Years have past in which we have not seen the runoff that used to come to us every year from the mountains. We have thus lost many crops. For a long time we have stopped planting, because the market has been hurt and no longer has any commercial value worth mentioning. It became so bad that we were taking a crate of okra to Dubayy, and the merchant would take it for a dirham a crate. Is that reasonable? We pray that our rulers and this good man may be granted long lives and good health. He has not been remiss, but has built this giant dam in our valley to protect our homes and provide water for drinking and farming. We pray that God will send the valley lots of rain this year and that the dam will fill with water to compensate us for long years of drought."

Ahmad 'Uthman Mubarak, who works in the water department and supervises the water plant that supplies the residents of the valley, said: "The dam will bring benefit to the people. It will impound large amounts of water to benefit people, crops, and livestock. We suffered greatly from the flood danger that kept us sleepless every winter. With the completion of this big dam this year, we believe there will no longer be any danger of flooding, but rather great benefit."

#### European, Gulf Experts Discuss Ports

92AE0128A Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 30 Nov 91 p 2

[Article: "Foreign Experts Affirm: Country's Ports Play Prominent Role in International Shipping; Linking Ports with Railway Network Urgent Necessity"]

[Text] From its inception, the United Arab Emirates [UAE] has paid special attention to the construction and development of airports and ports under the country's plan to build basic infra-structure projects in fields such as health, education, roads, bridges, and construction facilities.

The country continued to develop, modernize, and expand its various ports and airports since it is the gateway to the Gulf and, consequently, needs to prepare its air and maritime accesses to perform this role. This is not only a service to the UAE's economy and trade, but is a service to the economy and trade of all the Gulf countries. Re-export trade statistics confirm this, having risen from 7.3 billion Emirian dirhams in 1988 to 9.3 billion dirhams in 1989, subsequently reaching 11.6 billion dirhams in 1990.

Moreover, UAE ports played the leading role in securing Kuwait's requirements and imports during the period when its own ports became inoperative.

In the opinion of European and Gulf experts, UAE's ports, assuming continuing modernization, expansion, and development—especially in Dubayy, Abu Dhabi

and al-Fujayrah—are capable of playing the same role as Dutch ports, especially Rotterdam. Most of Europe's trade, approximately 229 million tons in 1989, passes through this Dutch port.

Those experts indicate that, for UAE ports to be able to play this role, they would require a railway to link them, especially al-Fujayrah port on the Gulf of Oman, with the various countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] to enable imports and exports go between any of these countries and UAE ports. The port of Rotterdam, which is linked by an integrated railway network, has this feature. Surface transport operations, which are more costly and less flexible than rail transport, presently fulfill this function.

Secondly, UAE ports require a collection of modern technical and administrative regulations which will provide security and safety for importers' and exporters' goods, saving them time and reducing their costs.

In the framework of UAE efforts to realize this aim, several steps have been taken recently, one of the most important being the unification of the administrations of Jabal 'Ali and Rashid ports into a single Department of Ports.

Another step, the appointment of Sheikh Sa'id Bin-Zayid Al Nuhayyan as chief of the Ports Department in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, was a fresh indication of the importance that the emirate accords to developing and elevating the role of Zayid port in the economic and commercial life of the UAE.

The important symposium on the ideal use of maritime, air, and surface accesses to the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, which the Abu Dhabi Chamber of Commerce and Industry conducted, is also considered a necessary and appropriate step for discussing ways of developing those accesses.

This symposium stressed the importance of integrating the storage and communications sectors with the surface, maritime, and air transport sectors to enable those accesses to play their role and rise to the responsibilities of economic and social development.

Treasury records stated that federal and local expenditures on the transport, storage, and communications sectors in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi were approximately 35 billion dirhams up to the end of 1990, or approximately 14.5 percent of the Emirate's total capital reserves; 242 billion dirhams.

They also stated that the UAE currently have 14 maritime ports, three of which, (Zayid, al-Sa'diyat and the free port), are in Abu Dhabi, in addition to five international airports.

The Abu Dhabi chamber's symposium pointed to the shrinking activities of surface, maritime, and air transport during the Gulf crisis, due to the closure of some surface and air corridors and the huge increase in insurance premiums, especially on maritime transport.

It added that the share of the transport, communications, and storage sectors amounted to approximately 6.5 percent of the gross local product, excluding crude oil, for the Emirate of Abu Dhabi in 1985. It then rose to 8.1 percent in 1990. Naturally, the numerical increase in the volume of foreign trade in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi gives a clear idea of the importance of developing maritime, air, and surface accesses in the emirate. Overall foreign trade rose from 6.37 billion dirhams in 1985 to 6.93 billion dirhams in 1986, and then to 7.6 billion dirhams in 1988, going on to more than 10 billion dirhams in 1989. The foreign trade figures include the value of imports, then the value of exports and re-exports, and the value of transit goods.

The symposium also discussed the role of insurance companies and the Maritime Ports Authority in limiting maritime losses. The various situations that lead to losses and maritime damage were delineated. Some are caused by the goods themselves, like when the goods do not fit their container, or when the goods' natural and chemical specifications are not taken into consideration. Some relate to transport, like lack of coordination or failure to follow procedures; while others are caused by the ports, like pile ups, failure to employ modern handling and delivery procedures, poor storage, and others.

## REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

### President Salih on Domestic, Foreign Policy

92AE0118A Paris AL-FURSAN in Arabic  
25 Nov 91 pp 22-24

[Interview by 'Atif 'Awdah in Sanaa; date not given]

[Text] Sanaa—Sanaa is currently experiencing profound changes and fundamental transformations stemming primarily from the unification of the north and south, which has become a tangible reality in the life of unified Yemen. These rapid, successive changes have coincided with the difficult circumstances created by the Gulf war, which have affected Yemen as they have other Arab countries. This has generated a broad debate in Yemen on numerous issues, and a lively discussion on democracy, the next legislative elections, the economic crisis, the unity government's way of handling the economic crisis, and the future of Yemen's Arab and international relations.

We brought the gist of this discussion to Lieutenant General 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, the President of the Council of the Presidency, hoping to find clear answers to persistent questions being asked in Yemen. The interview took place at the headquarters of the General People's Conference, which is the party that formed following unification under President Salih's leadership. Before the interview, the president's information office informed us that the answers would be written, and that the meeting would be only a protocol meeting. However, during the interview, President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih welcomed AL-FURSAN and expressed his willingness to

respond directly to any question. The interview was conducted accordingly. It touched on various domestic and Arab issues, and was conducted in the presence of the editor-in-chief of the 26 SEPTEMBER newspaper, Colonel 'Ali Hasan al-Shatir, and the president's press advisor, 'Abduh Burji. The following is the text of the interview:

[Awdah] It has now been 18 months since the historical achievement of unification. How do you view the future?

[Salih] We are optimistic about the future despite the economic difficulties now facing the unified state. Unification has created for our people a new climate for building and achievement. It has unleashed the people's enormous energies in the fields of national giving and the model exploitation of resources and capabilities.

Unification has constituted an integrated, cultural, renaissance plan that has embodied the people's will and aspirations to embark on the path of progress and flourishing.

[Awdah] Yemen is witnessing a remarkable democratic development. What are the rules of democratic life in Yemen? How do you evaluate the practice of democracy in the light of past experiences?

[Salih] Democracy is the national choice for building [the nation]. It is the basis of the unified state and one of the guarantees of Yemeni unity. We are happy with the democracy that our country has achieved, which allows all of the people's different political groups, organizations, and political forces to express themselves clearly and firmly, and to share national decisionmaking responsibility in actualizing the principle of government by the people. Several problems have emerged regarding the practice of democracy. These problems stem from an erroneous understanding of democracy on the part of some, and from the practice of democracy in an erroneous, irresponsible manner. However, this is natural and can be rectified with more democratic practice, because there is no retreating ever from the democratic choice as a national, cultural method for building the new Yemen.

[Awdah] Is there any truth to rumors that the transitional period, which is supposed to end in November 1992, might be extended? What would be the reasons for such a postponement?

[Salih] Before unification, we signed an agreement setting the transitional period at two and a half years. We are now engaged in preparing a general elections draft law. It will take time for the draft to receive the discussion it deserves in the House of Representatives. We are optimistic that the transitional period will not end until after general elections have been held.

[Awdah] Unification was the fruit of the efforts of the People's Conference and the Socialist Party, and the coronation of a mutual political understanding between the leaderships of the two parts. Does this mutual

understanding still remain in effect? What are the bases of cooperation between the two leaderships? Is there a possibility of an alliance between them in the next elections?

[Salih] The General People's Conference and the Yemeni Socialist Party, both of which had the honor of actively participating in reunification together with the people, are now allies and partners in power based on the achievement of the highest national interest, the preservation of Yemeni unity, and the actualization of the principles of the Yemeni revolution. As for an alliance between them in the next elections, the General People's Conference, and [I am speaking] in my capacity as its general secretary, is calling for a broad alliance with the Socialist Party and all political parties and organizations, because this is dictated by Yemen's interest.

#### Guarantees of Fair Elections

[Awdah] What are the guarantees for the holding of fair, democratic elections that reflect the Yemeni people's aspirations?

[Salih] The elections draft law, which will be discussed in the House of Representatives, will furnish all guarantees for the holding of fair, democratic elections. Our country has experience in this. The ballot boxes will be the judge of all of the political parties and organizations, and they will give actual, concrete form to the Yemeni people's will and aspirations to build and achieve.

[Awdah] Yemen's nascent experiment in democracy following unification has been accompanied by several negative factors. What is your philosophy regarding the future deepening of popular participation in political life?

[Salih] I stated in a previous response that the democratic choice is absolutely the primary choice for building [the nation]. It is the best cultural means for active popular participation in building the new Yemen. If some practice democracy erroneously and irresponsibly, democracy itself will guarantee the rectification of these excesses.

[Awdah] Some are pointing to shortcomings in political and security performance in the country against the background of several recent, scattered incidents. How do you explain the nature of these incidents? How do you respond to rumors of the government's weak performance in this regard, and where are you looking for a solution to several security, political, or economic problems?

[Salih] Such incidents happen, and we expect them in light of the changes that unification has produced in the country, the region, the Arab world, and internationally. Some are pushing to incite unrest and undermine security in the society. These attempts are destined to fail, because the Yemeni people is aware of all of the dangers and challenges that surround its unification, principles, and democratic experiment.



In general, the government is engaged in taking measures to ensure public security and establish stability in society.

[Awdah] Yemen suffers from inherited and new economic problems. What is your government's policy to solve these problems, especially inasmuch as they have worsened due to the events in the Gulf? What has been done in efforts to merge the two armies into a single army?

[Salih] We are indeed suffering from difficult economic circumstances due to domestic and foreign factors, the most salient being the return of more than a million emigres as a result of the Gulf crisis. The leadership and the government are busily engaged in taking measures to remedy the economic situation in the country.

Regarding the merging of the army, the merger process has been carried out. The army is unified. Its command, administrations, and budget are unified. Remaining units are being merged through training and conscription centers. The process is proceeding well.

[Awdah] There is notable Arab and American interest in extracting oil from Yemen. In your estimation, when will this important economic factor enter the economic cycle? What is keeping this from happening?

[Salih] Oil is currently being produced in modest quantities. However, the results of the new oil explorations are good and a cause for optimism, especially in Hadramawt, Shabwah, and Ma'rib. Many American and European companies are exploring and drilling for oil in different areas of the republic, and the results augur well. Actually, investments in the oil field are major and require some time and effort before they yield results. It is only a matter of time.

#### What Several Newspapers Stated Is Incorrect

[Awdah] It has been noted that the formation of the unity government burdened the state budget, which led, according to opposition newspapers, to a number of resignations. Is there an intention to form a national government distinguished by competence and effectiveness, and which pays more attention to economic data than to the data imposed by the circumstances of unification?

[Salih] First, not everything written by party or other newspapers is correct. Some newspapers resort to sensationalism and instigation, relying on inaccurate information in their reports, including what you mentioned about resignations in the government. The current government—which is a unity government that includes good, national capabilities—is working hard to overcome all difficulties in the path of development, especially in the economy.

[Awdah] The Madrid Conference, which is one of the main results of the Gulf war, is approaching. How do you view the prospects of a just settlement of the Palestinian issue based on Yemen's clear policy on it?

[Salih] We in Yemen welcome the convocation of any peace conference, and we have welcomed the Madrid Conference. We hope that it will achieve all legitimate Arab rights, chief among which is the right of the Arab Palestinian people to establish an independent state on its national soil, based on UN resolutions. We hope that the efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union will result in this conference successfully fulfilling the Arabs' legitimate rights. This will be very important for the achievement of security, stability, and peace in the Middle East. As long as the Arab-Israeli conflict is not resolved on a just, enduring basis through the return of the occupied territories and the guarantee of the Palestinian people's legitimate rights, danger will continue to threaten security, stability, and peace in the region.

[Awdah] The Gulf war led to Arab-Arab interactions that are causing a rift in all relations. We find echoes of this rift in Yemeni newspapers, especially regarding relations with Saudi Arabia. How do you view putting an end to the collapse of these Arab relations and Yemeni-Gulf relations, especially relations with neighboring Saudi Arabia?

[Salih] Yemen always calls for Arab solidarity. The negative setbacks to the course of Arab-Arab relations that occurred during and after the Gulf crisis, including the setback in Yemen's relations with its Saudi neighbor, are regrettable. The Arabs must seek to bury and forget the past and to heal the wounds. This is the right way to begin repairing relations between brothers. For our part, we in Yemen—regarding our relations with the Saudi fraternal neighbor—nothing prevents us from, nor do we have reservations about, reaching a mutual understanding and seeking fraternal relations with the brothers in Saudi Arabia, inasmuch as this serves the common interest of the two neighboring, fraternal countries and the interest of the Arab nation.

[Awdah] Despite Iraq's compliance with all of the unjust conditions of the Security Council, the continuation of the economic blockade is harming the Iraqi people. How do you view an international, Arab action to eliminate the sufferings of the Iraqi people?

[Salih] The truth is that the continuation of the economic blockade against the Iraqi people, which is consequently suffering because of a lack of food and medicine, deviates from Security Council resolutions. There must be an Arab and international initiative to call for lifting the economic blockade and easing the suffering of the fraternal Iraqi people. There must be a humanitarian, just examination of the severe suffering of this Arab, Muslim people.

[Awdah] Experts predict the development of Yemen's relations with the European Community. How do you view the development of these relations amid the decisive influence of the unipolar order?

[Salih] Yemeni-European relations are witnessing continuous, uninterrupted development in a direction which strengthens those relations and expands fields of cooperation based on mutual benefits and the realization of

the common interests of the Yemeni people and the peoples of the EC countries.

[Awdah] Is there any development in Yemeni-American relations, against the backdrop of the tension stemming from the misunderstanding of Yemen's position on the Gulf war?

[Salih] Actually, some rift occurred in Yemeni-American relations during the Gulf crisis. However, these relations have not been affected adversely. Together, we are

making efforts to transcend the effects of that crisis. Relations are witnessing tangible, positive development day after day.

[Awdah] To what extent have international changes affected Arab national security?

[Salih] International changes have no doubt affected Arab national security. They should be absorbed and endorsed in the interest of strengthening that security. Arab national security is an indivisible whole, and it is the responsibility of all Arabs, without exception.

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